Bentley v. Bunton

Decision Date29 August 2002
Docket NumberNo. 00-0139.,00-0139.
PartiesBascom W. BENTLEY, III, Petitioner, v. Joe Ed BUNTON and Jackie Gates, Respondents.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Mike A. Hatchell, Molly H. Hatchell, Hatchell P.C., Tyler, George Chandler, Reich Chandler, Chandler Law Offices, Lufkin, Darrin M. Walker, Law Office of Darrin Walker, Kingwood, for Petitioner.

Robert L. Crider, Palestine, Armando De Diego, The Law Office of Armando De Diego, Dallas, Ronald D. Wren, Bedford, for Respondents.

Justice HECHT delivered the opinion for the Court with respect to Parts I, III, IV, and V, in which Justice OWEN, Justice BAKER (except for Part V-D), Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ joined, with respect to Part II, in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice ENOCH, Justice OWEN, Justice BAKER, Justice HANKINSON, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ joined, and with respect to Part VII, in which Chief Justice PHILLIPS, Justice ENOCH, Justice OWEN, Justice HANKINSON, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ joined, and an opinion with respect to Part VI, in which Justice OWEN, Justice JEFFERSON, and Justice RODRIGUEZ joined.

For months, the host of a call-in talk show televised on a public-access channel in a small community repeatedly accused a local district judge of being corrupt. A co-host on some of the shows expressed agreement with the accusations but never himself used the word "corrupt". The judge sued both of them for defamation. Based on conclusive proof that the accusations were false and defamatory, and on jury findings that the defendants acted with actual malice as well as a specific intent to cause injury, the trial court rendered judgment awarding the plaintiff actual and punitive damages assessed by the jury against each defendant separately. Notwithstanding the jury's finding that the defendants conspired together, the court refused to hold them jointly liable for the actual damages each caused. The plaintiff and both defendants appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against the talk show host who made the repeated accusations and reversed the judgment against his co-host.1 The liable defendant and the plaintiff seek review here.

The legal and evidentiary issues raised by the parties are too numerous and varied to summarize at this point, but principal among them are these:

• Does article I, section 8 of the Texas Constitution restrict liability for defamation of a public official more than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?

• Under the circumstances presented here, are accusations that a public official is corrupt actionable statements of fact or protected expressions of opinion?

• Can a person be liable for defamation if all he does is express agreement with another's defamatory statements?

• Were the accusations of corruption in this case false as a matter of law?

• Can a person who falsely accuses a public official of being corrupt be proved by clear and convincing evidence to have acted with actual malice despite his assertions that he sincerely believed the accusations?

• Under the circumstances, are awards of $7 million for mental anguish damages and $1 million punitive damages excessive as a matter of law either under Texas common law or the First Amendment?

We agree with the court of appeals that only the one defendant is liable for defamation, but we conclude that the jury's finding of $7 million in mental anguish damages has no evidentiary support and is excessive as a matter of law by constitutional standards. We remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

I

"Q&A", a live, ninety-minute, call-in television talk show, began broadcasting weekly in 1990 on a public-access channel available to cable subscribers in and between Palestine and nearby Elkhart, two towns in Anderson County in East Texas. At that time, the population of Palestine, the county seat, was about 18,000, and the population of Elkhart was just over 1,100.2 All of the participants in "Q&A" — including the self-described hosts, producer, director, investigators, reporters, and cameraman — were unpaid volunteers. The privately produced programs generally consisted of one or two hosts talking about various subjects of local interest, either by themselves or with guests or callers. Programs were often rerun during the week. Program content ranged from informational to editorial.

Defendant Joe Ed Bunton, a Palestine native, helped start "Q&A". Bunton had returned to Palestine several years earlier after college and fifteen years in the army, and had been elected to one term on the city council. He was defeated in his bid for re-election, as well as in three successive attempts to regain a seat on the council. After his first defeat, he became interested in public-access television as a means of increasing his involvement in grass-roots politics. Bunton began hosting "Q&A" programs in 1994. In his brief in this Court, Bunton describes "Q&A" as "a wide-open, sometimes caustic and/or an uncivilized public forum, which has become the electronic soapbox for Palestine, Texas.

In the spring of 1995, Bunton learned of a criminal case that had been pending for two years in the 369th District Court before Judge Bascom Bentley III, one of four judges whose districts included Anderson County. Bentley, himself a lifelong resident of the county, had been appointed to the district court in 1989, elected in 1990, and re-elected in 1994. He had previously served as Palestine city attorney, county attorney, and judge of the county court at law. The defendant in the case, a young man named Curbo, had been charged with robbery (purse-snatching), and in March 1993, Judge Bentley had placed him on what the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure calls "community supervision" — a kind of probation — for five years with his adjudication of guilt deferred.3 Barely eight weeks later, Curbo had been arrested for credit card abuse.4 Court records reflected that in June 1993 the district attorney filed a motion to adjudicate Curbo's guilt on the robbery charge and that Judge Bentley released Curbo on his personal recognizance — that is, without a surety bond5 — without ruling on the motion. From these records, Bunton surmised, without discussing the case with Curbo's lawyer or the district attorney, that Bentley's release of Curbo was improper, and furthermore, that Bentley had left the motion pending for criminal design: so that he could use the threat of further proceedings against Curbo to pressure Curbo's father, then a mayoral candidate, into acting as directed in the event he became mayor. Bentley, Bunton supposed, could control Curbo's father by threatening to adjudicate Curbo and sentence him to prison. Had Bentley been so motivated, his conduct would undisputedly have been criminal.6 In fact, however, Curbo's release without a surety bond had been requested by Curbo's lawyer without objection from the district attorney and was clearly within Bentley's discretion,7 and the case had remained pending because neither Curbo's probation officer nor the district attorney believed that Curbo, who suffered from learning disabilities, should be incarcerated. Accordingly, neither Curbo's lawyer nor the district attorney had ever requested a ruling on the motion to adjudicate. Moreover, Curbo's father was not elected mayor.

Bunton also learned early in 1995 that Anderson County Sheriff Mickey Hubert had refused to arrest one of his own deputies, Danny Harding, on a warrant that an assistant district attorney had helped procure without the approval of the district attorney, who had determined that evidence concerning Harding should first be presented to the grand jury. After what Bunton called an "investigation" of the circumstances, he concluded that Hubert had violated article 2.18 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ("Custody of Prisoners")8 8 and section 39.02(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code ("Abuse of Official Capacity"),9 even though the district attorney had had the warrant recalled. Bunton also concluded that Bentley, who had not issued the warrant and was in no way involved in the matter, was responsible for failing to convene a court of inquiry to determine whether Hubert had violated the law10 and to have him arrested.11

On the "Q&A" program broadcast on June 6, 1995, a videotape excerpt of which is in the record, Bunton announced that the topic for discussion would be "corruption at the courthouse". He charged that Bentley's release of Curbo and the delay in resolving the case "makes the system look corrupt". He asserted that his accusations against the judicial system in Anderson County were "true". He admonished Bentley to "clear this case off your docket and quit hanging it over these people's heads". He also discussed the Harding matter and explained why he thought Bentley and Hubert had both acted illegally. Bunton claimed to have made lengthy investigations of both matters, reviewing records and interviewing employees at the courthouse. He dared Bentley and Hubert to call in or come on the program and show that his allegations were untrue:

Bascom, you and Mickey call in and say it ain't true. Say, "Joe Ed, you're lying. You're telling untrue things about it." I dare you. You're welcome to come in here. You can come out here. You can call in here. The fact is, y'all are corrupt, y'all are the criminals, y'all are the ones that oughta be in jail.

After the program, Bentley telephoned Bunton's home and left word for him to call back. Bunton did not return the call. Bentley also called "Q&A" and asked a volunteer there to tell Bunton to stop calling him corrupt. The volunteer acknowledged that Bunton was "going too far" but said that Bunton was "out of control" and there was nothing to be done.

A videotape...

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