Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins Supervisors of Kendall County v. Post

Decision Date01 October 1876
Citation94 U.S. 260,24 L.Ed. 154
PartiesTOWN OF SOUTH OTTAWA v. PERKINS. SUPERVISORS OF KENDALL COUNTY v. POST
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Argued by Mr. P. Phillips and Mr. T. Lyle Dickey for the plaintiffs in error, by Mr. G. S. Eldridge for Perkins, and by Mr. D. T. Littler and Mr. H. Greene for Post.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

The first of these actions was brought by Perkins, the plaintiff below, to recover the amount due upon two negotiable bonds of the town of South Ottawa, in the usual form, for $1,000 each, made payable to the Ottawa, Oswego, and Fox River Valley Railroad Company, or bearer, in three years from July 1, 1869, with coupons for the semi-annual payment of interest attached. They each contained recitals as follows:——

'This bond is one of a series of twenty bonds, bearing even date herewith, each for the sum of $1,000, . . . and is issued in pursuance of an election held in said town, on the eighth day of October, 1866, under and by virtue of a certain act of the legislature of the State of Illinois, approved Feb. 18, 1857, entitled 'An Act authorizing certain cities, counties, incorporated towns and townships to subscribe to the stock of certain railroads,' . . . at which election a majority of the legal voters participating in the same voted 'for subscription' to the capital stock of said railroad in the sum of $20,000, and to issue the bonds of said town therefor; and the said election was by the proper authorities duly declared carried 'for subscription,' previous application having been made to the townclerk of the town, and said clerk having called said election in accordance therewith, and having given due notice of the time and place of holding the same, as required by law and the act aforesaid.'

The second action was brought on a bond issued by the county of Kendall, in Illinois, bearing date the fourth day of May, 1869, in aid of the same railroad, and by virtue of the same act of the legislature, and containing substantially the same recitals, mutatis mutandis, as those in the Ottawa bonds, except that the election authorizing the issue of the bonds is stated to have been held on the thirtieth day of March, 1869. The facts in the two cases are, in other respects, substantially the same.

The only authority claimed for issuing these bonds is the act referred to in the above recital therein. If no such act was ever passed by the legislature of Illinois, the bonds are void. A municipal corporation cannot issue bonds in aid of extraneous objects without legislative authority, of which all persons dealing with such bonds must take notice at their peril. Pendleton County v. Amy, 13 Wall. 297; Kenicott v. The Supervisors, 16 id. 452; St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 id. 644; Town of Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484.

It is insisted on the part of the plaintiffs in error in these cases that the law relied on for authority to issue the bonds in question was never passed, no entry of its passage appearing on the journal of the Senate of Illinois.

The Constitution of Illinois, adopted in 1848, contains the following provisions:——

'ART. 3, SECT. 1. The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a general assembly, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives, both to be elected by the people.'

'SECT. 3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish them. . . .'

'SECT. 21. . . . On the final passage of all bills, the vote shall be by ayes and noes, and shall be entered on the journal; and no bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of all the members elect in each house.'

The Constitution also provides that all bills passed shall be signed by the speakers of the two houses, and approved and signed by the governor, or, in case of his refusal, shall be repassed by a majority elected to each house. The general laws of the State provide for depositing all acts of the legislature, and the original journals of the two houses, in the office of the Secretary of State, who is charged with having them printed; and the printed statute-books are made evidence of the acts contained therein.

In the construction of the constitutional provisions above recited, the Supreme Court of Illinois, by a long course of decisions, has held that it is necessary to the validity of a statute that it should appear by the legislative journals that it was duly passed in the manner required by the Constitution.

As early as 1853, it was decided, in Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, that it was 'competent to show from the journals of either branch of the legislature that a particular act was not passed in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, and thus defeat its operation altogether. The Constitution requires each house to keep a journal, and declares that certain facts, made essential to the passage of a law, shall be stated therein. If those facts are not set forth, the conclusion is that they did not transpire. The journal is made up under the immediate direction of the house, and is presumed to contain a full and complete history of its proceedings. If a certain act received the constitutional assent of the body, it will so appear on the face of its journal. And when a contest arises as to whether the act was passed, the journal may be appealed to to settle it. It is the evidence of the action of the house, and by it the act must stand or fall. It certainly was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the signatures of the speakers and the executive should furnish conclusive evidence of the passage of a law. The presumption, indeed, is, that an act thus verified became the law, pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution; but that presumption may be overthrown. If the journal is lost or destroyed, the presumption will sustain the law, for it will be intended that the proper entry was made on the journal. But when the journal is in existence, and it fails to show that the act was passed in the mode prescribed by the Constitution, the presumption is overcome, and the act must fall.'

This case was followed, in 1855, by Turley v. County of Logan, 17 id. 151. There, a law was supposed to have been passed at the session of the legislature in 1853, for the removal of the seat of justice of Logan County, by a vote of the people. In the fall after, a vote was taken, which resulted in favor of the removal. Turley and his associates then filed their bill to restrain the county officers from erecting county buildings at the new location, on the ground that, as appeared by the journal, the act had not been read in the House of Representatives the full number of times required by the Constitution, and so was no law. The fact being as alleged, the injunction was, in the first instance, allowed, but afterwards, in February, 1854, the same legislature met in extra session, and, on recollection of members, and by the manuscript notes of the clerk, the House of Representatives amended its journal so that it showed the bill had been read the requisite number of times. Thereupon the Supreme Court, when the case came there, while recognizing fully the authority of Spangler v. Jacoby, affirmed a decree dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill, for the reason that it was within 'the power of the same legislature, at the same or a subsequent session, to correct its own journals, by amendments which show the true facts as they actually occurred.'

The same question was also considered by the same court in Prescott v. The Trustees of the Illinois & Michigan Canal, 19 id. 324, decided in 1857. There, Prescott and Arnold were entitled to purchase, at the appraised value, certain lots in Chicago, which had been appraised twice; and the point to be decided was, whether they should pay according to the first or second appraisal. The second appraisal was made under a law supposed to have been passed Feb. 14, 1851, but which the journals showed had never in fact passed either branch of the general assembly. Accordingly, the court held, upon the authority of Spangler v. Jacoby, that the second appraisal was invalid, and that the parties had the right to purchase under the first.

In the case of The Supervisors of Schuyler County v. The People, 25 id. 181, which came before the court in 1860, it was objected that the Senate journal did not show that the bill incorporating the railroad company was read three times in that body before it was put on its final passage; but the court, while still approving Spangler v. Jacoby, held that the Constitution did not require the fact that the bill had been read three times to be entered on the journals, and, consequently, that the validity of the law could not be impeached on that ground.

In 1864, in the case of The People ex rel. Barnes v. Starne, 35 id. 121, an application was made for a mandamus to compel the treasurer of the State to countersign, register, and pay a warrant issued upon him in favor of Barnes, the relator, by the auditor of public accounts. The warrant was issued upon the authority of what was supposed to be a statute of Illinois, approved Feb. 14, 1863, as compensation for transporting and bringing home certain wounded soldiers belonging to the State; but it being shown that the journal of the House of Representatives did not contain entries to the effect that the bill was passed by a majority of the members elect, or that the vote was taken by ayes and noes upon the final passage, the mandamus was refused. In the opinion of the court the authorities are extensively reviewed, and the rulings in the previous cases reaffirmed.

These cases were all decided before the issue of the bonds sued on in this case. But since that time two cases have arisen under the very law now in question, in which the Supreme Court of Illinois has decided that it...

To continue reading

Request your trial
134 cases
  • Enochs v. State ex rel. Roberson
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • 8 Octubre 1923
    ... ... from chancery court of Hinds county, HON. NILES MOSELEY, ... Special Chancellor ... 634; Carpenter v ... Perkins, 83 Conn. 11, 20; Parker v. Johnson, 37 ... Bliss, 113 A ... SOUTH ... CAROLINA--The inheritance tax law in this ... Miss. 575; Bridges v. Supervisors, 57 Miss. 255; Ex ... Parte Burden, 92 Miss ... ...
  • First Nat. Bank v. Obion County
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee
    • 28 Octubre 1924
    ...Loague, 129 U. S. 493, 9 S. Ct. 327, 32 L. Ed. 780; Barnett v. Dennison, 145 U. S. 135, 12 S. Ct. 819, 36 L. Ed. 652; South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154. It is further objected that the records are not offered. This objection would be good if the matters sought to be shown......
  • State v. Greer
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 9 Octubre 1924
    ... ... value ( County of Jefferson v. B. C. Lewis & Sons, ... 20 Fla ... require designated municipal officers of the town of Quincy ... to levy a tax to pay interest on, ... 255, 24 L.Ed. 125; Town ... of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260, 24 L.Ed. 154; ... Supervisors of Fond du Lac County, 16 Wall. 678, 21 ... ...
  • State ex rel. Langer v. Crawford
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 20 Junio 1917
    ...party; a law to-day, and not a law to-morrow; a law in one place, and not a law in another in the same state.” Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, 24 L. Ed. 154. In this connection it should further be noted that to hold legislation that is passed with the emergency clause provid......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • The Municipal Bond Cases Revisited.
    • United States
    • American Bankruptcy Law Journal Vol. 94 No. 4, December 2020
    • 22 Diciembre 2020
    ...judgment on bonds from same issuance); Ottawa v. Nat'l Bank, 105 U.S. 342 (1881) (same). (105) See, e.g., Town of S. Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876) ("There can be no estoppel in the way of ascertaining the existence of a law. That which purports to be a law of a State is a law, or it......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT