Marriage of Littlefield, In re, 64471-3
| Decision Date | 07 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 64471-3,64471-3 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Edmund W. LITTLEFIELD, Jr., Respondent, and Charissa L.D. Littlefield, Appellant. |
Frank W. Birkholz, V. Lee Rees, Seattle, Charles K. Wiggins, Bainbridge Island, for Respondent.
Cathy J. Zavis, Seattle, Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Northwest Women's Laws Center.
The issue in this appeal is whether a trial court entering an initial parenting plan has authority to order the primary residential parent of a child to live in a particular geographic area in order to facilitate frequent contact between the child and the other parent. We hold that under the Parenting Act of 1987, Laws of 1987, ch. 460, a trial court has no such authority. We also hold that a trial court is not bound by parenting plan provisions contained in a prenuptial agreement. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
This action concerns the post-dissolution parenting of the 5-year-old daughter of Edmund and Charissa Littlefield.
Edmund and Charissa met in May 1989 at a music festival in California, when Edmund was 40 years old and Charissa was 23. Edmund was married but in the process of separating at the time. Charissa had never been married.
Both Edmund and Charissa grew up in California and their families continue to live in California. Edmund is the beneficiary of one trust fund valued at $54 million and Edmund and his first wife had a son who was 8 years old at the time their marriage was dissolved in November 1990. The parenting plan entered in that dissolution proceeding restricted Edmund's contact with his son to supervised visits lasting from one to four hours every two weeks. Edmund also was restricted from using drugs or alcohol during any visitation and was to remain in substance abuse counseling.
another valued at more than $9 million. His annual income for 1995 was approximately $1.2 million in interest earnings. At the time he and Charissa met, Charissa had a guitar, a pickup truck, her clothing, and some furniture.
Because of the problems encountered in his first dissolution action, Edmund and Charissa entered into a prenuptial contract on August 7, 1991, three days before they were married. Most of the provisions of the contract relate to financial matters. Paragraph 18 and part of paragraph 19, however, involve parenting arrangements for any future children the couple would have. Paragraph 18 states:
Charissa and Edmund believe that any child they have will benefit from the full involvement of both parents. Both believe that it is not in the best interest of the child to become engaged in psychiatric evaluations or protracted disagreements over parenting plans. Accordingly, their children shall spend equal residential time with both parents. How the time is divided shall be determined by the conditions then prevailing, including the age of the children, work schedules of the parents, and other relevant factors. Holidays and birthdays shall be alternated. Major decisions pertaining to the children, including education, religion and military service shall be made jointly. The child's feelings and wishes will be considered in the decision.
Paragraph 19 provides, in part, that if the couple had a child and later separated, Edmund would provide a suitable house for Charissa and the child. The contract The home shall be selected after consultation by both of the parties, but in the event they cannot agree, Charissa's decision shall be final, provided that the value of the home shall not be more than one and a half times the mean sale price of homes for that portion of the city of Seattle located north of the ship canal to the northerly city limits at 145th street during the twelve month period immediately preceding purchase or lease.... The intent of this provision is to provide a nice house if the parties have any children, but not a luxurious or fancy house in the best neighborhood.
discusses the rent, lease or purchase of a house and then states:
At the time the agreement was signed, the couple did not know that Charissa was in the early stages of pregnancy. Their daughter, Heather, was born in California on April 29, 1992.
During their marriage, the Littlefields spent several months each year in northern California. They also spent several months each year on Edmund's farm near Arlington, Washington.
Edmund is a member of a band, and he operates a recording studio which is incorporated under the name of Sage Arts, Inc. This recording business has operated at a loss of more than $275,000 per year for several years. Edmund's income from his trusts has been the sole support of his lifestyle, the acquisition of his farm in Arlington, his recording business and his other assets. The farm is not run as a business and generates no income.
The couple separated in July 1994, when Heather was two years old. Charissa and Heather spent the next six weeks in California and Hawaii and moved into a house in Seattle in September 1994, the same month that the petition for dissolution was filed.
In the spring of 1995, Charissa decided to move to California. She testified that she was very unhappy living in Seattle and that she missed the support of her family and Edmund had no objection to the move during May, June or July, as he was performing with his band in California during those months and saw the child frequently. The child spent most of August on the farm with her father. In September 1995, Charissa suggested that Edmund fly to California to spend a week with Heather and then Heather could fly to Washington to spend a week with Edmund in October. Edmund is able to spend private time with Heather at his brother's pony ranch in northern California.
friends in California. No temporary parenting plan had been entered at the time of the move.
It was not until April 1996, shortly before trial began, that temporary orders were requested. At that time, Edmund began insisting that Charissa return to Seattle to live.
The trial court appointed a psychologist to evaluate the situation and make a recommendation to the court. The psychologist filed a parenting evaluation report, exhibit 2, and testified at trial. The psychologist testified that Charissa had been the primary parent for Heather since the separation, and she did not recommend that Edmund be designated as primary parent because he was not as well suited for that role as Charissa.
The psychologist testified that both parents were immature and neither was well suited to take on the responsibility for raising a youngster, as "[b]oth Ed and Charissa appear to have significant difficulty putting anyone's interests ahead of their own needs." Ex. 2 at 16. She stated that Edmund's farm was not a particularly child-friendly, or even a safe, environment for a preschooler.
The psychologist recommended that "Charissa should be the primary custodial parent for Heather." Ex. 2 at 19. She also recommended that "Ed should have frequent, but brief visits with Heather." Ex. 2 at 19. These visits, she said, should be three or four days of each week. In order to accomplish this schedule, she recommended that The psychologist testified that she thought it would be more difficult for Edmund to move to California than for Charissa to move to Seattle because of his business and because Charissa "has only a year's worth down there at this point." Report of Proceedings at 51. She also testified that she based her recommendation on the fact that Charissa was the more adaptable of the two adults and that she had more psychological strengths.
Charissa be ordered to move back to Seattle and to live no more than one hour away from the farm in Arlington.
The trial court accepted the psychologist's recommendation. It ordered that Charissa was designated the primary residential parent of Heather. 1 It then ordered Charissa to move back to the Snohomish/King County area until the child is eight years old.
A parenting plan was entered August 19, 1996, ordering Charissa and Heather to move to Washington by September 15, 1996. 2
Charissa moved this court for a stay of that portion of
the order requiring her to relocate to Washington and also petitioned for direct review of that order. Both the motion and the petition were granted.
1. Does a trial court hearing a disputed parenting plan action have authority to require the parents to live within a certain geographic area in order to facilitate frequent contact between the child and both parents?
2. Are parenting plan provisions which are incorporated into a prenuptial agreement enforceable?
Generally, a trial court's rulings dealing with the provisions of a parenting plan are reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wash.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629 (1993); In re Marriage of Wicklund, 84 Wash.App. 763, 770, 932 P.2d 652 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. Kovacs, 121 Wash.2d at 801, 854 P.2d 629; Wicklund, 84 Wash.App. at 770 n. 1, 932 P.2d 652.
A court's decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard. State v. Rundquist, 79 Wash.App. 786, 793, 905 P.2d 922 (1995) (citing W ASHINGTON S TATE B AR A SS'N, W ASHINGTON A PPELLATE P RACTICE D ESKBOOK § 18.5 (2d ed.1993)), review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1003, 914 P.2d 66 (1996).
Geographic Restriction. We first address whether a trial court...
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Table of Cases
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§24.04 General Principles
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§54.04 Drafting Written Agreements
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