943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1991), 90-2292, U.S. v. Wakefield
| Citation | 943 F.2d 53 |
| Party Name | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard A. WAKEFIELD, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Case Date | August 27, 1991 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Page 53
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, No. 90-80059; Hackett, J.
E.D.Mich.
AFFIRMED.
Before KEITH, Circuit Judge, LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WEBER, District Judge. [*]
PER CURIAM.
Richard Allen Wakefield ("defendant") appeals from the district court's November 1, 1990, judgment of conviction order and imposition of sentence entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, possession with the intent to distribute heroin and attempted possession with intent to distribute heroin. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
I.
A.
The following statement of the facts is based on testimony at defendant's suppression hearing and evidence adduced at trial. Defendant had been obtaining and distributing large quantities of very high-grade heroin since 1987. This heroin was often obtained through an individual living on the west coast known to defendant as "Mr. Wee." Defendant provided information about his heroin trafficking to authorities after a search warrant executed at his home on December 22, 1989, yielded approximately an ounce of heroin of extremely high purity; various drug paraphernalia, including a sifter, a diluting agent and small plastic bags; $5000 in cash; and records indicative of drug trafficking.
After defendant was taken to the Farmington Hills police station for booking, he stated that he was willing to cooperate with the police to set up his supplier, Mr. Wee. Defendant provided additional information about his drug trafficking activities and Mr. Wee's role. Defendant also discussed the general outlines for a deal in which he would participate in setting up Mr. Wee. He would arrange for the purchase of three kilograms of pure heroin from Mr. Wee for delivery to Detroit.
In an unrelated incident which occurred before the details of this plan were finalized, Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force agents Leslie Fountain ("Agent Fountain") and Gregory Sykes ("Agent Sykes") (collectively the "agents") observed and approached defendant at Detroit's Metropolitan Airport on January 16, 1990. Agent Fountain observed defendant walk up to the Northwest Airlines first class ticket line and purchase a ticket with cash. He recognized defendant from an airport encounter two or three months earlier involving defendant and a companion. At that time, defendant had identified himself as the owner of a hair salon in Detroit named Styles D'Elegance. Agent Fountain had inquired about the shop's owner and learned that his name was Richard Wakefield. He had also learned that Wakefield had an extensive narcotics record and had used numerous aliases in the past.
Defendant carried only a small canvas travel bag and checked no luggage. He also appeared nervous, repeatedly looking over his shoulder while purchasing his ticket. Agent Fountain checked with the ticket agent and found that defendant had purchased a round trip ticket in the name of James Williams on a nonstop evening flight to Los Angeles. The agents tended to watch this flight based upon their experience with individuals engaged in drug trafficking.
At that point, Agent Fountain decided to initiate contact with defendant and informed his partner, Agent Sykes, of this intention. The agents caught up with defendant in the F Concourse. As Agent Fountain approached defendant, he asked to speak with defendant and to see his airline ticket. The agents were in civilian attire, and they showed defendant their credentials. Although the agents had guns with them, they were never drawn or otherwise displayed.
After making a comment like "why do you bother me every time I come to the airport," defendant produced his round-trip ticket in the name of Jesse Williams which was for a two-day stay. Defendant had paid $1,051 in cash for the ticket. In response to Agent Fountain's request for some picture identification, defendant stated that he did not have any. When asked whether defendant was the owner of a hair salon, defendant responded, "Yes, Styles D'Elegance." This information caused Agent Fountain to believe that the name on the airline ticket was an alias.
Defendant was told he was not under arrest, he was not being accused of having narcotics, and that he was free to board the plane if he wished. However, Agent Fountain stated that he was going to retain defendant's bag long enough to permit the drug detection dog to conduct a sniff test. He estimated that the bag would be detained for about five minutes since the dog was on the premises. Defendant then said, "come on, man," walked out of the jetway and led the agents to the bathroom. When they entered the restroom, defendant handed his bag to Agent Fountain. Agent Fountain opened the bag and discovered a large amount of currency stacked and wrapped with rubber bands. 1 While Agent Fountain was searching defendant's bag, Agent Sykes observed defendant reach into his coat pockets. With one hand, he flung an additional bundle of money at Agent Fountain while, with the other hand, he dropped a small clear plastic bag 2 into the trash can by his side. At that point, defendant was placed under arrest and advised of his Miranda rights.
Defendant claimed that he was actually in the process of an undercover deal set up by Detective Patrick Monti ("Detective Monti") and that the agents had ruined the plan by causing him to miss his flight. The agents called Detective Monti and learned that defendant's story was false. When the agents relayed this information to defendant, he acknowledged to Agent Fountain that he had been travelling to Los Angeles to purchase a pound of heroin, which he intended to break down and sell to smaller street distributors in Detroit.
During the early morning hours of January 17, 1990, Agent Fountain obtained a telephonic search warrant authorizing the search of defendant's residence. The January 17, 1990, search yielded a few drug trafficking records and a small quantity of heroin.
B.
On February 6, 1990, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against defendant. Count one charged conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Counts two and three 3 charged possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count four 4 charged attempt to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846.
Defendant insisted on representing himself despite several attempts by the district court to dissuade defendant. In response to its concern that defendant receive a fair trial, the district court appointed stand-by counsel for defendant. Defendant filed numerous motions, including several motions for suppression of evidence. On June 4 and 5, 1990, the district court held a hearing on defendant's motions to suppress. The district court denied these motions in their entirety.
A jury trial was held July 10-18, 1990. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. On November 1, 1990, defendant was sentenced, pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") to a term of life imprisonment.
II.
The first issue defendant raises is whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a conspiracy in which he participated. Specifically, defendant argues that the only evidence of the conspiracy was provided by his own out-of-court, post-offense statements which were not corroborated by independent evidence. We disagree and conclude that there was sufficient independent, corroborative evidence to establish that a conspiracy existed and defendant, in fact, participated in the conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and to distribute heroin.
Proof of an agreement or a tacit understanding between two persons is a prerequisite to obtaining a conspiracy conviction. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 536-37 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985). Statements sufficient to establish an element of a crime which are made by a defendant after the crime has been committed require independent corroboration. Pennell, 737 F.2d at 536-37. This rule's underlying rationale is that "out-of-court admissions occurring after a crime has been completed are less reliable than similar admissions made beforehand." Id. at 537. Every element of the charged crime need not be established solely by the corroborating evidence. Id. "An out-of-court admission is adequately corroborated if the corroborating evidence 'supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.' " Id. (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 92-93 (1954)). "[C]ircumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and ... to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold that a reasonable jury could have accepted the evidence as adequate to support the conclusion that defendant agreed with at least one other person to possess with the intent to distribute heroin. See id.
On January 2, 1990, defendant again voluntarily appeared at the police station to be debriefed about his heroin connections...
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