Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC

Decision Date19 November 2019
Docket NumberNo. 19-1805,19-1805
Citation943 F.3d 373
Parties Deborah AMLING, personally, and as Personal Representative for the Estate of Robert M. Amling, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARROW INDUSTRIES LLC, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John L. Steffan, IV, Attorney, MAUNE RAICHLE HARTLEY FRENCH & MUDD, LLC, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Adam Doeringer, Attorney, Michael William Drumke, Attorney, SWANSON, MARTIN & BELL, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before Easterbrook, Hamilton, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

Deborah Amling and her husband Robert sued Harrow Industries and other businesses in an Illinois state court for causing Robert to develop mesothelioma

by exposing him to asbestos. Two years later, the Amlings sued Harrow again, this time in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment on the meaning of an asset-purchase agreement between Harrow and another company, Nexus, also a defendant in the Amlings’ state suit. The district judge thought the declaratory judgment action unripe and dismissed it. Even if it were ripe, the judge ruled in the alternative, she would decline to exercise jurisdiction over it. The Amlings appealed. Robert died while this appeal has been pending; Deborah now prosecutes the state and the federal lawsuits in her own right and as representative of Robert’s estate.

We affirm. It is virtually certain that the Amlings’ state suit will answer the question presented by their federal suit: whether under the terms of the asset-purchase agreement Harrow or Nexus could be liable for their injuries. That fact makes this a live controversy but simultaneously justifies the district court’s sound exercise of its discretion in deciding not to issue a declaratory judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

To determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, a court may look past the complaint to any pertinent evidence. Sapperstein v. Hager , 188 F.3d 852, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). The complaint’s jurisdictional allegations are taken as true, though, unless the defendant offers evidence calling jurisdiction into question. Id. at 856. The undisputed jurisdictional facts in this case are taken from the Amlings’ federal and state complaints, as well as from the docket of a related federal case and certain public documents, all properly subject to the district court’s judicial notice.

Robert Amling began working in the horticulture industry in 1965 and continued in that career for the rest of his working life. At one point, Robert worked for National Greenhouse Company, whose products allegedly contained asbestos to which he was exposed during his work.

Sometime between 1965 and 1990, National Greenhouse’s assets and liabilities were transferred to Harrow Products, a division of Harrow Industries. In November 1990, Harrow Products executed an asset-purchase agreement with Nexus, transferring all of National Greenhouse’s assets and, critically for our purposes, some of its liabilities to Nexus, as defined by the agreement.

Robert Amling was diagnosed with mesothelioma

in 2015. In 2016, the Amlings sued Harrow, Nexus, and others in Illinois state court, alleging the defendants caused Robert’s mesothelioma by tortiously exposing him to asbestos.

In 2017, Harrow filed a declaratory judgment action against Nexus in the Central District of Illinois. Harrow sought a declaration that any liability of National Greenhouse to the Amlings had passed from Harrow to Nexus under the terms of the 1990 asset-purchase agreement. Apprised of Harrow’s suit, the Amlings successfully sought a stay of their own suit and unsuccessfully moved to intervene in Harrow’s. Harrow voluntarily dismissed its action in 2018 without a decision on the merits.

The Amlings then filed their own declaratory judgment action in the same federal district courtthe case before us now. The district court had jurisdiction of the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The Amlings’ suit is basically a mirror image of Harrow’s: it seeks a declaration that under the terms of the 1990 agreement, Harrow, not Nexus or any other entity, is liable for National Greenhouse’s torts alleged in the Amlings’ state complaint. (Schlage Lock Company is also named as a defendant here as Harrow’s alter ego or successor in interest; we need not discuss it further.) The Amlings’ state case is still stayed.

Prudently policing its own jurisdiction, the district court ordered the parties to address whether the case was justiciable. After briefing, the court concluded it was not because there not yet a ripe controversy suitable for judicial action. In the alternative, the court held it would decline to exercise whatever jurisdiction it might have had. The court dismissed the action without prejudice. We have jurisdiction of the Amlings’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Analysis

The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, with irrelevant exceptions: "In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction," a district court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphases added). The two italicized phrases are the subjects of this appeal. We address each in turn.

A. "Case of Actual Controversy"

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." Rock Energy Coop. v. Village of Rockton , 614 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2010). The phrase "case of actual controversy" in the Declaratory Judgment Act "refers to the type of Cases and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under Article III." MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 127, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007), citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth , 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937). The requirements of the Act and those of Article III are therefore coextensive. See Aetna , 300 U.S. at 239–41, 57 S.Ct. 461. We review de novo whether these requirements have been met. Deveraux v. City of Chicago , 14 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1994).

One aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is ripeness. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund ex rel. Bunte v. American Int’l Group , 840 F.3d 448, 451 n.2 (7th Cir. 2016), citing Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. , 501 U.S. 252, 265 n.13, 111 S.Ct. 2298, 115 L.Ed.2d 236 (1991). Declaratory judgment actions are ripe and otherwise justiciable when " ‘the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’ " MedImmune , 549 U.S. at 127, 127 S.Ct. 764, quoting Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co. , 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). There must be a "definite and concrete," "real and substantial" dispute that "touches the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests" and "admits of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Id. (cleaned up), quoting Aetna , 300 U.S. at 240–41, 57 S.Ct. 461. These general phrases take on more concrete meaning in specific cases.1

Whether the 1990 asset-purchase agreement provided that Harrow or Nexus would be liable to the Amlings for torts by National Greenhouse is such a ripe and specific controversy. We do not yet know whether National Greenhouse tortiously caused Robert’s mesothelioma

. We know that, if it did, Harrow or Nexus may be liable for it. Interpreting the 1990 agreement is necessary and sufficient to find out which.

Moreover, it is virtually certain that, absent federal intervention, the question will be answered in the ordinary course of the ongoing state litigation. Harrow and/or Nexus have every reason to insist on its judicial determination. As noted, Harrow has already tried once to secure one. As a matter of procedure such determination may be made "at any stage of the cause, before or after judgment, as the ends of justice may require," 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-407 (nonjoinder and misjoinder of parties), and as a matter of substance, the determination could be made today. The meaning of the 1990 agreement as applied to the Amlings’ claims waits on no future condition.

Ripeness and other justiciability requirements bar a federal court from deciding a question that depends on so many future events that a judicial opinion would be "advice about remote contingencies." Rock Energy , 614 F.3d at 748, quoting Meridian Sec. Ins. v. Sadowski , 441 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006). There is nothing remote about a plaintiff’s asking which of two defendants she is currently suing is the right one to sue. In a practical sense, there is nothing contingent about it either. If the plaintiff does not raise the question, one or both defendants almost certainly will.

The parties and the district court focused on the extensive case law dealing with the justiciability of disputes among tort victims, insured tortfeasors, and insurers. Such disputes are often the subject of declaratory judgment cases. Those cases teach that a live dispute between an insurer and its insured over the insurer’s duties to defend and indemnify the insured against its victim’s tort claims is also a live dispute between each of them and the victim. Maryland Casualty Co. , 312 U.S. at 273–74, 61 S.Ct. 510 ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 959 F.2d 677, 680–82 (7th Cir. 1992) ; Truck Insurance Exchange v. Ashland Oil, Inc. , 951 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1992) ; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Schulte , 302 F.2d 174, 176–77 (7th Cir. 1962).

As we summarized in Truck Insurance Exchange , "a tort victim has a practical, albeit only a potential, financial interest in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
71 cases
  • Cordova v. City of Chicago (In re Cordova)
    • United States
    • United States Bankruptcy Courts. Seventh Circuit. U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 6 Diciembre 2021
    ...that is generally known with the trial court's territorial jurisdiction. Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(1); see also Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC, 943 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2019) (a court may take notice of the docket of related federal cases). That notice can be taken sua sponte and at any stage in a......
  • Finch v. Treto
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 9 Junio 2022
    ...depends on so many future events that a judicial opinion would be ‘advice about remote contingencies.’ " Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC , 943 F.3d 373, 377–378 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rock Energy Co-op. v. Village of Rockton , 614 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2010) ). Even where a case is co......
  • United States v. Glispie
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 19 Noviembre 2019
    ...5/19-3.The Clerk of this Court will transmit the briefs and appendices in this case, together with this opinion, to the Supreme Court of 943 F.3d 373 Illinois. On the request of that Court, the Clerk will transmit all or any part of the record as that Court so desires.QUESTION CERTIFIED----......
  • Admiral Ins. Co. v. Niagara Transformer Corp.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • 6 Enero 2023
    ..., 343 F.3d 383, 389–91 (5th Cir. 2003) ; W. World Ins. Co. v. Hoey , 773 F.3d 755, 758–61 (6th Cir. 2014) ; Amling v. Harrow Indus. LLC , 943 F.3d 373, 379–80 (7th Cir. 2019) ; Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc. , 426 F.3d 994, 996–99 (8th Cir. 2005) ; United States v. City of Las Cr......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT