Irvin v. Harris

Decision Date19 November 2019
Docket NumberAugust Term, 2018,Docket No. 17-1062-pr
Citation944 F.3d 63
Parties Samuel IRVIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, Daniel Miller, Demetrio Lifreiri, Eugene Mazzio, Intervenors, Louis Milburn, A. Brown, for Class of Louis Milburn, Plaintiffs, v. David R. HARRIS, Superintendent, Green Haven Correctional Facility; Thomas A. Coughlin, III, Defendants-Appellees, Henry S. Dogin, Administrator Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, United States Department of Justice; Patricia Harris, Secretary of Health Education and Welfare, Defendants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

BRIAN MARC FELDMAN, Harter Secrest & Emerly LLP, Rochester, NY (Gregory M. Dickinson, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant Samuel Irvin and Intervenors Daniel Miller, Demetrio Lifreiri, and Eugene Mazzio.

MARC S. GRUBE, Assistant Solicitor General (Steven C. Wu, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief), for Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees David R. Harris and Thomas A. Coughlin, III.

Before: POOLER, LOHIER, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Judge Lohier concurs in a separate opinion.

POOLER, Circuit Judge:

Samuel Irvin appeals from an order entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska, J.), denying Irvin’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to reconsider termination of the Milburn consent decree. We hold that Irvin has standing to invoke Rule 60(b) to challenge the termination because he is sufficiently connected with the underlying litigation and his interests are strongly affected by the termination. We also hold that the termination of the consent decree violated Rule 23(a)(4) and the Due Process Clause because the class was inadequately represented at the times relevant to the termination proceedings.

BACKGROUND

This case stems from a termination of a consent decree in 2015 that was first entered by the district court in 1982. The consent decree’s objective was to ensure that inmates at Green Haven Correctional Facility had access to adequate medical care. In September 1979, Louis Milburn, then an incarcerated inmate at Green Haven, filed a pro se complaint alleging deficiencies in its provision of health care services. In April 1980, Milburn, at this time represented, filed an amended complaint with 13 other co-plaintiff class representatives, alleging that Green Haven’s health care services were so inadequate that they violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court subsequently certified a class of "all persons who are or will be confined at the Green Haven Correctional Facility" in December 1980. Joint App’x at 105.

Eventually the parties stipulated to an entry of final judgment whereby plaintiffs agreed to discontinue the action in exchange for certain reforms. In August 1982, the district court entered a consent decree providing injunctive relief to the class members.

About seven years later, plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the Green Haven defendants in contempt for violating the 1982 consent decree and to modify the consent judgment to achieve its original purpose. In response the district court appointed a medical auditor, Dr. Robert Cohen, who determined that Green Haven was not in compliance with the consent judgment and recommended additional modifications to improve health care at the facility. In 1991, the parties entered a proposed stipulation for entry of a modified judgment, and plaintiffs withdrew their motion when defendants agreed to amend the 1982 consent decree. As with the 1982 consent decree, the court entered the 1991 consent decree after concluding that the settlement was "fair, adequate and reasonable to all members of the plaintiff class." Joint App’x at 200.

Meanwhile, Dr. Cohen continued to audit Green Haven’s health care system for the next 23 years. His three-year term was repeatedly extended because Green Haven was not in full compliance with the 1991 consent decree. In his most recent report in 2014, Dr. Cohen finally found that Green Haven was in compliance with the terms of the modified final judgment.

In July 2014, defendants moved to terminate the consent decree under Section 802 of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") of 1995, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, on the basis that the consent judgment was no longer necessary "to correct a current and ongoing" violation of any constitutional right and that, even if some unconstitutional conditions persisted, the judgment was not the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. Joint App’x at 385-86.

Initially, class counsel opposed and filed a cross-motion to modify the 1991 consent decree to address ongoing deficiencies. But on August 15, 2014, class counsel wrote a letter to certain inmates—specifically, "all class members with whom counsel had any contact in the preceding two years," Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2 n.3—including Irvin and intervenor Demetrio Lifreiri, explaining why counsel believed that the risk of an adverse decision should be avoided. Class counsel also explained that they had not yet made a "final decision" on how to proceed but they would nonetheless continue with discovery. Joint App’x at 344.

Without further notice to any class members, class counsel next informed the district court by letter dated March 2, 2015, that they would no longer oppose termination. The letter informed the court that "Plaintiffs have agreed to withdraw" their opposition to the motion to terminate, and that their opposition was "based on the representation by counsel for Defendants that [certain Green Haven officers] will promptly meet in person with Plaintiffs’ expert ... to enable [him] to present his expert findings and recommendations with respect to medical care and record keeping at Green Haven." Joint App’x at 288. On March 4, 2015, again without any notice to the class members, the district court noted the withdrawal, so-ordered class counsel’s letter, and terminated the consent decree. It is undisputed that at the time of termination, neither Louis Milburn, nor any of the other class representatives, were still incarcerated at Green Haven. Class counsel then informed certain class members by letter dated March 11, 2015 that the consent decree had been terminated. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 6 n.5.

In June 2016, Irvin, a Green Haven inmate who was a member of the Milburn class, filed the pro se Rule 60(b) motion at issue in this appeal, seeking to set aside the district court’s termination order. Irvin purported to move on behalf of himself and the entire "class of prisoners at [the] Green Haven." Joint App’x at 295.1 Specifically, his motion called attention to Green Haven’s "cutting back on all the supplies," its "eliminat[ion] [of] one of the day nurses and all the emergency call buttons" in prisoners’ cells, and its "elimination of the overnight nurse all together." Joint App’x at 323.2

The district court denied Irvin’s Rule 60(b) motion on two grounds. First, it concluded that Irvin lacked standing to bring a Rule 60(b) motion because he was merely a class member rather than a named class representative. Second, it construed Irvin’s filing as a motion for relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(3), so it denied it as untimely under Rule 60(c), which requires that motions under subsections "(1), (2), and (3) [be made] no more than a year after the entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Even construing the motion under the catchall provision, Rule 60(b)(6), the court found that Irvin had not shown the "extraordinary circumstances" required for relief.

Irvin then timely appealed the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. This Court appointed pro bono counsel to represent Irvin, instructing counsel

to brief, among any other issues, whether: (1) Appellant had standing to move for relief from the order terminating the consent decree (including whether he could have objected to class counsel’s decision to withdraw its opposition to the defendantsmotion to terminate that decree); (2) his motion for relief was timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) ;3 and (3) he demonstrated extraordinary circumstances for such relief (including whether the existence of extraordinary circumstances could have been determined on the motion papers alone).

Order, Dkt. No. 49.

In January 2018, Green Haven inmates Demetrio Lifreiri, Eugene Mazzio, and Daniel Miller moved to intervene in the appeal. This Court granted the motion. The intervenors also sought to reverse the district court’s order denying Irvin’s pro se Rule 60(b) motion.

DISCUSSION

Irvin argues on appeal that the district court’s judgment is void under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) because it violated due process. In particular, he argues that (1) the class was not adequately represented, and that (2) the district court was required to provide notice to the class or conduct a fairness hearing. Because we agree with Irvin’s first argument, we do not address the second.

Generally, we review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Lawrence v. Wink (In re Lawrence) , 293 F.3d 615, 623 (2d Cir. 2002). But when we consider a Rule 60(b)(4) motion challenging a judgment obtained without due process, "a deferential standard of review is not appropriate because if the underlying judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4)." Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert , 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 60(b)(4) "is unique ... because relief is not discretionary and a meritorious defense is not necessary." Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G. , 629 F.2d 730, 733 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980).

I. Forfeiture

At the outset, we determine that Irvin has preserved his argument that the district court’s...

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