944 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2019), 18-3173, Glick v. Western Power Sports, Inc.

Docket Nº:18-3173
Citation:944 F.3d 714
Opinion Judge:SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Party Name:Austin GLICK, Plaintiff-Appellant v. WESTERN POWER SPORTS, INC., doing business as Fly Racing; Leatt Corporation, Defendants-Appellees
Attorney:Brian P. Galligan, GALLIGAN & REID, Des Moines, IA, Angela M. Pollard, SCHNEIDER-POLLARD LAW, LLC, Greenwood, IN, for Plaintiff - Appellant. Connie L. Diekema, Joseph F. Moser, FINLEY LAW FIRM, Des Moines, IA, John L. Tate, STITES & HARBISON, Louisville, KY, for Defendants - Appellees.
Judge Panel:Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
Case Date:December 05, 2019
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
 
FREE EXCERPT

Page 714

944 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 2019)

Austin GLICK, Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

WESTERN POWER SPORTS, INC., doing business as Fly Racing; Leatt Corporation, Defendants-Appellees

No. 18-3173

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

December 5, 2019

Submitted: September 26, 2019

Page 715

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Page 716

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

Brian P. Galligan, GALLIGAN & REID, Des Moines, IA, Angela M. Pollard, SCHNEIDER-POLLARD LAW, LLC, Greenwood, IN, for Plaintiff - Appellant.

Connie L. Diekema, Joseph F. Moser, FINLEY LAW FIRM, Des Moines, IA, John L. Tate, STITES & HARBISON, Louisville, KY, for Defendants - Appellees.

Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Austin Glick appeals the district court’s1 orders granting Leatt Corporation’s and Western Power Sports, Inc. d/b/a Fly Racing (WPS)’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denying Glick’s motion for entry of default against WPS. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

I.

On August 20, 2015, Glick was injured in Madison County, Iowa when a neck brace allegedly caused or failed to protect him from serious bodily injury. On September 28, 2017, Glick filed an amended complaint against Leatt and WPS, the makers and sellers of the neck brace, purporting to assert claims of strict products liability, breach of warranty, negligence, gross negligence, and consumer fraud. Leatt filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. WPS did not join in the motion and failed to file an answer or other responsive pleading by the November 17, 2017 deadline for doing so. On May 3, 2018, the district court granted Leatt’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the amended complaint lacks elementary factual allegations and, with very few exceptions, alleges nothing more than legal conclusions and recitations of the elements of the causes of action. Thus, the court dismissed all claims against Leatt.

That same day, Leatt’s attorneys filed appearances and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on behalf of WPS. On May 17, 2018, Glick filed a motion for entry of default against WPS, and asked the court to find that WPS’s motion to dismiss was untimely. On September 5, 2018, the district court issued an order denying Glick’s motion for entry of default and granting WPS’s motion to dismiss. Relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, the court found that it would be improper to enter default against WPS because, even though WPS’s motion to dismiss was likely untimely, the amended complaint fails to state a claim against WPS. The court entered judgment in favor of WPS on September 7, 2018. This appeal followed.

Page 717

II.

Glick argues that the district court erred in granting the motions to dismiss, because the amended complaint alleges sufficient facts to put Leatt and WPS on notice of the claims. We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true all factual allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014). However, we need not accept as true a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Hanten v. Sch. Dist. of Riverview Gardens, 183 F.3d 799, 805 (8th Cir. 1999); Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). Although detailed allegations are not required to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.

Here, all but one of the allegations in the amended complaint constitute mere legal conclusions and recitations of the elements of the causes of action.2 Thus, the amended...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP