City of Pharr v. Ruiz

Decision Date03 April 1997
Docket NumberNo. 13-96-430-CV,13-96-430-CV
PartiesCITY OF PHARR, Appellant, v. Cesar RUIZ, et al., Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Jeffrey D. Roerig, Ernest W. Grumbles, Roerig, Oliveira & Fisher, Brownsville, Michael Zanca, McAllen, for appellant.

Michael J. Garza, Dori Contreras Garza, McAllen, Adam Poncio Cerda, Garriga & Poncio, San Antonio, for appellees.

Before DORSEY, CHAVEZ and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

RODRIGUEZ, Justice.

Appellees sued the City of Pharr ("the City") under section 101.001 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code ("Tort Claims Act") for injuries resulting from a high-speed police chase. The City moved for partial summary judgment claiming sovereign immunity based on its police officers' official immunity. Appellees argued on the grounds that fact issues exist as to whether the actions of the officers were discretionary and performed in good faith. The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

While on evening patrol duty, Officer David Castillo of the City of Pharr Police Department was alerted by radio dispatch to a suspicious red pickup truck driving without its headlights turned on. Officer Castillo spotted the truck moving at a high rate of speed. As he approached, the truck sped away and ran a stop sign. After Castillo pursued with overhead lights and siren engaged, the truck finally stopped along the side of the road. As Officer Castillo stood outside his patrol car, the truck sped away. Officer Castillo again pursued the truck along with three other patrol units. All had their lights and sirens engaged.

During the pursuit, Officers Castillo and Lopez heard over the radio that the driver of the truck had tried to ram an officer's patrol car. They also observed the truck run two stop signs and a red light at a high rate of speed. As the truck turned to enter a private parking lot, it collided with a car driven by appellees. All of the occupants in the car were injured.

Appellees sued the City alleging that the officers negligently breached their duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the road, and, pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, failed to act in good faith by believing that the need to apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit.

JURISDICTION

Under Texas procedure, appeals are allowed only from final orders or judgments. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex.1992); North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex.1966); Cameron County v. Alvarado, 900 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Unless a statute specifically authorizes an interlocutory appeal, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final judgments. Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.1985) (orig. proceeding); Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 895. Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code specifically allows appeal of various interlocutory orders, including an order that "denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state[.]" TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp.1997).

In the present case, the City of Pharr moved for summary judgment claiming sovereign immunity based on its officers' official immunity. The supreme court has held that a city may rely on section 51.014(5) to appeal the denial of summary judgment based on sovereign immunity through its employees' qualified or official immunity. City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 904 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex.1995)(where plaintiff sued City but not City's employee, section 51.014(5) applied to City's claim of sovereign immunity through employee's official immunity). We therefore have jurisdiction over the City's interlocutory appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When an appellate court reviews a trial court's denial of summary judgment, it applies the standards mandated by the Texas Supreme Court. They are:

1. The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue exists, we accept as true evidence favorable to the non-movant.

3. We indulge in every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the non-movant's favor.

See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). A defendant who moves for summary judgment must show that the plaintiff has no cause of action. A defendant may meet this burden by either 1) disproving at least one essential element of each theory of recovery, or 2) conclusively proving all elements of an affirmative defense. Mitchell v. City of Dallas, 855 S.W.2d 741, 748 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993), aff'd, 870 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.1994). If the movant's motion and summary judgment proof facially establish his right to judgment as a matter of law, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to raise fact issues precluding summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979).

In this case, the City asserted governmental immunity, via official immunity, as an affirmative defense and, therefore, had the burden to conclusively prove all of the essential elements of this defense. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984). No disputed question of material fact can remain on the affirmative defense. Black v. Victoria Lloyds Ins. Co., 797 S.W.2d 20, 27 (Tex.1990).

IMMUNITY

Police officers are entitled to official immunity from suits arising from the performance of their 1) discretionary duties 2) in good faith as long as they are 3) acting within the scope of their authority. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1994); Alvarado, 900 S.W.2d at 879. Where an employee possesses official immunity, the governmental entity does not have respondeat superior liability under the Tort Claims Act. DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.1995). Thus, in order to prevail on its governmental immunity claim, the City had to establish that its officers were officially immune from liability.

In response to the City's motion for summary judgment, appellees argued that fact issues remain as to (1) whether the police officers' actions were discretionary in light of the department's policy on high-speed chases, and (2) whether the officers acted in good faith. 1

A. Discretionary acts.

When considering whether a government employee's actions were discretionary or ministerial, a court's inquiry is not whether the officer had discretion to do an allegedly wrongful act, but whether the officer was performing a discretionary function. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653. The purpose of the doctrine of official immunity is to protect public officers from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. Id. at 653-54.

Ministerial acts are those:

[w]here the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment ... but where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial.

Id. at 654 (quoting Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495, 501 (1878)). If an action involves personal deliberation, decision and judgment, it is discretionary; actions which require obedience to orders or the performance of a duty to which the actor has no choice, are ministerial. Id.

In the present case, the police department had specific pursuit guidelines, which provided, in relevant part, as follows:

SECTION 3. POLICY

A. An officer shall not engage in high-speed pursuit whenever it reasonably appears that the potential harm to persons or property arising from such pursuit outweigh the potential harm threatened by the escaping offender. In the absence of an outweighing danger to persons and property, an officer shall not engage in high-speed pursuit whenever it reasonably appears that apprehension of the escaping offender by other means is likely. In determining whether to engage in pursuit, an officer may consider all relevant factors....

....

D. An officer shall notify his supervisor upon engaging in any high-speed pursuit, unless to do so would unreasonably delay the initiation of such pursuit.

....

SECTION 4. PROCEDURE

A. When not coordinated by a dispatcher or supervisor, the officer in the primary pursuing unit of the high-speed pursuit shall direct the pursuit by both his unit and others.

....

C. Only the primary pursuing unit shall engage in high-speed pursuit, unless a supervisor authorizes additional units to engage in the pursuit.

....

F. Except when directed otherwise by a supervising officer, the primary pursuing unit of a high-speed pursuit may at any time abandon that pursuit in the interest of safety; that unit and/or the base station shall immediately communicate that decision to all other units involved. Upon receiving such communication, all units shall abandon that high-speed pursuit.

Twelve months after that policy came into effect, Police Chief Leo Saldana issued an "Inter Office Memo" addressing "General Order # 1 Use of Departmental Vehicles." The memo provided, in its entirety, as follows:

YOUR ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER IS REQUIRED

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY WHEN RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY, ALL PERSONNEL WILL ONLY BE ALLOWED TO EXCEED THE SPEED LIMIT BY (10) MILES AND ONLY WITH OVERHEAD LIGHTS AND SIREN ON.

ALL PURSUITS ORIGINATING IN OUR CITY MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY A SUPERVISOR.

ALL PERSONNEL WILL HAVE TO STOP AT ALL TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES BEFORE PROCEEDING FORWARD AND THEN ONLY WHEN SAFE.

PERSONNEL WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE ON ANY OUT OF THE CITY LIMITS PURSUITS.

A COPY OF THIS GENERAL ORDER SHOULD BE PLACED IN YOUR PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL, THE ORIGINAL WILL...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Cameron County v. Carrillo
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 4, 1999
    ...duties performed in good faith within the scope of their authority. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653 (Tex. 1994); City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). Official immunity frees government officials to exercise their duties without fear of damage ......
  • Vela v. Rocha
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • July 12, 2001
    ...plaintiff carries a high burden of proof to avoid a summary judgment based on official immunity. Davila, 6 S.W.3d at 793; City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). To controvert a government official's summary judgment proof on good faith, the plai......
  • City of San Juan v. Gonzalez
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • June 1, 2000
    ...establishing all elements of an affirmative defense. See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993); City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 712, (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). Official immunity is an affirmative defense. See Rubio, 980 S.W.2d at 948. Consequently, the......
  • City of Robstown v. Ramirez, 13-99-738-CV
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • March 31, 2000
    ...establishing all elements of an affirmative defense. See Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993); City of Pharr v. Ruiz, 944 S.W.2d 709, 712, (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1997, no writ). Official immunity is an affirmative defense. See Rubio, 980 S.W.2d at 948. Consequently, the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT