Bruno v. Supreme Court of Pa.

Citation946 F.Supp.2d 392
Decision Date13 May 2013
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 13–1357.
PartiesJudge Mark A. BRUNO, Plaintiff, v. The SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, PA, for Plaintiff.

A. Taylor Williams, Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Plaintiff Judge Mark A. Bruno brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Chief Justice Ronald D. Castille, Justice Thomas G. Saylor, Justice J. Michael Eakin, Justice Deborah McCloskey Todd, Justice Seamus P. McCaffery, and Justice Max Baer (collectively, PA Supreme Court Defendants). On February 1, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sua sponte suspended Bruno without pay. Bruno claims that the PA Supreme Court Defendants violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Bruno has filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that I enjoin “the Defendants from suspending Judge Mark A. Bruno without pay and benefits pending the resolution of his criminal trial.” Pl.'s Mot. 2. The PA Supreme Court Defendants request that the motion for a preliminary injunction be denied. For the reasons set forth below, I will deny Bruno's motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Judge Mark A. Bruno is a Pennsylvania Magisterial District Judge in the Borough of West Chester. At the request of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Bruno has presided over cases in the Philadelphia Traffic Court once a year for four or five days while Traffic Court judges are away on training.

On January 29, 2013, Bruno was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The indictment charges that Bruno and his co-conspirators “used the Philadelphia Traffic Court ... to give preferential treatment to certain ticket-holders, most commonly by ‘fixing’ tickets for those with whom they were politically and socially connected.” Compl. Ex. A ¶ 1.

On February 1, 2013, without any prior notice to Bruno, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order (“Suspension Order”) suspending Bruno without pay. The Suspension Order states:

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of February 2013, it is hereby ordered that Magisterial District Judge Mark A. Bruno for Magisterial District 15–1–01, of the Fifteenth Judicial District, Chester County, Pennsylvania, is hereby relieved of any and all judicial and administrative responsibilities as a judge of the Magisterial District Court.

It is further ordered that Judge Mark A. Bruno is suspended without pay pending further Order of this Court.

This Order is without prejudice to the rights of Judge Mark A. Bruno to seek relief in this Court for the purpose of vacating or modifying this Order. In re: Avellino, 547 Pa. 385, 690 A.2d 1138 (1997); and see In re: McFalls, 568 Pa. 228, 795 A.2d 367 (2002).

Compl. Ex. B. Since the February 1, 2013 Order, Bruno has not received any pay. He still receives medical benefits, but has to pay $72.00 per month to receive them.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The PA Supreme Court Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine. The doctrine is named after the only two Supreme Court cases to have applied the doctrine to defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company, 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). RookerFeldman is a narrow doctrine “confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006). Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which this Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction....” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, only the Supreme Court is vested with jurisdiction over appeals from final state-court judgments. “Accordingly, under what has come to be known as the RookerFeldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 463, 126 S.Ct. 1198 (emphasis added). Thus, the RookerFeldman doctrine only applies in the “limited circumstances” where “the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 291, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (emphasis added). Parallel state and federal litigation does not trigger application of the RookerFeldman doctrine, even when the federal litigation is initiated after the state proceedings have commenced. Id. at 291–94, 125 S.Ct. 1517.

While Courts of Appeals recognize that RookerFeldman only applies to federal district court suits filed after state proceedings are final, there is some disagreement as to when a state proceeding has sufficiently “ended” to trigger RookerFeldman. Compare Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir.2005) ( RookerFeldman applied where the Puerto Rico Supreme Court had finally resolved the sole federal question in an interlocutory ruling), with TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584 (7th Cir.2005) ( RookerFeldman does not apply to interlocutory rulings because the state-court proceeding has not ended). Even under the broadest definition of this requirement, state proceedings have not ended here. In Federacion, the First Circuit adopted a broad and comprehensive test to determine if state proceedings had ended for RookerFeldman purposes. See also Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1275 (11th Cir.2009) (applying Federacion test); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 n. 2 (10th Cir.2006) (approvingly citing Federacion test); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n. 1 (9th Cir.2005) (applying Federacion test). According to the First Circuit, state proceedings have “ended” in the following three situations: (1) “when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved”; (2) “if the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further action.... For example, if a lower state court issues a judgment and the losing party allows time for appeal to expire”; and (3) “if the state court proceedings have finally resolved all the federal questions, but state law or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.” Federacion, 410 F.3d at 24–25.

Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court sua sponte issued the Suspension Order, suspending Bruno “pending further Order of this Court ... without prejudice to the rights of Judge Mark A. Bruno to seek relief in this Court for the purpose of vacating or modifying this Order.” Compl. Ex. B. On its face, the Suspension Order is not final and does not end the state proceedings because it anticipates further action of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and invites Bruno to appeal his suspension by seeking to vacate or modify the Order. The Suspension Order fits none of the situations described above, in which state proceedings have ended. The Suspension Order does not affirm the judgment of any lower court and it clearly leaves more to be resolved. Additionally, both parties may seek further action. In fact, no time limitation has been placed on Bruno's right to appeal his suspension. Moreover, the language of the Suspension Order indicates that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court intends to take further action. Lastly, the state court proceedings have not yet resolved Bruno's constitutional challenge to his suspension, but it is reasonable to presume that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will entertain this challenge if Bruno seeks to vacate or modify the Suspension Order. According to the Third Circuit:

When the “administrator” making a decision is a state supreme court and that state supreme court presents a litigant with an opportunity to present arguments to the court, it is reasonable for a party to expect that such a body will entertain constitutional challenges to its actions and to expect litigants to be on notice of this possibility, even if the state court seems to be acting in an administrative capacity.

Guarino v. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151, 1161 (3d Cir.1993). Therefore, the RookerFeldman doctrine does not apply because the state proceedings have not ended and a final judgment has not issued.

Furthermore, the RookerFeldman doctrine is inapplicable because under the doctrine, “a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (emphasis added). In order for RookerFeldman to apply, a judicial proceeding, rather than an administrative act, must have occurred. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476–77, 103 S.Ct. 1303;Guarino, 11 F.3d at 1157. In determining whether this requirement has been met, the Third Circuit has equated “judicial proceedings” with “adjudicative acts.” See Blake v. Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 71–72 (3d Cir.1992). There are two types of administrative acts,...

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5 cases
  • In re Bruno
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • August 28, 2014
    ...On May 13, 2013, the district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. See Bruno v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 946 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D.Pa.2013). The district court also denied reconsideration. In June and July 2013, Judge Bruno filed several other motions in the district co......
  • In re Magisterial Dist. Judge Mark A. Bruno, J-59 A-2013
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • October 1, 2014
    ...process rights. On May 13, 2013, the district court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. See Bruno v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 946 F.Supp.2d 392 (E.D. Pa. 2013). The district court also denied reconsideration. In June and July 2013, Judge Bruno filed several other motions ......
  • Khalil v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • January 31, 2014
    ...proceedings wound to a close; thus, even under the strictest version of the test, the doctrine would apply. See Bruno v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 946 F. Supp. 2d 392, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2013). Thus, to the extent that Khalil attacks the outcome of state appellate proceedings, Rooker-Feldman is appropria......
  • McKinney v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • June 5, 2017
    ...relatively insubstantial' as compared to the 'severity of depriving someone of the means of his livelihood.' " Bruno v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 946 F.Supp.2d 392, 400 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 932 (1976)) ("The private interest depends upon both '......
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