Adkins v. General Motors Corp.

Citation946 F.2d 1201
Decision Date15 October 1991
Docket NumberNos. 90-3164,D,AFL-CI,90-3234 and 90-3235,s. 90-3164
Parties138 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 120 Lab.Cas. P 10,988 John J. ADKINS, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants (90-3164)/Cross-Appellees, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant (90-3234), and Local 801; International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers,efendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants (90-3235).
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Dwight D. Brannon (argued and briefed) Brannon & Hall, Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellants cross-appellees.

Joseph P. Buchanan (argued and briefed), Cowden, Pfarrer, Crew & Becker, Dayton, Ohio, Elmer W. Johnson, General Motors Corp., Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellee cross-appellant General Motors Corp.

Richard Rice (argued and briefed), Kettering, Ohio, Carole W. Wilson, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellee cross-appellant Intern. Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC

Before MILBURN and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and DEMASCIO, * Senior District Judge.

BOGGS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs are a class of former employees of defendant General Motors Corporation (General Motors) and their spouses. Because the spouses' claims are derived from the employees' claims, we shall use the term "plaintiffs" to refer to the employees only, unless the facts and the law of this case require us to distinguish between the plaintiffs-employees and the plaintiffs-spouses.

At all times relevant to this dispute, the plaintiffs were members of defendant International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine and Furniture Workers and of defendant Local 801 of that union (collectively, "the union"). In a prior action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, plaintiffs brought a hybrid unfair representation/unfair labor practices claim against General Motors and the union, pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1). See generally Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 556 F.Supp. 452 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (motion to dismiss); Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 573 F.Supp. 1188 (S.D.Ohio 1983) (motion for summary judgment), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir.1985). In that case, plaintiffs alleged, in substance, that General Motors and the Union had colluded in negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement in order to abrogate the special seniority rights contained in a collective-bargaining agreement called the "bridge agreement." We will discuss the nature of this agreement and the plaintiffs' rights under it more fully later in this opinion.

In the same action, plaintiffs also pursued pendent state law claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract rights, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. The federal labor law claim was dismissed with prejudice as untimely. The pendent state law claims were dismissed without prejudice, for lack of a substantial federal question to support the exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims.

After the dismissal, many of the same plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court alleging fraud, tortious interference with contract rights, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby initiating the case now before this court on appeal. See generally Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 578 F.Supp. 315 (S.D.Ohio 1984). The factual allegations of the complaint were substantially the same as those advanced in the federal suit. Defendants removed the case to federal district court, asserting that these claims were fully preempted by federal labor law. Plaintiffs then moved to remand the case. The court below ruled that since plaintiffs' fraud and misrepresentations claims were fully preempted by federal labor law, the case contained a federal question substantial enough to support the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. At the same time, the district court also gave the defendants twenty days to present proper motions for summary judgment on all claims. The court noted its previous disposition of plaintiffs' federal labor law claims, which it had dismissed as untimely, and the identity of the complaint filed in the previous action and this one.

After defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to the suggestion of the district court, 713 F.Supp. 1043 the court below held that the federally-preempted fraud and tortious interference claims were barred by the six-month statute of limitations of the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). These claims were dismissed with prejudice.

With respect to plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress, the court ruled that some were preempted and others were not preempted. Those preempted were dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. Those not preempted were remanded to state court, because the dismissal of the federally preempted claims had left the case without a substantial federal question. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966).

This timely appeal and cross-appeal follow the court's dismissal and remand. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in holding any of the claims preempted and in remanding the unpreempted emotional distress claim. On cross-appeal, defendants argue that the court erred in holding that some of plaintiffs' emotional distress claims were not preempted and in failing to dismiss all these claims with prejudice as time-barred under federal labor law.

We affirm the district court's judgment in so far as it holds plaintiffs' claims completely preempted and therewith barred as untimely by applicable federal labor law. We vacate the judgment below in so far as it holds that plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are not completely preempted and remands them to state court. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss all of plaintiffs' emotional distress claims with prejudice as completely preempted and time-barred under federal labor law.

I

Before the events giving rise to this case occurred, plaintiffs were employed by the Frigidaire Division of General Motors at its Dayton-area plant. They were paid at the wage rates prevailing in the automotive industry instead of the lower wages of the appliance industry. General Motors wanted to pay its Frigidaire employees at the lower rates and, to this end, it negotiated a new agreement with the local in 1976. As the quid for this quo, General Motors agreed that Frigidaire workers could transfer to the nearby Delco plant, also owned by General Motors and organized by the local, where automotive workers' rates prevailed. The agreement granting the plaintiffs these rights, called the "bridge agreement" by the parties, provided that if there were lay-offs at Delco, Frigidaire workers who had transferred there could return to Frigidaire, where they would replace workers with less seniority. Plaintiffs took advantage of the "bridge agreement" and transferred from the Frigidaire plant to the Delco plant. The Delco plant later became a part of the Harrison Radiator Division of General Motors, but for purposes of simplicity we shall continue to refer to it as the Delco plant.

In 1979, General Motors sold its Frigidaire Division to White Motors, but retained possession of the physical plant at Dayton. General Motors planned to convert the facility and use it as part of its Chevrolet Division. All the workers were laid off as a result. The local then entered into negotiations with General Motors in order to secure employment for its laid-off members when the plant re-opened and to maintain its own position as their bargaining agent. General Motors agreed to rehire its laid-off employees and to recognize the union, but in the ensuing collective-bargaining agreement, the "bridge agreement" was abrogated. The resulting agreement was ratified by workers from the former Frigidaire plant and by the former Frigidaire workers who had transferred to Delco. The latter group included the plaintiffs. At the time of ratification, workers at the Delco plant were experiencing full employment, while workers at the Frigidaire plant were being laid off. As the year progressed, however, the situation was reversed. Workers at the Delco plant were laid off, including the plaintiffs. When they tried to retreat to the former Frigidaire plant, now part of Chevrolet, they learned that the "bridge agreement" had been abrogated.

The substance of plaintiffs' grievance, both in the preceding case and in this one, is that they were not told that the new collective-bargaining agreement terminated their retreat rights and that the union president told them many times prior to ratification of the new collective bargaining agreement and afterwards that their "bridge agreement" rights would not be affected by the new arrangement. Plaintiffs argue that these representations were fraudulent and wrongly induced them to ratify an agreement not in their interest. Plaintiffs assert that the motivation for this alleged fraud was collusion between the local and General Motors, whereby the union agreed to the termination of plaintiffs' rights in exchange for General Motors's recognition of the local as the representative of the workers at the new Chevrolet plant. According to plaintiffs, this collusion constitutes common law fraud under state law. Plaintiffs also argue that the local president's post-ratification assurances about the survival of their rights have created a contract, which defendants have violated by refusing to honor their "bridge agreement" rights. Finally, the plaintiffs take the position that by their conduct in negotiating and...

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