Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc.
| Citation | 947 F.2d 1405 |
| Decision Date | 31 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-35488,90-35488 |
| Parties | Jess Wesley CRAWFORD; Diane LaPlante; Rodney Lane, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENUINE PARTS CO., INC.; Echlin, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Joseph R. Marra and Thomas A. Marra, Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, Great Falls, Mont., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Bert A. Fairclough and Dennis P. Clarke, Smith, Walsh, Clarke & Gregoire, Great Falls, Mont., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana.
Before WALLACE, C.J., and O'SCANNLAIN and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
We consider whether federal court deference to Indian tribal courts is required when the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction comes on the eve of trial, years after the action was filed.
This action arose when an automobile accident occurred on December 20, 1982, on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana. Jess Crawford, Diane LaPlante, and Rodney Lane, all members of the Blackfeet Tribe, were in Crawford's Ford Bronco when Lane, the driver, was forced to take evasive action to avoid livestock grazing on or near the road. The Bronco overturned and all three occupants were injured; Crawford was rendered a quadriplegic.
In 1984, the three injured occupants brought suit in state court against the State of Montana and various companies involved in the production, sale, or maintenance of the Bronco. Included were products liability claims against two companies, now known as Genuine Parts Company and Echlin, Incorporated, for the alleged improper manufacture and installation of brakes upon the Bronco. These two defendants are located outside of Montana.
Eventually, all but the two brake companies were settled out of the litigation. On January 13, 1987, the brake companies removed the action to federal district court on the ground of diversity. The district court assumed jurisdiction, consolidated the cases, and set a trial date of May 2, 1989.
On April 10, 1989, twenty-three days before trial, the three plaintiffs requested that the district court transfer the cases to the Blackfeet tribal court. The plaintiffs claimed that they had only recently realized that original jurisdiction properly lay in the tribal court. On April 14, all parties stipulated to vacating the trial date.
Over one year later, on May 8, 1990, the district court denied the motion to transfer and the parties' joint motion for a stay of proceedings. We granted permission for an immediate appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 737 F.Supp. 1121.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), and Iowa Mutual Insurance Company v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987), the Supreme Court announced that principles of comity required federal courts to dismiss or to abstain from deciding cases in which concurrent jurisdiction in an Indian tribal court was asserted. See Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 942 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir.1991) (Stock West II ). Whether proceedings are actually pending in the appropriate tribal court is irrelevant. See Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir.1987) (). "The requirement of exhaustion of tribal remedies is not discretionary; it is mandatory." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir.1991). If deference is called for, the district court may not relieve the parties from exhausting tribal remedies. Id. 1
Nonetheless, mandatory deference does not follow automatically from an assertion of tribal court jurisdiction. The Supreme Court took pains to note that exhaustion would not be required "where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction 'is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith,' or where the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n. 21, 105 S.Ct. at 2454 n. 21 (internal citation omitted). More recently, we held that deference to tribal courts is not required when the disputed issue is not a "reservation affair" or did not "ar[i]se on the reservation." Stock West II, 942 F.2d at 661.
In this case, the brake companies offer two reasons why the district court correctly declined to defer: (1) this case is not sufficiently tied to reservation interests, and (2) the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction was untimely. We examine each contention in turn.
The brake companies' first argument, not addressed by the district court, is that comity does not require federal court abstention or dismissal where the federal court's jurisdiction over the dispute is "derivative," having arisen by virtue of a removal from state court. The brake companies urge that this dispute involves "significant off-reservation activity," in contrast to the cases imposing a mandatory exhaustion requirement. Thus, the argument goes, Montana state courts would have at least concurrent jurisdiction over the case, and the principles of comity upon which the Supreme Court relied in LaPlante and National Farmers Union simply do not apply.
There is a kernel of merit in the brake companies' legal argument. As we recently held in Stock West II, the mandatory exhaustion requirement announced in LaPlante and National Farmers Union does not apply when the dispute is not a "reservation affair" and did not "arise on the reservation." See id. However, we do not agree that this particular case fits within the Stock West II rule. Lawsuits springing from on-reservation automobile accidents have often been considered to arise on the reservation, at least when members of the tribe are involved in the litigation. See, e.g., LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 11-13, 107 S.Ct. at 974-75 (); National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 847-49, 105 S.Ct. at 2449-50 (). "Such disputes clearly 'arise' on the reservation, given the situs of the harm on the reservation and the presence of Indian parties." Stock West II, 942 F.2d at 662.
We are perplexed by the brake companies' invocation of "derivative jurisdiction" as an answer to the comity concerns that have animated our cases in this area. It may well be that Montana state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over this matter; nonetheless, this case currently rests in federal court, with diversity jurisdiction. We see no reason why its arrival in the court by way of removal diminishes the force of the Supreme Court's directive that we not permit the federal courts to operate "in direct competition with the tribal courts," LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 16, 107 S.Ct. at 976. 2
The brake companies' other argument, that the assertion of tribal court jurisdiction was...
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