United States v. Brown, No. 17-15470

• Decision Date: 09 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. 17-15470
• Citation: 947 F.3d 655
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Corrine BROWN, Defendant - Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

947 F.3d 655

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.Corrine BROWN, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 17-15470

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed January 9, 2020

David Paul Rhodes, U.S. Attorney Service - Middle District of Florida, U.S. Attorney's Office, Tampa, FL, Eric G. Olshan, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

William Mallory Kent, Law Office Of William M. Kent, Jacksonville, FL, James Wesley Smith, III, CPLS, PA, Orlando, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael Robert Ufferman, Michael Ufferman Law Firm, PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,^* District Judge.

ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:

If the right to a jury trial means anything, it means a right to a verdict based on the evidence. Indeed, the entirety of our procedural mechanisms is geared to achieve this result: we have trials so we can ensure all jurors consider the same universe of evidence; we have an entire body of rules—the Federal Rules of Evidence—devoted to controlling the information on which jurors can rely in reaching their decision; and we expressly instruct the jurors that they must determine their verdict based on the evidence. Then, if a defendant loses at trial, on appeal, we review the record to be certain that sufficient evidence supports the verdict.

We do these things to try to ensure that only those proven guilty based on admissible evidence will be convicted and to try to prevent convictions that arise from prejudice or even ostensibly noble reasons—such as a juror’s belief that God has told him to convict, irrespective of the evidence. The consistent application of these practices underpins the public’s faith in the jury system and delivers due process of law, an ideal in which our system of justice is grounded.

So we must steadfastly insist that a deliberating juror who is incapable of reaching a verdict based on the evidence be dismissed, regardless of whether that juror intends to convict or acquit a defendant. If we do not, we guarantee that, under at least some circumstances, a juror who is unable to arrive at a verdict rooted in the evidence will nonetheless be allowed to convict a defendant. That is unacceptable.

Here, the district court became aware that during deliberations, Juror 13 in Defendant-Appellant Corrine Brown’s trial made remarks suggesting he might not base his verdict on the evidence adduced at trial. Specifically, Juror 13 informed the other jurors at the outset of deliberations that "[t]he Holy Spirit told [him]" that Brown was not guilty on all counts.

The district court questioned Juror 13 for a while, in the presence of the parties, to ascertain whether Juror 13 meant that he had prayed to the Holy Spirit for guidance and wisdom in reaching a verdict based on the evidence—which would not run afoul of the court’s instructions to return a verdict based on the evidence—or whether he meant instead that he believed the Holy Spirit had "told" him to return a certain verdict irrespective of what the evidence showed—which would violate the court’s instructions. Based on Juror 13’s responses and demeanor, the district court concluded that Juror 13 was not capable of rendering a verdict rooted in the evidence presented at trial but that, despite his best intentions, Juror 13 would instead arrive at a verdict based on his perceived divine revelation, uninformed by the actual evidence. For this reason, the district court dismissed Juror 13 from the jury.

We find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings. And for that reason, the district court certainly did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Juror 13 from the jury. To hold otherwise would undermine our system of justice by allowing jurors to return verdicts based not on the evidence or law, but instead on a juror’s perceived divine revelation, irrespective of the evidence. Though here, the juror’s perceived divine revelation might have worked in the criminal defendant’s favor had the district court not learned of it mid-deliberations, a contrary holding would allow criminal defendants to be convicted based on a divine revelation divorced from the evidence, rather than the evidence presented at trial—a troubling result, to say the least. And regardless of whether it works in favor of or against the defendant, a rule that would allow a juror to base his verdict on something other than the evidence would be antithetical to the rule of law and is contradicted by decades of precedent.

Brown also raises a challenge to the forfeiture order the district court entered. We find no error there, either. We therefore affirm Brown’s convictions.

I.

A.

A federal grand jury issued a 24-count indictment charging Brown with one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud ( 18 U.S.C. § 1349 ), sixteen counts of mail and wire fraud ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342, 1343 ), one count of theft of government funds ( 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 642 ), two counts of engaging in a scheme to conceal material facts ( 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) ), one count of engaging in a corrupt endeavor to obstruct the administration of the Internal Revenue laws ( 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) ), and three counts of filing a false tax return ( 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) ).

The charges related to One Door for Education—Amy Anderson Scholarship Fund ("One Door for Education"), an organization that purported to be a charity that raised funds for, "among other things, scholarship assistance for disadvantaged students and the purchase of computers to be donated to schools." According to the indictment, Brown and her alleged co-conspirators "used Brown’s official position as a Member of Congress to solicit contributions to One Door for Education and to induce individuals and entities to make donations" to that organization for the stated charitable purposes.

But upon receipt of the contributions, the indictment alleged, Brown and her co-conspirators distributed a total of only $1,200 for scholarships from the more than $800,000 collected for that stated purpose. The indictment further asserted that Brown and her co-conspirators used the "vast majority" of the remaining monies "for their own personal and professional benefit." In particular, the indictment charged that they used the funds to pay for "a variety of personal expenses" such as "luxury vacations," and "to pay for events hosted by Brown or held in [her] honor," including spending the monies for the use of luxury boxes at sporting and concert events.

Brown proceeded to trial on the charges. During jury selection, all prospective jurors affirmed that they had no "political, religious, or moral beliefs that would preclude [them] from serving as a fair, impartial juror" in the case and that they had no "religious or moral beliefs" that would preclude them from "sitting in judgment of another person." Then the selected jurors swore to "render a true verdict, according to the law, evidence, and instructions of this court, so help [them] God."

The court elaborated on that promise, explaining that the jurors’ job was to "decide this case based solely on the evidence [they] hear[d] in this courtroom." The court then repeated its instruction twice more: "If you didn’t get it in this courtroom, you shouldn’t have it. If you didn’t get it in this courtroom, you shouldn’t have it." In fact, the court further emphasized that "our whole system depends on the fact that the case is decided in this courtroom on the evidence in this courtroom and nothing else," and that "every single one of [the jurors] has that responsibility to make sure that that’s what happens."

During the trial, the parties presented 371 exhibits and testimony from 41 witnesses. On May 8, 2017, after the eight-day trial, the court instructed the jury on the law. It told the jury that its "decision must be based only on the evidence presented during the trial" and that it "must not be influenced in any way either by sympathy for or prejudice against the defendant or the government." And, the court said, the jury "must follow the law" as the court explained it, "even if [the jurors] d[id] not agree with the law," and "must follow all of [the court’s] instructions as a whole." The court explained that the government’s burden to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt required "real doubt, based on [the jury’s] reason and common sense after [ ] carefully and impartially consider[ing] all the evidence in the case." Then it emphasized that the jury "must consider only the evidence that [the court] ha[d] admitted in the case."

After instructing the jury on the elements of the charged offenses, the court told the jurors that they were the "judges of the facts" and that their "only interest [was] to seek the truth from the evidence in the case." Before the jury started deliberations, the court identified the alternates and ordered them to stay in the courthouse and to continue to not discuss the case. The jury then began deliberating.

B.

It wasn’t too long before trouble began to brew. In the evening of May 9, Juror 8 (who was not the foreperson) called the courtroom deputy and reported that she and other jurors had "concerns" about Juror 13. In particular, Juror 8 conveyed that from the outset of deliberations, Juror 13 had been speaking about "Higher Beings" in connection with Brown’s name. The courtroom deputy immediately informed Juror 8 that she could not discuss the matter with her but advised Juror 8 that she would report the matter to the district judge, which she did. Once the district judge learned of the problem, he communicated with counsel about the situation that evening (May 9).

First thing the next morning (May 10), the court convened a hearing with counsel and Brown on the matter, where it stated for the record what had transpired the evening before. At the hearing, the district court stated, "[I]t is difficult to tell how...