Spring Creek Home, LLC v. Shurigar
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. A-19-584.,A-19-584. |
| Citation | 28 Neb.App. 785,948 N.W.2d 297 |
| Parties | SPRING CREEK HOME, LLC, a Nebraska limited liability company, appellee, v. Rhoda SHURIGAR, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Court of Appeals |
Richard Calkins, of Calkins Law Office, Alma, for appellant.
Gregory D. Barton, of Barton Law, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
Rhoda Shurigar appeals from an order of the district court for Webster County that found her personally liable to Spring Creek Home, LLC, for unpaid care expenses incurred by a man for whom she served as a court-appointed guardian. She argues on appeal that the court erred in its interpretation of the contract, that its decision contravenes public policy, and that damages were not sufficiently proved. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the order of the district court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
On October 2, 2017, Spring Creek Home filed a complaint alleging that Shurigar had breached a "Resident Service Agreement" (Agreement) she had signed on her ward's behalf and was therefore personally responsible for the unpaid charges incurred. Attached to the complaint was a copy of the Agreement, which was signed by Shurigar. It named Timothy Tierney as the "Resident" and Shurigar as the "Responsible Party." Also attached to the complaint were a monthly services statement and other documents demonstrating the amount of damages claimed. Shurigar filed an answer on November 6, 2017.
Shurigar filed a motion to dismiss on March 2, 2018. Meanwhile, Spring Creek Home filed a motion for summary judgment and notice of hearing on March 21. On May 7, a hearing on Spring Creek Home's motion for summary judgment was held, but Shurigar failed to appear. In its order, the court stated that Shurigar had reasonable advance notice of the hearing. The court found that the evidence was undisputed that the Agreement named Shurigar a " ‘responsible party’ " and that she was personally liable for any breach of the Agreement. The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to Shurigar's failure to pay Spring Creek Home charges of $9,923.97 and entered a judgment of that amount in Spring Creek Home's favor.
On May 17, 2018, Shurigar filed a motion to set aside default judgment and application for new trial and an affidavit in support thereof. She stated that proper notice was not given to her for the May 7 hearing. The court determined that even though Spring Creek Home appeared to have sent notice by first-class mail as claimed, there was a question as to whether Shurigar actually received the notice. Moreover, after reviewing the parties’ briefs and affidavits, the court determined that Shurigar may have a meritorious defense and that the interests of justice demanded that the case be heard on its merits. Accordingly, on October 4, the court sustained Shurigar's motion to set aside the summary judgment and motion for a new trial.
The court held a trial on March 27, 2019. A copy of the Agreement was admitted into evidence as exhibit 4. At the top of page 1, the Agreement identifies the parties:
| *788 Spring Creek Home, LLC | |
| Resident Service Agreement | |
| This agreement is between: | Date: May 20, 2015 |
| Spring Creek Home, LLC | |
| 602 Michigan Ave. | |
| Inavale, NE 68952 | Resident |
| Timothy Tierney | |
| Casey Snell, Administrator | Rhoda Shurigar |
| Facility Representative | Responsible Party |
| Hereafter known as the "Facility" | Hereafter known as the "Resident" |
Later on page 1, under "General Provisions," it states:
On page 2, under the heading "Financial Agreement," the Agreement states, We will enumerate other pertinent provisions of the Agreement as needed in our analysis of the case.
Michaelle Strickland, the chief executive officer of Spring Creek Home, testified that she had drafted the Agreement. She described Spring Creek Home as a residential facility that provided services for people who were diagnosed with severe chronic mental illnesses. She said that most residents were "dual eligible" for government benefits, meaning they received both Medicaid and Medicare benefits. Like those of many residents, Tierney's benefits had been paid directly to Spring Creek Home since he became a resident in May 2015—according to Shurigar. Strickland testified that Tierney had also been receiving benefits under the State's "Aid to Aged, Blind and Disabled" (AABD) program, but that those benefits terminated in January 2017.
Casey Snell, who began as the administrator at Spring Creek Home in 2012, testified that she personalized their template agreement for Tierney. She signed page 8 of the Agreement as "Facility Representative." Snell discussed Tierney's pastdue account and testified that she often worked with residents whose accounts fell behind because it took time for them to recover funds in conjunction with State agencies. As an example, she testified that Spring Creek Home had received a $3,000 payment in a single month, which was much more than usual, because it was for past-due benefits owed to Tierney under the AABD program.
Shurigar testified that she worked as a professional legal guardian and conservator as appointed by the courts. She was appointed Tierney's temporary guardian on May 4, 2015, and appointed his full and permanent guardian on September 14. However, she was never appointed Tierney's conservator. Tierney had been found to be mentally incapacitated due to his mental health and substance abuse issues. Shurigar testified that she intentionally chose Spring Creek Home for Tierney because of its isolation and lack of nearby bars or liquor stores. Additionally, he was known to flee the places he lived. Shurigar called the decision to move Tierney into Spring Creek Home "absolutely strategic" as it made it easier to control his behavior and remove "temptations" from him.
Shurigar said that Spring Creek Home housed many other residents for whom she served as their guardian. She therefore had an existing relationship with Snell and testified that, if Snell was busy or out of town, Snell sometimes got paperwork to her after a resident had already moved into Spring Creek Home. Shurigar testified that she did not remember whether Snell and she signed the Agreement before or after Tierney had actually moved into Spring Creek Home but said that it was close in time.
When Shurigar became Tierney's guardian, he was not receiving benefits under the State's AABD program, but she said that she filed an application on his behalf as soon as he was placed at Spring Creek Home. He was approved, and Shurigar said that she reapplied for the benefits annually, which renewals were due on June 1 each year. Shurigar said that she was unaware that the State had terminated Tierney's benefits under the AABD program until Snell emailed her. She did reapply for AABD benefits after being informed by Snell of their termination. She subsequently decided to become the payee for Tierney's benefits and pay the provider. She decided to seek a new placement for Tierney after becoming concerned that Tierney was being billed for items for which he was not supposed to be billed.
Shurigar testified that she never signed a guaranty to be financially responsible for Tierney. She said that she would not have signed the Agreement if she thought Spring Creek Home were going to hold her personally responsible for Tierney's debts, and she said that under the Agreement, she did not believe she was financially responsible for Tierney. Shurigar testified that she provided her legal guardianship papers to Spring Creek Home before she signed the Agreement and that she signed the Agreement as Tierney's legal guardian.
The court entered judgment on May 23, 2019. The court recited portions of the Agreement and found that its plain terms were not ambiguous: "It is clear that ... Shurigar is lumped into the category of a resident at the beginning of the contract." The court found that Shurigar, as a professional guardian, ought to have read the Agreement but clearly had not because it unambiguously made her liable for nonpayment. The court further found that the contract was not contrary to law or public policy because it bound only Shurigar and did not require guardians in all cases to be personally responsible for the debts of their wards. Accordingly, the court entered judgment on behalf of Spring Creek Home and against Shurigar in the amount of $11,836.13.
Shurigar appeals from the district court's judgment.
Shurigar assigns, consolidated and restated, that the district court erred in its interpretation of the parties’ Agreement, in its determination that the Agreement was not against public policy, and in its calculation of the amount of damages.
The meaning of a contract is a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach its conclusions independently of the determinations made by the court below. Meyer Natural Foods v. Greater Omaha Packing Co. , 302 Neb. 509, 925 N.W.2d 39 (2019).
The determination of whether a contract violates public policy presents a question of law, and an appellate court independently reviews questions of law decided by a lower court. Mays v. Midnite Dreams , 300 Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 71 (2018).
The amount of damages to be awarded is a determination solely for the fact finder, and its action in this respect will not be disturbed on appeal if it is supported by evidence and bears a reasonable relationship to elements of damages proved. U.S....
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