95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96, Knapper v. Connick

• Decision Date: 19 January 1996
• Citation: 95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96, Knapper v. Connick, 668 So.2d 465 (La. App. 1996)
• Parties: 95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 465

668 So.2d 465

95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96

Issac KNAPPER, v. Harry F. CONNICK and David Paddison.

No. 95-CA-1377.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Fourth Circuit.

Jan. 19, 1996.

Writ Granted April 8, 1996.

Michael G. Riehlmann, and Laurie A. White, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellant, Issac Knapper.

Bruce S. Kingsdorf, Cleveland, Barrios, Kingsdorf & Casteix, L.L.P., New Orleans, for defendant/appellee, David Paddison.

Before BYRNES, LOBRANO and MURRAY, JJ.

[95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 1] MURRAY, Judge.

Issac Knapper appeals the grant of summary judgment dismissing his malicious prosecution claim against David Paddison ¹.

In 1979, Mr. Knapper was indicted by an Orleans Parish grand jury for first degree murder in connection with a highly publicized attempted robbery and killing of a tourist. After indictment, the case was assigned for prosecution to Assistant District Attorney David Paddison, who obtained a conviction based primarily upon the testimony of a co-defendant and the corroborating testimony of a surviving victim. Mr. Knapper was sentenced to life imprisonment at Angola, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Knapper, 458 So.2d 1284 (La.1984).

Mr. Knapper subsequently obtained the initial police report for the murder at issue and filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that the report [95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 2] contained exculpatory material which should have been disclosed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). In State v. Knapper, 579 So.2d 956, 960 (La.1991), the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with Mr. Knapper's contentions ² and remanded for a new trial, specifically concluding "that the prosecution failed to disclose the [police] report to the defense." On remand the Orleans Parish District Attorney's office entered a nolle prosequi in the case. The dismissal form shows the recommendation was based upon inconsistencies in the police report noted by the Supreme Court as well as difficulties in obtaining witnesses. Mr. Knapper was released from Angola in late 1991 after being incarcerated for more than twelve years. He filed this suit for malicious prosecution shortly thereafter.

After answering Mr. Knapper's Second Amending Petition, Mr. Paddison moved for a summary judgment of dismissal. The motion was granted based upon the trial court's finding that although the criminal case was "a bad prosecution" and that "a gross injustice may have been done here," Mr. Paddison was immune from suit for malicious prosecution under Foster v. Powdrill, 463 So.2d 891 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985). Additionally, the court indicated that since a grand jury had indicted Mr. Knapper, Mr. Paddison could not be liable. On appeal, Mr. Knapper asserts both stated grounds for dismissal are erroneous conclusions of law.

When reviewing a trial court decision granting summary judgment, appellate courts consider the evidence de novo, applying the same criteria used by trial [95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 3] courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Select Properties, Ltd., 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183. Thus, the appellate court must make an independent determination of whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La.Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 966(B); Young v. Oberhelman, 607 So.2d 719 (La.App. 4th Cir.1992). Summary judgment must be reversed unless the reviewing court finds that the mover proved both of the following elements: (1) no genuine issues of material fact exist, and (2) the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Chaisson v. Domingue, 372 So.2d 1225, 1227 (La.1979); Poydras Square Associates v. Suzette's Artique Inc., 614 So.2d 131 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). A fact is material if its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiff's cause of action. Whitney National Bank v. Rockwell, 94-3049 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 1325. Both the evidence and all inferences drawn from the evidence must be construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, and all doubt must be resolved in his favor. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 94-1648 & 94-1649 (La.App. 4th Cir. 3/16/95), 652 So.2d 1090, 1093, writ denied, 95-0949 (La. 5/19/95), 654 So.2d 1090.

Mr. Paddison contends summary judgment was properly granted because district attorneys are immune from suit for actions taken within the course of their duties. Although this issue of prosecutorial immunity has not been addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Second Circuit has recently held that a district attorney enjoys absolute immunity for actions taken within the scope of his or her prosecutorial duties. Connor v. Reeves, 26,419 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1/25/95), 649 [95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 4] So.2d 803, writ denied, 95-0771 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 601. Drawing on the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), it was found "that public officers would be greatly hampered, deterred and intimidated in the discharge of their duties if they were not protected to some reasonable degree from private liability for actions which are improper or exceed their authority." Connor, 26,419 at p. 4, 649 So.2d at 805. Thus, although the plaintiff in Connor presented documentary evidence which purportedly showed there was no legal basis for the charges brought by the defendant district attorney, the dismissal of the suit on summary judgment was affirmed.

However, this court has long held that malicious prosecution is an exception to the quasi-judicial immunity afforded to district attorneys and members of their staffs. West v. Foti, 94-2139, p. 2-3 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/26/95), 654 So.2d 834, 836, writ denied, 95-1333 (La. 9/1/95), 658 So.2d 1267; Dean v. Nunez, 534 So.2d 1282, 1294 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (on reh'g), reversed on other grounds, 536 So.2d 1203 (La.1989), on remand, 541 So.2d 260 (La.App. 4th Cir.1989), writ denied, 541 So.2d 1386 (La.1989); Crier v. New Orleans, 365 So.2d 35, 36 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978). While prosecutors are protected against claims for mere negligence, such as the "sloppy record keeping" seen in West, 94-2139 at p. 3, 654 So.2d at 836, they may still be held accountable for actions taken for private advantage or in reckless disregard of the rights of others, Miller v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Dept., 511 So.2d 446, 453 (La.1987). Therefore, absent a definitive ruling by our Supreme Court, we decline to overrule this court's longstanding precedents and thus extend absolute immunity to prosecutors.

[95-1377 La.App. 4 Cir. 5] Mr. Paddison contends that, even if he is not protected from suit by prosecutorial immunity, summary judgment was properly granted because Mr. Knapper cannot prove all essential elements of his claim as set forth in Miller, 511 So.2d at 452. First, he asserts that since his affidavit establishes that a grand jury indicted Mr. Knapper at the behest of another assistant district attorney and that he "did not have the power ... to refuse to prosecute an individual assigned to him for prosecution," it cannot be proven that he was the legal cause of the criminal proceedings or that probable cause for that proceeding was lacking.

We find, however, that Mr. Paddison's reliance on another prosecutor's presentation and the subsequent grand jury indictment is not justified. Our courts have rejected a presumption of probable cause based upon indictment, Parks v. Winnfield Life Ins. Co., 336 So.2d 1021, 1029 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 339 So.2d 351 (La.1976), or even based upon a conviction on the allegedly baseless criminal charges, Jones v. Soileau, 448 So.2d 1268, 1272 (La.1984).

Moreover, it is unknown when the critical police...