Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 September 1996
• Docket Number: INC,KMI-CONTINENTA,No. 655,D,655
• Parties: 73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1615 Veronice A. HOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v., Defendant-Appellee. ocket 95-7297.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 123

95 F.3d 123

73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1615

Veronice A. HOLT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KMI-CONTINENTAL, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 655, Docket 95-7297.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 19, 1995.

Decided Sept. 4, 1996.

Veronice A. Holt, Washington, D.C., Pro Se.

Lisa J. Damon, Hartford, CT (Albert Zakarian, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, CT, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: KEARSE, MINER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PARKER, Circuit Judge:

I. BACKGROUND

Veronice A. Holt, a black female attorney, appeals from a judgment of the District Court of Connecticut (Alfred V. Covello, Judge ) dismissing her complaint brought under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). Plaintiff sued defendant, KMI-Continental, claiming that defendant discriminated against her in the terms and conditions of her work because of her race and sex in violation of Title VII and § 1981. The district court dismissed all of plaintiff's pay discrimination claims because it determined that they were barred by the statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 and (although it was not pled) to the Equal Pay Act. Finding no genuine issues of material fact, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claims of discrimination in promotions, job tracking, and retaliation.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the § 1981 claim as well as the claim of discrimination in promotions and job tracking, and the retaliation claim. The district court erred, however, when it failed to consider the merits of plaintiff's Title VII pay discrimination claim after holding that the § 1981 pay discrimination (and unpled Equal Pay Act) claims were time barred. After reviewing the merits of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the pay discrimination claim, we hold that plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant's explanation for any pay discrepancy is pretextual. We grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on this alternative ground.

A. Procedural History

This is the third time plaintiff appeals to this court. In order to make some sense of what has happened thus far, a review of the procedural history of the case follows.

In October of 1981, while still employed at Continental, Holt filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CCHRO") alleging that Continental had unlawfully discriminated against her in pay, promotions, and benefits because of her race and sex. Two months later, Holt filed a second complaint with the CCHRO alleging retaliation. On January 22, 1982, defendant discharged plaintiff. On February 3, 1982, Holt amended her CCHRO complaint to include a claim of retaliatory discharge.

On February 16, 1982, Holt filed a complaint in federal district court under Title VII and § 1981. Plaintiff sought the sole relief of a preliminary injunction reinstating her to her position with Continental pending the outcome of the administrative proceedings before the CCHRO. The district court denied the preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate either likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm required for injunctive relief. Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 542 F.Supp. 16, 17 (D.Conn.1982).

This court reversed and remanded because the district court had not considered whether defendant's allegedly retaliatory discharge of plaintiff could have a chilling effect on other individuals considering pursuing relief under Title VII or § 1981, or on witnesses who might testify on behalf of plaintiff, thus satisfying the irreparable injury requirement for a preliminary injunction. Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1294, 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984). In addition, the court explained that if plaintiff wanted to pursue her § 1981 action for damages, she should amend her complaint so it could be considered on the merits if the court denied the preliminary injunction motion. Id. at 92.

On remand, plaintiff chose not to amend her complaint to add a § 1981 claim for damages. However, she added § 1981 and § 1983 claims against various state officials. The district court dismissed the claims against the state officials, Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 653 (D.Conn.1985), denied the preliminary injunction in an unpublished opinion and dismissed the complaint. Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., No. B-82 Civ. 119 (D. Conn. June 6, 1985). Plaintiff appealed and this court affirmed by summary order. Holt v. Continental Group, Inc., 788 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 141, 93 L.Ed.2d 84 (1986).

On August 6, 1986, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued a right to sue letter on the claims of discrimination in pay, benefits, and promotion. Plaintiff filed suit on August 8 on those claims. ¹ On February 24, 1993, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter on the retaliation claims. On March 25, 1993, plaintiff filed suit on those claims. ² On September 15, 1993, the district court granted Continental's motion to consolidate the two cases. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment and the court granted defendant's motion on all counts. Holt v. KMI Continental, Inc., No. B-86 Civ. 389 & 93 Civ. 619 (D.Conn. Feb. 16, 1995). This appeal followed.

B. Facts

Holt is a black female attorney. She graduated from George Washington law school in 1973. In 1976, Continental hired her to work in the legal department of a subsidiary, Continental Forest Industries ("CFI"), as Assistant General Counsel. Her starting salary was $26,000, which was higher than her previous salary and consistent with her three years of work experience. During her tenure at Continental, plaintiff repeatedly complained that her salary was lower than those of her colleagues. Defendant attempted to alleviate plaintiff's concerns, often awarding her substantial raises. She was being paid $57,500 at the time she was terminated in 1982.

Although Holt received significant raises while employed by defendant, she was not permitted to participate in the Management Incentive Plan, ("MIP") the company's bonus program. Prior to a 1979 revision, the company permitted all attorneys to participate in the MIP. The revision resulted in higher salaries for attorneys, so Continental could more readily compete for legal talent, but fewer people were eligible for participation in the MIP. Following this revision, defendant did not permit attorneys with a C-2 salary grade to participate in the MIP with the exception of C-2 level attorneys who were participating prior to the revision and were "grandfathered" into the program. Neither Holt nor any other black employees met the eligibility requirements of the MIP program.

During Holt's tenure, three promotional opportunities became available. Holt sought out each promotion, and although she received other promotions, she was not awarded any of these particular promotions. She argues that the defendant's promotional policies were discriminatory because defendant filled each of the positions with a white colleague or left it unfilled.

The first position to become available was for an Associate General Counsel at CFI. Plaintiff's supervisor told her that she was not yet ready for the position, although she received a qualified evaluation for it. The position remained unfilled and various components of the job were delegated to other employees. A short time later, defendant promoted Holt to Corporate Counsel II at CGI, another of the subsidiaries. When plaintiff became discontented with the Corporate Counsel II position, defendant offered her two options for promotion. She ultimately accepted a new position as Securities Counsel.

The second promotion, which plaintiff did not receive, was Corporate Secretary of CGI. Defendant promoted William Sisley, a white male, who had four years more experience than Holt. The third position that became available was Assistant General Counsel of CGI. Defendant told Holt she was not yet ready for the position. The position remained vacant until after Holt was terminated. Defendant eventually gave the promotion to Patricia Heck, a white woman with more experience than Holt.

In support of her retaliation claim, Holt relies on the following evidence. Holt filed a complaint with the CCHRO in October 1981 claiming that Continental had discriminated against her in pay, benefits, and promotion because of her race and sex. Throughout her tenure with Continental, Holt received positive performance reviews. However, in December of 1981, Holt's performance review was "fully satisfactory," two levels below her prior rating. Plaintiff filed another complaint with the CCHRO two days later claiming retaliation.

Defendants respond that in January of 1982, the problems between plaintiff and defendant escalated. Two company executives complained about plaintiff's performance. One of the executives indicated that he was uneasy working with plaintiff. Without the proper authority, plaintiff unilaterally fired outside counsel and then hired new outside counsel. Defendants also maintain that plaintiff was disruptive in the office and was unable to get along with her colleagues. For example, plaintiff apparently demanded that a colleague, who was working on a business matter under deadline, relinquish access to the only available word processor so that she could work on a personal matter. After discussing these and other problems with plaintiff, defendants determined that plaintiff was no longer suited to her position. On January 20, 1982, plaintiff was fired.

II. DISCUSSION

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard applied by the district court. Taggart v. Time Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 45-46 (2d Cir.1991). A motion for...