Clark v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am.

CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Florida
Citation95 F.Supp.3d 1335
Docket NumberCase No. 3:14–cv–1037–J–34PDB.
PartiesChristine A. CLARK, Plaintiff, v. UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant.
Decision Date26 March 2015

Lindsay Tygart–Havice, Thomas S. Edwards, Jr., Edwards & Ragatz, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jeptha Fowlkes Barbour, Meagan Lindsay Logan, Marks Gray, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32; Report), entered by the Honorable Patricia D. Barksdale, United States Magistrate Judge, on February 9, 2015. In the Report, Magistrate Judge Barksdale recommends that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 8; Motion to Remand) be denied. See Report at 36. Magistrate Judge Barksdale further recommends that the Court should permit Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, and as such, deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 3; Motion to Dismiss) as moot. See Report at 1–2, 36. On February 23, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the Report. See Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations of February 9, 2015 (Doc. 33; Objections). Defendant responded in opposition to the Objections on March 9, 2015. See Defendant UNUM Life Insurance Company of America's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations of February 9, 2015 (Doc. 34; Response). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). If no specific objections to findings of fact are filed, the district court is not required to conduct a de novo review of those findings. See Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 779 n. 9 (11th Cir.1993) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, the district court must review the legal conclusions in the report de novo. See Cooper–Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir.1994) ; United States v. Rice, No. 2:07–mc–8–FtM–29SPC, 2007 WL 1428615, at *1 (M.D.Fla. May 14, 2007) ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

In her Objections, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination that the Motion to Remand should be denied. Plaintiff does not dispute the Magistrate Judge's factual findings. Indeed, it appears that the parties agree on the basic facts relevant to resolving the Motion to Remand. See Transcript of Oral Argument (Doc. 30; Tr.) at 17–19, 44–46. Rather, Plaintiff contends that Judge Barksdale erred in concluding that: (1) Defendant timely filed its Notice of Removal, and (2) the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because complete ERISA1 preemption is present. See Objections at 1.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Notice of Removal is untimely because Plaintiff's Complaint and discovery responses gave Defendant adequate notice that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Id. at 4–7. Although the Complaint and responses themselves did not contain the relevant information, Plaintiff contends that because the Complaint referred Defendant to unattached insurance policies, and the discovery responses referred Defendant to its claim files, Defendant was “on notice” or otherwise had a duty to review the referenced documents and determine that the $75,000 jurisdictional amount was met. See id. at 5–7. In addition, Plaintiff argues that, had Defendant reviewed its claim files, it would have found the facts supporting its ERISA preemption argument. Id. at 6–7. As such, because Defendant did not remove this case within thirty days of its receipt of the Complaint or Plaintiff's discovery responses, Plaintiff maintains that the Notice of Removal is untimely. Id. at 3, 6–7. Second, Plaintiff contends that her claims are not preempted because the insurance policies at issue are not governed by ERISA. See id. at 7–8. In support, she relies on the fact that neither she, her former employers, nor the insurance agent intended for ERISA to apply to the subject disability policies, the policies were sold as individual policies, and the policies do not contain any ERISA language. Id. at 8. Plaintiff emphasizes that the policies do not apply to any “class of beneficiaries” but were obtained only for her, and that none of her employers had any control over the policies. Id. at 9–10.

Upon independent review of the file and for the reasons stated in Judge Barksdale's Report, the Court will overrule the Objections, and accept and adopt the legal and factual conclusions recommended by the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge carefully considered the foregoing arguments, among others, comprehensively reviewed the applicable law, and determined that Plaintiff's contentions were unavailing. The Court concludes that Judge Barksdale's recommended resolution of the Motion to Remand results from a correct application of the appropriate legal framework and an accurate assessment of the relevant record. While Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Barksdale's conclusions, she has simply failed to show them to be legally or factually incorrect. In addition, absent any objection from Defendant, see Response at 8, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that Plaintiff be given leave to amend. As such, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss as moot. In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations of February 9, 2015 (Doc. 33) are OVERRULED.
2. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) is ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.
3. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 8) is DENIED.
4. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before April 27, 2015.
5. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 3) is DENIED as moot, without prejudice to filing another motion if appropriate upon review of the amended complaint.
6. The parties shall file an amended case management report on or before April 27,2015.
Report and Recommendation

PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Through contract and tort claims under state law, Christine Clark seeks disability benefits and mental-distress damages from Unum Life Insurance Company of America. Doc. 2. Before the Court is Unum's motion to dismiss her tort claim, Doc. 3 (motion), Doc. 21 (response), and her motion to remand the case to state court on the grounds that Unum's only basis for removal—federal-question jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 –1461 —is absent and Unum filed its removal notice too late. Doc. 8 (motion), Doc. 11 (response), Doc. 19 (reply). I heard arguments on the motions, Doc. 30, and the parties supplemented their arguments afterward, Docs. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29. Concluding that ERISA completely preempts at least one contract claim and Unum timely filed its notice of removal, I recommend denying her motion to remand. Because she has stated a desire to amend the complaint if the case stays here, Doc. 30 at 55, I recommend giving her leave to do so and denying without prejudice the motion to dismiss the tort claim.

I. Background
A. Pleadings

Clark filed the complaint in state court on September 9, 2013. Docs. 1–1, 2. She alleges the following facts. She is a Florida citizen,1 and Unum is a Tennessee corporation with its principal place of business in Maine.2 Doc. 2 ¶¶ 1–3, 6. She used to be a trial lawyer specializing in “civil trial, personal injury, and wrongful death.” Doc. 2 ¶¶ 7, 8. In that position, she bought from Unum two “personal” disability policies, the first in 1992 and the second in 1994.3 Doc. 2 ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 8. More than a decade later, because of spine problems and depression, she could no longer work in that position. Doc. 2 ¶ 9. Unum recommended she was “totally disabled” and paid her benefits beginning in December 2007 (pending validation) but ceased in October 2010, finding she was no longer disabled. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 13, 14.

Clark identifies the policies by designation numbers, purchase dates, and subject but does not attach them to the complaint. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 4, 5. Instead, for each, she alleges: “In lieu of attaching a copy of the referenced policy to this Complaint, Plaintiff would show that Unum is the originator and creator of said contract/policy of insurance and the original is already in its possession.” Doc. 2 ¶¶ 4, 5.

Clark asserts three claims under Florida law: (1) breach of the first disability policy by failing to timely pay benefits, Doc. 2 ¶¶ 22–25; (2) breach of the second disability policy by failing to timely pay benefits, Doc. 2 ¶¶ 26–29; and (3) negligent or intentional breach of statutory duties in Fla. Stat. § 626.9541 (defining unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices by insurers) and other unspecified statutes by failing to timely pay benefits, investigate the claims, and communicate about the claims. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 18, 30–33.

Clark does not specify an amount in controversy. See generally Doc. 2. She alleges, [t]his is an action for damages in excess of $15,000.” Doc. 2 ¶ 1; see Fla. Stat. § 26.012(2)(a) (providing jurisdiction of circuit courts over all cases not cognizable by county courts); Fla. Stat. § 34.01(1)(c) (providing jurisdiction of county courts over cases in which amount in controversy does not exceed $15,000). For the contract claims, she alleges that she “has suffered and continues to suffer damages.” Doc. 2 ¶¶ 25, 29. For all of the claims, she demands unpaid benefits, interest, costs, and attorney's fees. Doc. 2 ¶¶ 25, 29, 33. For the tort claim, she also seeks damages for mental anguish caused by having to undergo lifestyle changes. Doc. 2 ¶ 33.

In state court, Unum answered the contract claims, Doc. 4, moved to dismiss the tort claim on the ground it cannot proceed before any breach determination, Doc. 3, and...

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