Riley v. County of Broome

• Decision Date: 21 November 2000
• Citation: 95 N.Y.2d 455,742 N.E.2d 98,719 N.Y.S.2d 623
• Parties: BETTY A. RILEY et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF BROOME et al., Respondents. JOHN P. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

95 N.Y.2d 455

742 N.E.2d 98

719 N.Y.S.2d 623

BETTY A. RILEY et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF BROOME et al., Respondents.

JOHN P. WILSON, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of the State of New York.

Argued October 17, 2000.

Decided November 21, 2000.

Thomas F. Cannavino, Endicott, for appellants in the first above-entitled action.

William L. Gibson, Jr., County Attorney of Broome County, Binghamton (Robert G. Behnke of counsel), for respondents in the first above-entitled action.

Lockwood & Golden, Utica (Lawrence W. Golden and B. Brooks Benson of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled action.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Robert M. Goldfarb, Preeta D. Bansal, Daniel Smirlock and Peter G. Crary of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action. Judges SMITH, LEVINE, CIPARICK, WESLEY and ROSENBLATT concur.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Chief Judge KAYE.

These appeals call upon us to do what increasingly is asked of courts in this age of statutes: interpret the words of a legislative enactment which the contesting parties construe differently. In particular, we are asked whether Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) exempts statutorily defined "hazard vehicles" engaged in highway work from the "rules of the road," and whether it limits the liability of their owners and operators to reckless disregard for the safety of others. We conclude that defendants correctly read the statute, and we hold—as did the courts before us—that the vehicles here were exempt from the rules of the road and their liability limited to reckless conduct.

Riley v County of Broome

Defendant Garwood A. Young, an employee of the Broome County Highway Division, was operating a street sweeper on West Colesville Road in the Town of Kirkwood. Young was driving two or three miles per hour, with the sweeper straddling the shoulder and the road. Plaintiff Betty Riley was also driving on West Colesville Road, in the same direction as the street sweeper. As Riley reached the top of a hill, she saw a "huge patch of fog"—actually a cloud of dirt and dust created by the sweeper—and collided with the sweeper.

Riley and her husband brought this action against Young and the County, alleging that the sweeper caused the accident. At trial, the court held—over Riley's objection—that, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), the applicable standard of care was whether defendants conducted themselves "in such a way so as not to recklessly disregard the safety of others." The court then charged the jury on that standard. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, finding no recklessness in the operation of the sweeper. In a comprehensive opinion by Justice Anthony J. Carpinello, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), all vehicles engaged in "highway maintenance" are exempt from the rules of the road and subject only to a recklessness standard (263 AD2d 267, 273).

Wilson v State of New York

Claimant John Wilson was driving west from Canajoharie to Utica on Route 5, traveling at 30 to 35 miles per hour. Moderate to heavy snow was falling, rendering visibility poor. Two snowplows owned by the State were operating near the intersection of Route 5 and Route 167, one behind the other in the eastbound passing lane on Route 5. As Wilson approached the intersection, the first snowplow stopped to make a wide turn, and the second snowplow—driven by William Hunt— made a left turn inside the first plow in an attempt to enter Route 167 North. Although Hunt looked, he did not see Wilson's car approaching, and his snowplow collided with Wilson's car.

Wilson then brought the present action against the State of New York. The case proceeded to trial before the Court of Claims. At the close of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss, arguing that Wilson had failed to establish that the accident was the result of recklessness. The court granted the motion, holding that a recklessness standard applied because the snowplow was involved in work on a highway within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b), and that the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that since the snowplow qualified as a vehicle "actually engaged in work on a highway" under section 1103 (b), the recklessness standard applied, and the evidence failed to establish that Hunt had acted recklessly (269 AD2d 854).

The "Hazard Vehicle" Exemption

On appeal to this Court, Riley and Wilson (claimants) contend that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) does not exempt "hazard vehicles"—like snowplows and street sweepers—from the rules of the road.¹ Rather, they assert that section 1103 (b) exempts such vehicles only from the stopping, standing and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a). We agree with the trial courts and the Appellate Division that section 1103 (b) exempts all vehicles "actually engaged in work on a highway"—including the vehicles here— from the rules of the road.

Some degree of risk, of course, is inherent in travel on public highways. Certain classes of vehicles—like snowplows and street sweepers—are intended to minimize the risk by keeping the roadways clean and safe for everyone. While serving an important public function, however, those vehicles may themselves cause risks to ordinary motorists with whom they share the road. Over the years, courts and legislatures have struggled to define the rules under which these vehicles may operate and the standard of care they owe to others.

At common law, all vehicles, including emergency vehicles, were held to an ordinary negligence standard (see, e.g., Farley v Mayor of City of N. Y., 152 NY 222, 227-228 [1897]; Garrett v City of Schenectady, 268 NY 219, 223-224 [1935]; Ottmann v Village of Rockville Centre, 275 NY 270, 273 [1937]).² But the common law also recognized that the level of care owed by emergency and road work vehicles must be tempered by the nature of their work. Fire trucks, for instance, were permitted to drive at the "greatest practicable speed," since the "safety of property and the protection of life may * * * depend upon celerity of movement" (Farley v Mayor of City of N. Y., supra, at 227). In addition, many emergency vehicles were, by statute, given the right of way (see, id.). Nevertheless, the common law required that such vehicles exercise their right of way "with care and caution * * * measured by the purpose and necessity of the right" (Hashey v Board of Fire Commrs. of Roosevelt Fire Dist., 192 NYS2d 767, 769-770 [Sup Ct, Nassau County]).

In 1957, the Legislature enacted what is now title VII of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (§ 1100 et seq.), creating a uniform set of traffic regulations, or the "rules of the road" (see, L 1957, ch 698). That legislation was intended to update and replace the former traffic regulations, and bring them into conformance with the Uniform Vehicle Code adopted in other states (see, Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1957, ch 698, at 35-37).

The Vehicle and Traffic Law states that the rules of the road apply to all vehicles unless otherwise provided by law (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1101, 1103 [a]). Except for the provisions regarding driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, however, the rules of the road explicitly do not apply to "persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 [b]).³ Section 1103 (b) adds that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202 (a), which regulates stopping, standing and parking, does not apply to "hazard vehicles while actually engaged in hazardous operation on or adjacent to a highway but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such hazardous operation." Similarly, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 exempts "emergency vehicles," such as ambulances, police vehicles and fire vehicles (see, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 101), engaged in emergency operations from the rules of the road, subject to specified conditions.

The language of these statutes seems clear: all vehicles "actually engaged in work on a highway"—just as all emergency vehicles engaged in emergency operations—are exempt from the rules of the road. In the cases at hand, the street sweeper and the snowplow were engaged in "work on a highway." The street sweeper was cleaning the street; the snowplow was clearing the road during a snowstorm. Thus, the Appellate Division correctly held that section 1103 (b) exempts both vehicles from the rules of the road.

We reject claimants' contention that designated "hazard vehicles" are exempt only from the stopping, standing and parking regulations of section 1202 (a), even when they are engaged in work on a highway. Section 1103 (b) says no such thing. Rather, by its plain language, section 1103 (b) excuses all vehicles "actually engaged in work on a highway" from the rules of the road, regardless of their classification. To be sure, the statute also gives protection to designated "hazard vehicles" engaged in "hazardous operation" (as defined by sections 117-a and 117-b), excusing them from the stopping, standing and parking rules of section 1202 (a). But the statute nowhere states that "hazard vehicles" are a distinct class from "work vehicles," nor does it deny "hazard vehicles" the special protection given to all vehicles actually engaged in road work.⁴

The legislative history of section 1103 (b) confirms this plain language reading.

We note at the outset that it is appropriate to examine the legislative history even though the language of section 1103 (b) is clear. The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to "ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a], at 177). Of course, the words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent. As a general rule,...