Brown v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 30 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11–11019–JGD. |
| Citation | 950 F.Supp.2d 274 |
| Parties | Gregory T. BROWN, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Commonwealth of MASSACHUSETTS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Ilyas J. Rona, John R. Bita, III, Milligan Coughlin LLC, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Stephen C. Pfaff, Louison, Costello, Condon & Pfaff, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
The plaintiff, Gregory T. Brown, Jr., (“Brown”), was formerly incarcerated at the Essex County Corrections Facility (“ECCF”) in Middleton, Massachusetts. He claims that on March 24, 2010, while he was housed in the special management unit at ECCF, he was viciously attacked and beaten by his cellmate, Nathaniel A. Kargbo (“Kargbo”). On June 7, 2011, Brown brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258 (“MTCA”), claiming that various prison officials and corrections officers at ECCF deprived him of his constitutional and state law rights by knowingly placing him in a cell with a violent and mentally ill cellmate, and refusing to move Brown out of the cell despite his repeated requests to do so.1 In his complaint, Brown named as defendants the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“Commonwealth”); the Sheriff of Essex County, Frank G. Cousins, Jr. (“Sheriff Cousins”); the Superintendent of ECCF, Michael Marks (“Marks”); correctional officers Frank L. Waterman (“Waterman”), Kevin G. Clark (“Clark”), and Jordon Corriea (“Corriea”); unidentified John Doe employees of the Essex Sheriff's Department (collectively, the “Essex defendants”); and Brown's alleged assailant, Kargbo. Each of the individual Essex defendants was sued both individually and in his official capacity.
On February 21, 2012, 2012 WL 588800, this court dismissed Brown's claims against the Commonwealth and the Essex defendants under the MTCA, as well as Brown's Section 1983 claim against Sheriff Cousins in his official capacity. (See Docket No. 20). Therefore, the claims that remain consist of Brown's Section 1983 claims against Waterman, Clark, Corriea, Marks, and the John Does in both their official and individual capacities, and Brown's Section 1983 claim against Sheriff Cousins in his individual capacity.
The matter is presently before the court on “Defendants Cousins, Marks, Waterman, Clark and Corriea's Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 56(C)” (Docket No. 38), by which the Essex defendants are seeking summary judgment in their favor on each of Brown's remaining claims against them. For all the reasons detailed herein, the motion is ALLOWED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. During oral argument, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss his claim against Sheriff Cousins, as well as his official capacity claims against Marks, Waterman, Clark and Corriea. Accordingly, this court will enter judgment in favor of the defendants on those claims and will not address them further. With respect to the remaining claims, this court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether Waterman, Clark and Corriea violated Brown's constitutional rights under Section 1983 by acting with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's health and safety. Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims is denied. However, because the plaintiff has not presented sufficient facts to support his Section 1983 claim against Marks, the motion for summary judgment is allowed with respect to that defendant.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows, based on the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “[A]n issue is ‘genuine’ if it ‘may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’ ” Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990)). “A fact is material only if it possesses the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.” Id. (quotations, punctuation and citations omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano–Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010). If that burden is met, the opposing party can avoid summary judgment only by providing properly supported evidence of disputed material facts that would require trial. LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993). Accordingly, “the nonmoving party ‘may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,’ ” but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Vineberg, 548 F.3d at 56. “If, after viewing the record in the non-moving party's favor, the Court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate.” Walsh v. Town of Lakeville, 431 F.Supp.2d 134, 143 (D.Mass.2006).
The Essex defendants contend, as an initial matter, that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Brown's remaining claims because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Def. Mem. (Docket No. 39) at 4–5). It is undisputed that Brown never filed a grievance concerning his placement in a cell with Kargbo or the defendants' failure to remove Kargbo from his cell. ( See Def. Ex. A at 35–36).2 However, this court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether the defendants' alleged failure to comply with Brown's requests for a cell change were grievable under ECCF's internal grievance policy. Therefore, the defendants have not established that they are entitled to summary judgment on this basis.
The exhaustion provision of the PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Thus, as a general matter, the PLRA “requires prisoners to exhaust prison grievance procedures before filing suit.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 202, 127 S.Ct. 910, 914, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Nevertheless, the statute “does not require exhaustion of all remedies; it requires the exhaustion of ‘such administrative remedies as are available.’ ” Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 740 (8th Cir.2001). If a matter is not grievable under the prison's grievance policy, there is no administrative remedy available to exhaust. Shaheed–Muhammad v. DiPaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80, 102–03 (D.Mass.2005) ().
The record in the instant case contains evidence indicating that the defendants' failure to honor Brown's requests for a cell reassignment was not a grievable matter under ECCF's internal grievance policy. For example, during his deposition, Marks testified that a request by an inmate to move his cell, like a request to take a shower or use the phone, would not be considered a grievance. (Pl. Ex. B at 42). Additionally, Waterman testified, during his deposition, that an inmate requesting a cell reassignment would be expected to verbalize his request rather than fill out a inmate request form pursuant to the facility's grievance procedure. ( See Pl. Ex. C at 23–25). As Waterman explained in his testimony, a cell reassignment is a matter that would be handled by the officers on the floor and would not require a more formal, written form. ( Id. at 24–25). He further stated that to the best of his knowledge, there are no forms that are used for cell changes at ECCF. ( Id. at 25).
Clarke's deposition testimony regarding the procedures for handling inmate requests for a cell change was consistent with the testimony of Waterman. Specifically, Clark testified that inmates seeking to change cells would raise the issue verbally with a correctional officer rather than on a written form. (Def. Supp. Ex. B at 53–54). He also stated that there was no grievance procedure available for inmates seeking to be moved to another cell within the protective custody unit where Brown was housed, and he denied that he had ever given an inmate a written form to use in connection with a request for a cell assignment. ( Id. at 55). When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendants' own testimony raises an issue of fact as to whether Brown's complaints about his cell assignment, and the defendants refusal to move him, were grievable. Therefore, this court concludes that the question of exhaustion cannot be resolved on summary judgment. See Maraglia v. Maloney, Civil Action No. 2001–12144–RBC, 2006 WL 3741927, at *2–3 (D.Mass. Dec. 18, 2006) ().
The defendants argue that their testimony should not be read to suggest that there was no grievance procedure available to accommodate Brown's request for a cell reassignment. (Def. Reply Mem. (Docket No. 51) at 1). Rather, they contend that they were merely explaining the difference between a request form, which is used as part of ECCF's informal grievance...
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...PLRA." (Docket Entry # 94, pp. 3, 6-8) (citing Shaheed – Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80 (D.Mass.2005), and Brown v. Massachusetts, 950 F.Supp.2d 274, 278 (D.Mass.2013) ). Plaintiff thus claims excusable neglect due to his failure to argue that he exhausted his remedies under the PLRA......
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