Ezell v. Darr

Citation951 F.Supp.2d 1316
Decision Date12 June 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 4:11–CV–93 (CDL).
PartiesTerri EZELL, Donna Tompkins, and Joan B. Wynn, Plaintiffs, v. John DARR, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Muscogee County, and the Columbus Consolidated Government, Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Middle District of Georgia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Cheryl B. Legare, Edward D. Buckley, Justin Michael Scott, Buckley & Klein, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Clifton Cartwright Fay, James C. Clark, Jr., Kirsten Colleen Stevenson, Lucy T. Sheftall, Thomas F. Gristina, Columbus, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

CLAY D. LAND, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

“If you shoot at a king, you must kill him.” 1 The modern political version: “Make sure you pick the winner.” Plaintiffs Terri Ezell (Ezell) and Donna Tompkins (Tompkins), Muscogee County deputy sheriffs, picked their boss, incumbent Muscogee County Sheriff Ralph Johnson (“Johnson”), when they actively campaigned for him in his reelection bid against challenger John Darr (Darr). Johnson lost, and Darr became their new boss. Ezell and Tompkins now claim that shortly after Darr took office, he retaliated against them for their political support of Johnson by demoting them. They also maintain that their alleged demotions were motivated by their gender. In addition to these demotion claims, Ezell contends that she was denied “comp time” because of her gender, and Tompkins and Plaintiff Joan B. Wynn (Wynn) contend that they were denied a promotion because of their gender.2

Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of Plaintiffs' claims. Defendants' motion (ECF No. 32) is granted in part and denied in part as follows. Public employees do not forfeit their constitutional rights, but those rights are not absolute. Although the First Amendment generally prohibits discrimination based upon political affiliation, certain government employers can insist upon political loyalty as a legitimate job requirement. Under our First Amendment jurisprudence, the unique relationship between a sheriff and his deputies permits such a requirement. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Darr retaliated against them for supporting former Sheriff Johnson, that retaliation does not violate the First Amendment. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on those claims.

Although the unique relationship between a sheriff and his deputies may limit deputies' rights under the First Amendment, that relationship does not authorize adverse employment actions motivated by gender. Because a genuine factual dispute exists as to whether gender was a motivating factor in Darr' s decision not to promote Tompkins and Wynn and his decision to deny Ezell comp time, summary judgment is denied as to those claims. Defendants, however, are entitled to summary judgment on Ezell's and Tompkins's gender-based demotion/transfer claims because Ezell failed to produce sufficient evidence that gender was a motivating factor in Darr's decision to transfer her, and Tompkins cannot establish that her transfer was an adverse employment action. 3

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, drawing all justifiable inferences in the opposing party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it is relevant or necessary to the outcome of the suit. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A factual dispute is genuine if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the record reveals the following.

Darr was a deputy sheriff under Johnson. He decided to challenge his boss and ran against him in 2008. Darr won the election and was sworn into office as Muscogee County Sheriff in January 2009. Ezell and Tompkins, who had been employed as deputy sheriffs during Johnson's administration, publicly supported Johnson by putting a sign in their yards, attending campaign events, and sharing their endorsement of Johnson with other Sheriff's Office employees. 4 Ezell Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 50; Tompkins Decl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 49.

I. 2009 Reorganization

Under Johnson, the Sheriff's Office was organized with three main divisions: administration,operations, and the county jail. Administration and operations were headed by majors; the jail was headed by the jail commander. Those officers, who were the highest ranking officers in the Sheriff's Office, made up the Sheriff's command staff and closely assisted the Sheriff with the management and direction of the Sheriff's Office. Johnson's command staff included Chief Deputy Jimmy Griffin, Commander Ezell at the jail, Major Joe McCrea in administration, and Major Troy Culpepper in operations.5

Darr was not satisfied with the organization of the office or Johnson's command staff. Darr Dep. 45:23–47:19. He reorganized the Sheriff's Office along the following lines of responsibility: (1) the county jail; (2) administration, which handled the front office, warrants, tracking registered sex offenders, training, and the budget; (3) operations, which included patrol, special operations, courts, and investigations; and (4) professional standards, which was eventually separated out from administration and included internal affairs. Darr also replaced Johnson's command staff. Griffin retired, McCrea was terminated, Ezell was transferred to Recorder's Court, and Culpepper was transferred to the jail without any specific duties assigned to him.6 Darr formed a new command staff by promoting John Fitzpatrick from lieutenant to chief deputy, Randy Robertson from lieutenant to major, Mike Massey from captain to major, and Dane Collins from lieutenant to jail commander.

In addition to the complete overhaul of the command staff, Darr made other employment changes based on his belief that significant operational changes were necessary. He specifically wanted to improve communications among Sheriff's Office employees and establish a renewed focus on the Office's core mission—the jail. Id. As part of this reorganization, Darr promoted Larry Tippins, Gifford Anthony, Michael Farley, Brad Hicks, and Steven Sikes from sergeant to lieutenant; promoted Rusty Blair, Thomas Reavis, and Charles Pickett to sergeant; transferred Sgt. Ron Trotter from an administrative position at the jail to a squad position at the jail; transferred Lt. Tompkins, Lt. Pamela Brown, and Sgt. Thomas Mitchell to the jail; transferred Sgt. Grace Boone Black from the jail to administration; and hired Tabitha Massey as an “administrative coordinator.” Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. Attach. 3, Darr Aff. ¶ 8, ECF No. 32–3; Darr Dep. 171:17–178:17; Darr Dep. Ex. 35, Proposed Reorganization Spreadsheet, ECF No. 53–2 at 20.

Although Ezell and Tompkins lost no pay or benefits as a result of Darr's reorganization, they both considered their transfers to be demotions. They also maintain that Darr demoted them in retaliation for their political support of Johnson.

A. Ezell's Employment and Transfer

Ezell was hired as a correctional officer in 1983 and was promoted to deputy sheriff in 1985, sergeant in 1987, lieutenant in 1992, and captain in 1993. She was the only female captain at that time. She was the first woman to be promoted to major and became the jail warden in 2000. Ezell became commander in 2008 and began earning 5% more than majors in the same pay grade. As jail commander, Ezell was third in command on Johnson's command staff and supervised approximately 250 people. Ezell Decl. ¶ 10. Ezell considered running the jail one of the most important jobs in the Sheriff's Office. Ezell Dep. 43:24–44:1, ECF No. 39.

1. Replacement of Ezell as Jail Commander and Transfer to Recorder's Court

Upon taking office, Darr replaced Ezell with Collins as jail commander. Collins has worked for the Sheriff's Office since 1993, has a master's degree, and had worked with Darr as a lieutenant squad commander at the jail. Darr explained that he decided to replace Ezell as jail commander because during the time he worked as a sergeant at the jail, he witnessed several issues that needed improvement for which Ezell was ultimately responsible. Those issues included a lack of effective communication among the staff and a lack of progress in addressing problems at the jail covered by a consent order with the Department of Justice. Darr Aff. ¶ 4. Darr believed that Collins was better-suited to effectuate the changes at the jail because of Collins's demonstrated organization, communication, and supervisory skills, which Darr had personally observed when he and Collins worked together at the jail. Id. ¶ 5.

Upon deciding that Ezell would no longer be jail commander, Darr transferred her to Recorder's Court to handle the duties of the clerk for the Recorder's Court judge. That position was previously held by a sergeant. In her new position, Ezell primarily performed clerical duties related to the Recorder's Court docket, although she also had approximately twelve employees under her supervision. Recorder's Court has jurisdiction over traffic citations, city ordinance violations, and preliminary detention/bond hearings in certain criminal cases. The Recorder's Court judge sets bail, issues warrants, and collects fines/bonds.

Notwithstanding the importance of Recorder's Court and even though she experienced no change in pay or benefits, Ezell considered her transfer and the accompanying change of duties to be a demotion. She points to the following evidence to show that others in the Sheriff's Office also considered it a demotion. A Personnel...

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