U.S. v. Sturman

• Citation: 951 F.2d 1466
• Decision Date: 08 January 1992
• Docket Number: 90-3151 and 90-3750,90-3148,Nos. 90-3147,s. 90-3147
• Parties: 34 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 704 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. STURMAN (90-3147); Ralph L. Levine (90-3148); Reuben Sturman (90-3151); and Melvin Kaminsky (90-3750), Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 1466

951 F.2d 1466

34 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 704

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. STURMAN (90-3147); Ralph L. Levine (90-3148);

Reuben Sturman (90-3151); and Melvin Kaminsky

(90-3750), Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 90-3147, 90-3148, 90-3151 and 90-3750.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued Aug. 5, 1991.

Decided Oct. 24, 1991.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

Denied Jan. 8, 1992.

Bernard A. Smith, Office of U.S. Atty., Stephen H. Jigger, Office of U.S. Atty., Organized Crime Strike Force Unit, Cleveland, Ohio, Frank J. Marine (argued and briefed), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Crim. Div., Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Arthur Wells, Jr., Berkeley, Cal., Alan M. Caplan (argued and briefed), Bushnell, Caplan & Fielding, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant-appellant David A. Sturman.

Paul J. Cambria, Jr., Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Schuller & James, Buffalo, N.Y. (argued and briefed), for defendants-appellants Ralph L. Levine and Melvin Kaminsky.

Jeremy A. Rosenbaum, J. Michael Murray (argued and briefed), Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant-appellant Reuben Sturman.

Before KENNEDY and MILBURN, Circuit Judges, and WILHOIT, District Judge. ^*

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On June 25, 1987, the defendants were charged with one count of conspiring to defraud the United States by impeding governmental functions. Reuben Sturman was also indicted on counts of attempted tax evasion, filing false income tax returns, willfully failing to maintain records and file reports, and one count of endeavoring to obstruct justice. Following their conviction, Reuben Sturman was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, fined approximately $2.5 million, and ordered to pay prosecution costs. The other defendants were sentenced to shorter terms and fined lesser amounts.

Reuben Sturman engaged in the production, sale, and distribution of sexually explicit books and tapes. Some of the individual businesses ran "peep booths" which played sexually explicit videos. David Sturman, Reuben Sturman's son, was responsible for his father's businesses in the San Francisco area. Ralph Levine ran the businesses in Nevada and Melvin Kaminsky managed Reuben Sturman's principal business, Sovereign News Company.

The defendants, led by Reuben Sturman, created 150 domestic corporations beginning in the 1960s. Reuben Sturman also formed five foreign corporations in countries following strict "corporate secrecy" policies. The testimony of numerous witnesses revealed that the named shareholders and nominees in these corporations were often fictitious. In other cases, real people were listed as shareholders, but their names and signatures had been used without their knowledge or permission. The prosecution proved that, in fact, Reuben Sturman was the beneficial owner of most of the corporations.

The defendants used the corporations to conceal income. They transferred money between corporations in ways that made tracing income and expenses difficult. The defendants also skimmed money from some of the adult entertainment businesses. This money was then used to pay personal expenses or was transferred and deposited in Swiss bank accounts. These bank accounts Reuben Sturman took a variety of steps to conceal his activities from the authorities. A federal investigation in 1975 forced him to begin hiding documents. In 1979, following the issuance of subpoenas calling for various records, Reuben Sturman destroyed or hid many of the requested records. He took similar actions in response to a 1982 grand jury subpoena.

                were opened in 1974, as stated by Reuben Sturman, to "conceal his money" and "avoid taxes."  (Testimony of Walter Butti, Alfred Graf and James Olsafsky.)   The transfers to Switzerland were accomplished through a series of transactions involving both the foreign and domestic corporations
                

Tax records filed during the period of the conspiracy contained numerous false statements and inaccuracies. Reuben Sturman failed to report his ownership in the domestic and foreign corporations or his signature authority over foreign bank accounts. His tax returns for 1978-1982 underreported $2,735,713 in individual income. The other defendants also failed to report their signature authority in foreign accounts.

II. DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS COUNT I

All defendants filed motions to dismiss Count I which charged that the defendants,

did unlawfully, knowingly and willfully conspire, combine, confederate and agree together and with each other to defraud the United States of America by hampering, hindering, impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful Governmental functions of the Internal Revenue Service of the Treasury Department of the United States in the ascertainment, computation, assessment and collection of income taxes [in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.]

Defendants based their motions on this Court's decision in United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir.1989), which held that conspiracy to commit an offense and conspiracy to defraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 371, were two separate crimes. The District Court denied the defendants' motions holding that Minarik was inapplicable to the conspiracy charged in this case. We agree.

Count I of the indictment is based on 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1984) which states,

[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

Count I charges the defendants under the defraud clause of the statute. This type of conspiracy is generally known as a "Klein" conspiracy. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924, 78 S.Ct. 365, 2 L.Ed.2d 354 (1958). In Klein, several persons were charged with defrauding the United States by impeding and obstructing the lawful functions of the Treasury Department and concealing the nature of their business activities and source of income. As in this case, "the indictment [was] framed to make a general charge of impeding and obstructing the Treasury Department ... [with more specific allegations] as particular instances, rather than as substitute and complete allegations of the substantive crime itself." Klein, 247 F.2d at 916. The conspiracy in Klein also involved a large number of domestic and foreign corporations, and multiple violations of the tax laws.

In Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1186, this Court addressed the two clauses of the conspiracy statute. One of the defendants in that case, Aline Campbell, had been issued three tax assessments for a total demand of $108,788.15. Campbell responded that she did not owe a tax. Shortly after the tax assessment, Campbell, together with her friend Robert Minarik, arranged for the sale of a house Campbell owned. The $47,500 payment was made in the form of seven checks for $4,900 and one check for $3,732.18. The buyer assumed a mortgage for the balance. When Campbell cashed two of the checks at the same bank, the IRS was contacted. The IRS agents This Court held that defendants could not be charged under the defraud clause but convicted on evidence which supports the offense clause. In Minarik, the Court interpreted section 371 finding:

                obtained a warrant to search Campbell's car because she had attempted to avoid the Bank Secrecy Act which requires the filing of an IRS report for any transaction over $10,000.   The defendants were charged with conspiring to defraud the government by concealing the nature of and income from Campbell's business affairs in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.   The indictment did not make clear what function of the Treasury Department the defendants were impeding and the government changed its theory of the case throughout the indictment process and trial.   The defendants could have been charged properly under section 7206(4) of the Internal Revenue Code which makes it a felony to conceal any goods or commodities on which a tax or levy has been imposed
                

the "offense" and "defraud" clauses as applied to the facts of this case are mutually exclusive, and the facts proved constitute only a conspiracy under the offense clause to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7206(4)....

875 F.2d at 1187. The Court concluded that when Congress creates a specific offense out of conduct which was previously criminalized only if it took the shape of a conspiracy to defraud the United States, the court should require that a criminal conspiracy regarding that conduct be brought exclusively under the offense clause. Id. at 1194. Thus, if the offense clause covers an act or offense, a person cannot alternatively be convicted under the broad defraud clause. This rule comes into effect most often when a Congressional statute closely defines the duties a defendant is accused of violating. The Court reasoned that requiring an indictment to charge a defendant with conspiracy to commit a specific crime reduces the uncertainty in a case by defining up front the alleged crime.

Defendants here argue that the conduct alleged in Count I amounted to a violation of either 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) or 7206(4) and that the conspiracy should have been charged under the offense clause of section 371. We disagree. The conspiracy alleged and proven here was broader than a violation of a specific statute.

This Court, in Minarik, noted that the holding in the case referred to the offense and defraud clauses "as applied to the facts in this case." 875 F.2d at 1187. The facts in Minarik and this case are distinguishable. Reuben Sturman set up a complex system of foreign and domestic organizations, transactions among the corporations, and foreign bank accounts to prevent the IRS from performing its auditing and assessment functions. Evidence shows...