Jacobs v. Singletary
| Citation | 952 F.2d 1282 |
| Decision Date | 06 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-5293,90-5293 |
| Parties | Sonia JACOBS a/k/a Sonia Linder, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Marta Villacorta and Jim Smith, Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
Sonia Jacobs, pro se.
G. Richard Strafer, Quinon & Strafer, P.A., Miami, Fla., Christie E. Webb, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before FAY, Circuit Judge, JOHNSON *, Senior Circuit Judge, and MERHIGE **, Senior District Judge.
This case arises on appeal following the district court's denial of Sonia Jacobs' petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On the morning of February 20, 1976, Florida State Trooper Phillip Black (Black) approached a car parked at a rest stop on Interstate 95. Black was accompanied by Donald Irwin (Irwin), a visiting Canadian law enforcement officer. Black saw Walter Norman Rhodes (Rhodes) asleep in the driver's seat, Jesse Joseph Tafero (Tafero) asleep in the front passenger seat, and Sonia Jacobs (Jacobs) and her children asleep in the rear seat. Spotting a gun in the car, Black removed it and requested that Rhodes provide personal identification.
Black discovered that Rhodes was a convicted felon on parole and ordered Rhodes to stand in front of the car. Black then ordered Tafero and Jacobs out of the car. When Tafero did not quickly comply, Black pulled him out of the car. The two began scuffling. Jacobs remained in the car.
Black grabbed Tafero and pushed him against the patrol car. Irwin then held Tafero as Black radioed for backups. When Tafero struggled again, Black drew his service revolver. Tafero and the trooper started struggling.
Rhodes testified that Tafero reached for the trooper's gun arm. One to three shots were fired. Rhodes stated that he then turned and saw Jacobs holding a nine millimeter gun in both hands. Tafero snatched the gun from Jacobs. Tafero then fired at the trooper four or five times and then fired at Irwin twice. Tafero, testifying on behalf of Jacobs, claimed that while he and Black were struggling, Rhodes shot Black and then Irwin.
The group fled in the trooper's car. Shortly thereafter they commandeered a Cadillac and took its owner hostage. After crashing into a police roadblock, Jacobs, Rhodes and Tafero were placed into custody.
On March 3, 1976, Jacobs, Tafero, and Rhodes were indicted for two counts of first degree murder, theft of a firearm and a car, and kidnapping. Rhodes pled guilty and received a life sentence in exchange for his cooperation. Tafero's and Jacobs' trials were ordered severed. Jacobs was convicted on all counts. 1 The judge imposed a death sentence despite the jury's recommendation of a life sentence.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida, sua sponte, ordered the trial judge to divulge whether he imposed the death sentence after considering any information not known to Jacobs. The trial judge revealed that he had considered a presentence investigation report (PSI) unavailable to Jacobs. The Supreme Court ordered the lower court to release the PSI. Upon review, Jacobs' counsel discovered that Rhodes, the state's most important eyewitness, had undergone a confidential polygraph examination and that his statements during this examination differed in several material respects from his trial testimony.
The Florida Supreme Court temporarily relinquished its jurisdiction so that the trial court could evaluate whether withholding the polygraph report violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The trial court found that the prosecution did not improperly withhold the polygraph report because it was consistent with Rhodes' trial testimony. This ruling was then consolidated with the rest of the appeal. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but reversed the death sentences. Jacobs v. State, 396 So.2d 713 (Fla.1981). Jacobs was resentenced to two concurrent life sentences on the murder counts to be served with the third concurrent life sentence on the kidnapping count.
On November 25, 1985, Jacobs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Jacobs alleged: (1) the state suppressed Rhodes' statements to the polygraph examiner in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (2) the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury fully on Jacobs' theory of defense or on the limits of aiding and abetting; (3) the state violated Jacobs' Fifth Amendment rights by introducing post-arrest statements; (4) the trial court violated her right to due process by admitting unnecessary and graphically gory photographs. The magistrate recommended that the petition be denied. While the report was under consideration by the district court, Jacobs learned that Brenda Isham, her cellmate, had perjured her testimony at Jacobs' trial. With this new development, the district court granted Jacobs a stay of the proceedings so she could exhaust the issue in the state courts.
After exhausting the claim relating to Isham, Jacobs filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in June of 1988. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing on the perjury issue but Isham refused to attend, citing a fear of retaliation. The magistrate judge recommended that the amended petition be denied in light of Isham's failure to appear. Habeas counsel moved to reopen the hearing after they were able to convince Isham to return to Florida. On April 14, 1989, Isham attended a hearing but suffered a heart attack during cross-examination. Her testimony was later completed through a videotaped deposition.
The magistrate judge ruled that although Isham's trial testimony was perjured, the prosecution did not knowingly use it and the testimony in any event was not central to the state's case. The district court denied the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on all grounds. This appeal followed.
Jacobs raises the following claims on appeal: (1) the state knew or should have known that it used perjured testimony; (2) the state withheld impeachment evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (3) the trial court violated her right to due process by refusing to instruct the jury that the mere presence of a defendant at the scene of a crime is insufficient to justify conviction; (4) the state denied her Fifth Amendment right to silence as recognized by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); (5) the trial court violated her right to due process by admitting graphic photographs of the victims. We address these contentions in turn below.
Jacobs argues that the state's use of Isham's perjured testimony violated her right to due process of law. 2 Having already established that Isham's testimony was false and was used by the state, Jacobs must now prove that the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was false, and that the perjured testimony was material. See Williams v. Griswald, 743 F.2d 1533, 1542 (11th Cir.1984); see generally, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 765-66, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972).
The district court found that "neither the prosecutors [n]or police officers told [Isham] what to say or had any reason to disbelieve her story." The question of whether the state knew or should have known about the perjury and whether the perjury was material involves mixed questions of law and fact. We exercise de novo review over legal findings and apply the clear error standard to all factual findings. United States v. Premises Located at Route 13, 946 F.2d 749, 755 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Wragge, 893 F.2d 1296, 1298 n. 4 (11th Cir.1990).
Jacobs argues that the prosecution should have known Isham's testimony was perjured because (1) Isham had initially told state detectives that she knew only "jailhouse gossip" about Jacobs, and (2) state investigators later failed to corroborate her story. If the detectives indeed learned that Isham knew only gossip about Jacobs, then the prosecution must be charged with the same knowledge. See Williams v. Griswald, 743 F.2d at 1542; Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1977). Jacobs relies exclusively on Isham's deposition testimony in arguing that the detectives learned only jailhouse gossip. Isham's testimony on this issue, however, is unreliable. The district court found that Isham in her deposition was credible only in her "highly significant and dramatic" recantation of her trial testimony. After an independent review of the record, we agree with the district court that her testimony was otherwise rife with inconsistencies. Isham could not remember whether it was she or the state investigators who initiated the discussion in which she first mentioned Jacobs. Although Isham indeed testified at one point that she told the investigators that she knew only "jailhouse gossip" about Jacobs, Isham in the same deposition later claimed that she could not recall the substance of what she told the detectives about Jacobs. The district court thus did not clearly err in finding that Isham had not informed investigators that she knew only gossip. Moreover, the fact that state detectives failed to corroborate her testimony after interviewing three other cellmates of Jacobs rendered Isham's testimony only less credible, not incredible. We therefore find no error in the lower court's holding that the prosecution neither knew nor should have known that Isham would commit perjury during Jacobs' trial. 3
Rhodes, the only eyewitness to testify...
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