Zehner v. Trigg

• Decision Date: 15 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. IP 93-1398-C-H/G.,IP 93-1398-C-H/G.
• Parties: Kurt ZEHNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Clarence TRIGG, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

952 F.Supp. 1318

Kurt ZEHNER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Clarence TRIGG, et al., Defendants.

No. IP 93-1398-C-H/G.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

January 15, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Emry, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

Wayne E. Uhl, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for all defendants.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

HAMILTON, District Judge.

This case presents several issues concerning a new federal statute, section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Section 803(d), codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), is entitled "Limitation on Recovery." It consists of one sentence: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." The plaintiff class in this case consists of offenders who were in the custody of the Indiana Department of Correction and who worked in a kitchen at the Indiana Youth Center in Plainfield, Indiana. Plaintiffs allege that while they worked in the kitchen, the defendant correction officials violated their Eighth Amendment rights by deliberately exposing them to asbestos. Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive relief, and they do not claim that the alleged exposure has caused any physical illness thus far.

Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings based on § 1997e(e). They contend that plaintiffs have not alleged a "physical injury" within the meaning of § 1997e(e), and therefore have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In response, plaintiffs contend: (1) they can meet the "physical injury" requirement of § 1997e(e); (2) at least some class members are not subject to § 1997e(e) because they were no longer prisoners by the time the complaint was filed; and (3) § 1997e(e) is unconstitutional. As explained below, the court finds that § 1997e(e) applies to bar all of these plaintiffs' claims and that it is constitutional as applied to plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings must be granted and the action dismissed without prejudice. If any plaintiff actually develops a physical illness caused by the exposure to asbestos, that plaintiff may be able to bring a new action in the future.

Background

Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the same standards applied to a motion for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174, 182-83 (7th Cir.1986); Paist v. Town & Country Corp., 744 F.Supp. 179, 181 (N.D.Ill.1990). The court must accept as true the complaint's "well-pleaded factual allegations" and draw "all reasonable inferences" in plaintiffs' favor. Chakonas v. City of Chicago, 42 F.3d 1132, 1134 (7th Cir.1994). Defendants are entitled to dismissal of a claim only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that might be proved within the scope of the complaint's allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Reg'l Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 626-27 (7th Cir.1995). A plaintiff may plead a conclusion in the complaint, and then, if the conclusion is questioned in a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, the plaintiff may suggest a set of facts consistent with the allegations that would, if proven, establish the right to recover on the legal claim. Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 78-79 (7th Cir.1992).

In light of this standard, the following allegations are accepted as true. The Indiana Youth Center (IYC) operated a kitchen where food was prepared for inmates and employees. Plaintiffs, a class of inmates at IYC, were employed at the kitchen, where they were deliberately exposed over a period of at least two years to friable asbestos. The defendants, all IYC officials, knew of the presence of asbestos, the dangers of asbestos, and plaintiffs' exposure to it. Under the policies and procedures of IYC and defendants, no inmate assigned to work in the kitchen could refuse the assignment. Some of the plaintiffs either complained directly to each defendant or else provided notice to them through grievances and letters. As of the time the complaint was filed, defendants had failed to remove, abate, or encapsulate the asbestos and had failed to remove plaintiffs from areas where they would be exposed to the asbestos.

On October 14, 1993, the named plaintiffs filed their class action complaint. The complaint alleges that defendants' actions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also state that defendants were "deliberately and callously indifferent" to their serious medical needs. In addition to their federal Eighth Amendment claims, plaintiffs claim that defendants were negligent in violation of duties imposed under Indiana law. Plaintiffs seek damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "to compensate them for their physical and mental injuries and for the deliberate injuries to their constitutional rights." Without objection from defendants, this court certified that the action be maintained as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) with the class defined as: "All offenders in the custody of the Indiana Department of Corrections who were employed in the `old' kitchen or the tunnel under the `old' kitchen at the Indiana Youth Center in Plainfield, Indiana, for a total of thirty days or more after October 14, 1991, through October 14, 1993."

On April 26, 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA as Title VIII of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The PLRA includes a number of provisions limiting in various ways civil litigation filed by prisoners. The provision at issue here, § 803(d), amends 42 U.S.C. § 1997e by adding subsection (e), entitled "Limitation on Recovery." Section 1997e(e) provides: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." On July 12, 1996, plaintiffs clarified that their injuries consist of "untold future physical injury and present mental pain and suffering," as well as "mental anguish and the fear of developing cancer, asbestosis or related asbestos exposure diseases and conditions." Pl.Prelim. Contentions, ¶¶ 10, 17. The court directed the parties to address the impact of § 1997e(e) on plaintiffs' claims. In response, defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings.

Discussion

Apart from the effect of § 1997e(e), plaintiffs have stated a proper claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To maintain a cause of action for damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege each of the following elements: (1) a duty imposed by federal law on persons acting under color of state law to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the actor's breach of duty and the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual damages. See Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir.1985); accord, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1048, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (damages are available under § 1983 for actions found to have violated "constitutional rights and to have caused compensable injury") (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements of § 1983 in their complaint. The Eighth Amendment imposes on prison officials a duty to maintain "humane conditions of confinement," including adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and prisoner safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). In order for a plaintiff to state a claim alleging a violation of his or her Eighth Amendment rights, the plaintiff must allege both an objective component — that the conditions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment — and a subjective component — that the defendant acted with at least "deliberate indifference" to the harm. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. Plaintiffs here have alleged both. The complaint further alleges that defendants caused plaintiffs "physical and mental injuries." Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings asserts that plaintiffs have not alleged any physical injuries within the meaning of § 1997e(e) and therefore cannot recover damages for any mental or emotional injuries. The court will consider first the issues of statutory interpretation concerning the extent to which § 1997e(e) applies to these plaintiffs' claims. The court will then turn to the constitutional issues presented by application of the statute to their claims.¹

I. "Physical Injury" Requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Section 1997e(e) provides in full: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." Plaintiffs' complaint refers to "physical and mental injuries," but their contentions and brief make clear that they "are only claiming damages for mental and emotional injuries." Pl.Br. at 1; accord, id. at 12 ("Because of the nature of asbestos ..., the physical harm will occur, arguably, 20 to 30 years after the emotional harm was done."). Nevertheless, plaintiffs contend they have satisfied the "physical injury" requirement in § 1997e(e) because they have alleged and will "show that they were exposed to friable asbestos." Pl.Br. at 16.²

Plaintiffs argue that inhaling or ingesting asbestos particles is a physical "impact" that meets the "physical injury" requirement in § 1997e(e). Id. The...