Helinski v. Appleton Papers
| Decision Date | 31 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 94-2032.,Civil No. 94-2048.,Civil No. 94-2047.,Civil No. 93-3784. |
| Citation | 952 F.Supp. 266 |
| Parties | HELINSKI, et al., v. APPLETON PAPERS, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Michael A. Pretl, Baltimore, MD, for plaintiffs.
William F. Ryan, Jr., Whiteford, Taylor & Preston, Baltimore, MD, John B. Isbister, Tydings & Rosenberg, Baltimore, MD, Brian L. Wallace, Wallace & Whitney, Baltimore, MD, for defendants.
Plaintiffs Mary Patricia Helinski, Ann Holcomb, Mildred Miller-Jackson and Brenda Smith bring these diversity actions against several paper manufacturers. Plaintiffs claim that their exposure to defendants' carbonless copy paper (CCP) caused a variety of ailments broadly termed formaldehyde sensitization or multiple chemical sensitivity. Plaintiffs seek recovery under several theories, including negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Defendants move for summary judgment, primarily on the ground that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations in Maryland and Virginia.
Plaintiff Helinski is a Maryland resident. As a service representative for the former Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland (C & P), now Bell Atlantic, Helinski first used CCP forms in approximately 1982. Until 1984, Helinski worked at C & P's York Road office in Baltimore, and experienced no health problems. In 1984, Helinski was reassigned to C & P's Riva Road office in Annapolis.
Helinski's health complaints began in January 1989, coinciding with the onset of renovations to the Riva Road business office. The remodeling included the introduction of new carpeting, desks, cubicle enclosures, blinds, and paint. On or about February 15, 1989, Helinski visited her ophthalmologist, complaining of eye irritation, peeling and flaking of her eyelids and other vision problems. The ophthalmologist diagnosed Helinski with contact allergic dermatitis, but could not pinpoint its cause. Helinski also went to a C & P physician to discuss what might be causing her symptoms. Helinski took several CCP forms to her appointment, because she felt that the forms could be causing her symptoms. The C & P doctor could not determine the source of her symptoms.
Helinski continued to experience eye problems, as well as others such as dizziness, vertigo, headaches and respiratory difficulties. In discussions with co-workers and health professionals, Helinski voiced her suspicion that the CCP forms she was handling as part of her work duties were at least a partial cause of her illness. By late 1990, Helinski was convinced that her symptoms were work-related and not the result of her pregnancy or other factors. Helinski sought the advice of several physicians, who posited a variety of potential causes, including obesity, stress and reactions to makeup.
In mid-1991, Helinski was first told by physicians that CCP could be the cause of at least the dermatological symptoms she was experiencing. By 1992, after discussions with occupational health specialists, Helinski began to suspect that she was suffering from chemical hypersensitivity brought on by exposure to toxic substances in the workplace. Helinski conducted her own research on the subject, which led her to file this suit on November 15, 1993.
Plaintiff Ann Holcomb is a Virginia resident. From 1963 to 1993, Holcomb worked for C & P in various capacities in its Virginia offices. Holcomb first started working with CCP in 1987. By the summer and fall of 1990, Holcomb began to feel overly fatigued and had numerous headaches and sinus complaints. These symptoms continued, and worsened in the summer and fall of 1991, to include voice loss, dizziness and nausea. These exacerbated symptoms coincided with renovations to the office building in which Holcomb worked.
Holcomb sought the advice of several doctors, who advanced various theories for the cause of her complaints. In the fall of 1991, Holcomb was told that her problems could be the result of exposure to harmful substances at work. In February of 1992, Holcomb was diagnosed with multiple chemical sensitivity.
Holcomb filed suit in Virginia state court on July 23, 1993, alleging the same causes of action as in the present case. Holcomb's action was "nonsuited," or voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, on July 13, 1994. Nine days later, Holcomb filed this action.
Plaintiff Mildred Miller-Jackson is a Virginia resident, who began working for C & P in 1956. Miller-Jackson began working with CCP in the early 1980's. By the mid-1980's, Miller-Jackson began to experience frequent sinus problems and other health complaints. These complaints persisted until the summer of 1991, when the installation of a new roof on her office building appeared to exacerbate her symptoms. Miller-Jackson claims to have become chronically ill in mid-1991, and in February of 1992 she was diagnosed with multiple chemical sensitivity. Like Holcomb, Miller-Jackson filed suit in Virginia state court on July 23, 1993. The claim was nonsuited in 1994, shortly before the instant action was filed.
Plaintiff Brenda Smith is a Virginia resident who began working for C & P in 1966. Smith was first exposed to CCP in the early 1980's, and soon thereafter began to have problems with her sinuses. Over time, her symptoms widened to include neurological complaints such as fatigue, dizziness, and difficulty concentrating. While Smith was treated for her sinus problems throughout the mid- to late-1980's, it was not until the summer of 1991, while she was working at the same location as plaintiff Miller-Jackson, that her symptoms worsened. Smith, like Miller-Jackson, attributes this exacerbation to the installation of a new roof at her office, allegedly sealing in toxic materials. Smith saw several physicians for her sinus and respiratory problems after mid-1991. In early 1992, after visiting the same physician who treated Miller-Jackson, Smith was diagnosed with multiple chemical sensitivity. Like Holcomb and Miller-Jackson, Smith filed suit in Virginia state court in 1993, nonsuited in 1994, and filed the instant action shortly thereafter.
Plaintiff Helinski's claims are governed by Maryland's general three-year limitations period. Md.Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.Proc. § 5-101 (1995).1 The crucial question in this case is when the plaintiff's claim accrued. In Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 636, 431 A.2d 677, 680 (1981), the Court of Appeals applied the "discovery rule" to all claims in Maryland, holding that a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the alleged wrong at issue. Poffenberger was the final step in the discovery rule's evolution from the exception to the general rule in Maryland.
Maryland law has also addressed the application of the discovery rule to product liability actions. The Court of Appeals held in Pennwalt Corp. v. Nasios, 314 Md. 433, 448-49, 550 A.2d 1155, 1163 (1988), that in general, a plaintiff is put on inquiry notice, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when: (1) the plaintiff has knowledge of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position to undertake an investigation; and (2) that investigation, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would lead to knowledge of the alleged tort. More specifically, in products liability actions, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know: (1) she has suffered injury; (2) the injury was probably caused by the defendant; and (3) there was probably manufacturer wrongdoing or a product defect. Id. at 455-56, 550 A.2d at 1167. "Clear and unequivocal proof" of manufacturer wrongdoing or a product defect is not required; rather, express or implied knowledge of each element is sufficient to trigger the limitations period. Id. at 456-57, 550 A.2d at 1167. A plaintiff's mere suspicions are not sufficient to constitute inquiry notice, however. Baysinger v. Schmid Prods. Co., 307 Md. 361, 367, 514 A.2d 1, 4 (1986).
While the parties in the present case agree that this analytical structure controls, and also do not dispute most of the relevant facts, they come to very different conclusions regarding the application of these facts to the Pennwalt test. Defendants emphasize that Helinski believed CCP to be a potential cause of her health problems by early 1989, five years before filing suit. Defendants attach special importance to the fact that in her March 1989 visit to a C & P physician, Helinski brought along CCP forms in an effort to determine whether they could be causing at least some of her problems. These facts, defendants allege, indicate that more than three years before filing suit Helinski possessed enough information to cause a reasonable person to investigate further, thereby triggering the limitations period.
Plaintiff does not dispute the facts underlying defendants' assertions, but claims that she did not receive inquiry notice until much later. Helinski points out that physicians gave contradictory diagnoses of her problems until well after 1989, and claims that it was not until she received information regarding chemical sensitivity in late 1991 that she was prompted to investigate the role of CCP in her illness. In general, Helinski argues that the relevant facts regarding her knowledge of causation and product defect are disputed and cannot be determined as a matter of law, precluding summary judgment.
Causation plays an especially important role in this case. Normally, the most important question regarding accrual is when the plaintiff possesses enough information to undertake an investigation into her injury. Once this investigation begins, it is often relatively simple to discover the causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's product. In the case at hand, however, because the medical community is still divided regarding the existence of CCP-caused health...
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