Barnes v. State , 82S05–1007–CR–343.
| Decision Date | 20 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 82S05–1007–CR–343.,82S05–1007–CR–343. |
| Citation | 953 N.E.2d 473 |
| Parties | Richard L. BARNES, Appellant (Defendant below),v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Erin L. Berger, Evansville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Joel M. Schumm, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Amici Curiae.Eric C. Bohnet, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Amici Curiae.Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Stephen R. Creason, Chief Counsel, Office of Attorney General, Karl M. Scharnberg, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition for Rehearing
When law enforcement officers responding to a “domestic violence in progress call” arrived at the scene, the husband, about whom his wife had made the 911 call, got physical with the responding police officer. A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. We earlier affirmed his conviction, and he has petitioned for rehearing.
In addition, the Attorney General has requested rehearing, as have amicus curiae members of the Indiana General Assembly, who urge clarification or modification of our prior ruling.
The petitions for rehearing, advanced by thoughtful people, have convinced us that the appropriate course is to grant rehearing and speak further on the law of this case.
At the heart of this appeal has been the suspected spouse abuser's contention that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that he had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter the residence was legally unjustified.
Neither the trial court, nor the Court of Appeals, nor this Court have agreed with Barnes that the officers violated any statute or any provision of the state or federal constitutions when they sought entry, at the wife's request, to investigate and ensure the wife's safety.
The central question we addressed earlier was whether the defendant was entitled to have the jury told that the common law right to defend one's home against invasion was a defense against Indiana's statute that criminalizes violence against police officers acting in the course of their duties. The legislature has declared it to be a Class A misdemeanor when one commits battery on a law enforcement officer “while the officer is engaged in the execution of the officer's official duty.” Ind.Code § 35–42–2–1(a)(1)(B) (2008).1
Barnes's demand for this instruction has rested solely on the common law rule that “a man's home is his castle,” which gives him the right to reasonably resist unlawful entry. The amicus legislators additionally cite a statute not pleaded by Barnes which creates a defense to crimes of violence, authorizing a person to use “reasonable force, including deadly force, against another person ... if the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate” the unlawful entry of his dwelling or occupied motor vehicle. I.C. § 35–41–3–2(b). As will appear below, the Attorney General's analysis of this statute speaks to the same point raised by the amicus.
Tense and even dangerous police-citizen encounters fit no limited pattern; reactions and decisions are made in the split second, and each incident is unique. The hindsight, after-the-fact evaluation by the judiciary is inherently a case-by-case process, but our courts have shown themselves equal to the task as they strike the correct balance between safety and privacy.
The Attorney General is correct that making such decisions is inherently a matter based on fact, but whether a criminal defendant may be...
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