953 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1991), 91-1355, Jackson v. Duckworth

• Citation: 953 F.2d 646
• Party Name: Marshall JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jack DUCKWORTH, Warden, Sergeant H. Abbott, Investigator, C. Adkins, Assistant Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Case Date: October 02, 1991
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals, United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 646

953 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1991)

Marshall JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Jack DUCKWORTH, Warden, Sergeant H. Abbott, Investigator, C. Adkins, Assistant Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-1355.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

October 2, 1991

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA7 Rule 53 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Decided Jan. 27, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, No. 89 C 180, Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

N.D.Ind.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Before POSNER, COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Marshall Jackson is an inmate at the Indiana State Farm. He filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various officials of the Indiana State Prison. He alleged that the defendants-appellees violated his First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by interfering with receipt of his personal mail, depriving him of due process and equal protection during Conduct Adjustment Board (C.A.B.) hearings, and subjecting him to deplorable confinement conditions. The district court dismissed his claims pursuant to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Jackson now appeals the decision of the district court with respect to his First and Eighth Amendment claims, and the 1987 Conduct Adjustment Board hearing. ¹ He also asserts that the district court improperly dismissed various discovery motions. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to the discovery motions, First Amendment and due process claims. Jackson's Eighth Amendment claims are addressed in a published opinion issued in conjunction with this order.

I. FACTS

Prior to his transfer to the Indiana State Farm, Jackson was an inmate housed in the I-Cell House Detention Unit (I.D.U.) at the Indiana State Prison. On July 21, 1987, Jackson was found guilty of involvement in an illegal money order scam after a C.A.B. hearing. As a result, he was punished with two years of disciplinary segregation. Jackson alleges that the C.A.B. decision was based on insufficient evidence, and thus the proceedings violated his rights to due process as guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In connection with the charges against him, prison officials confiscated two personal letters to Jackson sent from outside the prison. Jackson asserts that this action violated his First Amendment rights to free expression. Jackson also alleges that he was subject to inhumane living conditions throughout his stay in the I.D.U. Finally, Jackson complains that the district court abused its discretion on numerous occasions in denying many of his discovery motions.

II. DISCOVERY

In reviewing a district court's decision on discovery matters, the standard to be applied is abuse of discretion. Olive Can Co., Inc. v. Martin, 906 F.2d 1147, 1152 (1990). The appellant must show that the record fails to support the findings of the court, or that the judge based his decision on an erroneous conclusion of law. See Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563-64 (7th Cir.1984). We will not reverse a trial judge's decision for abuse of discretion unless we "have a strong conviction that he exceeded the permissible bounds of judgment." American Hosp. Supply v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 595 (7th Cir.1985).

On the record, we see nothing to indicate that the district court abused its discretion. In his brief, Jackson implies that the defendants have been less than honest in their replies to his discovery requests, yet he offers no facts in support of his insinuations. Jackson's mere suspicions will not support a finding that the trial court abused its discretion. See Brown v. National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 172 (7th Cir.1986).

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a summary judgment determination by a district court. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 925 F.2d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.1991). We must determine whether there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law....