U.S. v. Moore

Decision Date05 March 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1230,91-1230
Citation954 F.2d 379
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvin MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

J. Michael Buckley, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued & briefed), Detroit, Mich., for U.S.

Herbert A. Jordan (argued & briefed), Detroit, Mich., for Alvin Moore.

Before RYAN and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge. *

GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Alvin Moore appeals from his conviction on two counts of distribution of dilaudid and one count of possession of dilaudid with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Moore asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses because the district court denied his motion to compel production of a confidential informant. He complains about a jury instruction that permitted the government to comment on the nonproduction of a witness and, he asserts, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. Moore also contends that the district court inappropriately interfered with defense counsel's statements to the jury that they consider the evidence without considering race. Finally, Moore urges that government counsel improperly commented on his ability to afford private counsel.

We affirm the conviction on all counts.

Moore did not dispute making the three deliveries on which the charges were based. Rather, he asserted that his actions were the product of a deteriorated mental condition caused by his wife's death from cancer. He contended that from this experience he developed a pathological need to relieve suffering and that this need motivated him to fulfill requests for pain-killers by "Jim," a cooperating individual, who falsely represented that he suffered from debilitating pain. Moore also asserted an entrapment defense, which the jury rejected.

Jim arranged all three transactions. He was present only at the first buy with Agent Rannazzisi. Agent Rannazzisi completed the second and third buys on his own.

After Moore's arrest he waived his constitutional rights and made an incriminating statement.

On the first day of trial defense counsel asked the government if it would be producing Jim. The government responded that it did not intend to call him as a witness. Defense counsel stated that he had expected the government to produce Jim and requested disclosure and production of this witness, saying only that he was "important to the defense." The court denied this request. Later the court revisited the issue, and defense counsel again was unable to articulate specifically how Jim's testimony would relate to the defense.

On the fourth day defense counsel asked again, asserting that Jim's testimony could test or substantiate entrapment. The court explored the matter further and counsel finally said, "Well, fine. I'll make a decision after he comes in, listen, as to whether or not we want to proceed further with the type of questions I want to ask. That's my strategy." The court again denied Moore's request for disclosure and production of the cooperating individual.

Moore contends that refusal to disclose or produce the CI violated the confrontation clause and the right to compulsory process. Specifically, he points to the government proof, through examination of Agent Rannazzisi, that the CI had said to Moore that prostitutes enjoy dilaudid tablets, i.e., "Hookers liked pills." The government's theory was that this statement tended to show Moore's state of mind and to rebut his claim that he was motivated by a pathological need to relieve sufferers. Moore testified that Jim never made this statement.

We review the district court's decision to deny defendant's motion for compulsory process under an abuse of discretion standard. Dorsey v. Parke, 872 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831, 110 S.Ct. 103, 107 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989).

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to a defendant the right to confront witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const.Amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment does not, however, require the government to call every witness competent to testify, including special agents or informers. U.S. v. Craig, 477 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.1973). If the evidence upon which a defendant is convicted was secured personally by government agents who testified, the government is not required to produce the cooperating individual. Id. at 131. Agent Rannazzisi was present for the three transactions for which Moore was convicted. Moore's right to confront witnesses against him was not abrogated.

Further, with respect to compelling production of confidential informants, the Supreme Court has made it clear that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable." Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The court must "balanc[e] the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-629. Mere invocation of this right does not automatically outweigh the public interest in protecting confidential informants. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655, 98 L.Ed.2d 798. An informant must be disclosed only upon a showing by the defendant that disclosure is essential to a fair trial. U.S. v. Hanna, 341 F.2d 906, 907 (6th Cir.1965).

Moore's argument that the Roviaro rule does not apply because Jim was not a confidential informant since Moore had met Jim face-to-face is without merit. In closing argument defense counsel acknowledged that Moore did not know Jim's last...

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    • United States
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    • December 27, 2018
    ...639 F.Supp.2d 818, 825 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (citing United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1985)); United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992)). Nothing prevented Petitioner from calling Marple as a defense witness. The undersigned therefore concludes that Petitioner......
  • Foster v. Ludwick
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    • May 22, 2002
    ...does not require the government to call every witness competent to testify, including special agents or informants. [United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992)]. If the evidence on which the defendant was convicted was obtained personally by the government agents who did test......
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    • December 10, 2018
    ...Id. Here, Darden has not "show[n] how disclosure of the informant would substantively assist his defense," United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992), particularly given the Government's representations about the discovery that was provided, and Darden's failure to rebut thos......
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • September 23, 2015
    ...decision to deny a motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir.1992). A district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct legal sta......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Piercing the veil of informant confidentiality: the role of in camera hearings in the Roviaro determination.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 46 No. 1, January 2009
    • January 1, 2009
    ...28, 2007); Petta v. Cain, No. CIV. A. 01-3891, 2002 WL 1216619, at *6 (E.D. La. June 3, 2002). (327.) See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that defense counsel argued that defendant knew the informant only as "Jim," did not know his last name or who J......
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    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • August 1, 2022
    ...Clause not violated when prosecution and defense both knowingly failed to call available informant as witness); U.S. v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992) (Confrontation Clause not violated when prosecution did not produce cooperating individual because government agent personally sec......

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