State v. Gearlds
| Citation | 956 N.E.2d 141 |
| Decision Date | 24 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 90A02–1105–CR–433.,90A02–1105–CR–433. |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant–Plaintiff,v.Skylor GEARLDS, Appellee–Defendant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Angela N. Sanchez, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.John Pinnow, Special Assistant to the State Public Defender, Greenwood, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Skylor Gearlds was charged with Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while suspended based on a previous violation within the past ten years pursuant to Indiana Code section 9–24–19–2. The trial court dismissed the misdemeanor charge because the statute contains a mistaken cross-reference allowing for a driving while suspended infraction to be enhanced when (1) the driver has a previous driving while suspended conviction and (2) the previous conviction is within ten years of the commission of the previous offense. We conclude that although there is a mistake in the statute, it is clear that the legislature did not intend to elevate all driving while suspended offenses with prior convictions but rather only intended to elevate those offenses where the offender had a prior conviction within ten years of the new offense. Put differently, the statute was intended to proscribe less conduct than the literal words of the statute do. Because we find the statute enforceable in its current form and Gearlds' conduct is proscribed under either reading, we reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
In May 2010, Gearlds was arrested for operating a vehicle in Bluffton, Indiana, while his license was suspended.
On September 2, 2010, the State charged Gearlds with Class A misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while suspended based on a previous violation within the past ten years. Ind.Code § 9–24–19–2; Appellant's App. p. 41. The State alleged that on April 27, 2009, Gearlds was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while suspended as an infraction under Cause No. 90D01–0903–IF–19. Appellant's App. p. 42. Indiana Code section 9–24–19–2 provides in full:
A person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway when the person knows that the person's driving privilege, license, or permit is suspended or revoked, when less than ten (10) years have elapsed between:
(1) the date a judgment was entered against the person for a prior unrelated violation of section 1 of this chapter, this section, IC 9–1–4–52 (repealed July 1, 1991), or IC 9–24–18–5(a) (repealed July 1, 2000); and
(2) the date the violation described in subdivision (1) was committed;
commits a Class A misdemeanor.
Ind.Code Ann. § 9–24–19–2 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The predecessor to this statute, Indiana Code section 9–24–18–5, was repealed in 2000, and Section 9–24–19–2 was added in 2000 by Public Law 32–2000, Sec. 1.
At a status hearing on April 18, 2011, Gearlds orally moved to dismiss the Class A misdemeanor charge because the “way the statute is written I don't think it is an appropriate statute any longer at this point that would be applicable and we would move for a dismissal based on the fact that I don't think it is appropriate.” Tr. p. 1. The following colloquy then occurred between the parties:
That same day, the trial court entered an order which provides in pertinent part:
Counsel for Defendant orally moves to dismiss the charge of Driving a Motor Vehicle while the Driving Privilege is Suspended under Indiana Code § 9–24–19–2 based upon this Court's previous ruling in State of Indiana vs Brown–Smith in Wells County Superior Court case number 90D01–0908–CM–0240. The Court, having considered the motion and over objection of the State, now enters the following Order:
* * * * * *
The statute as written erroneously refers to “subdivision (1)” instead of the unnumbered first paragraph of the statute and as written does not define a criminal offense.
There are two opposing principles of statutory construction which must be considered in determining whether in Indiana there is currently a viable charge of Driving While Suspended as a Class A misdemeanor. The first principle is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the state and in favor of the accused. The second principle is that, wherever possible, courts should interpret a statute in such a way that is not a nullity, presuming that our legislature did not intend to enact a law that has no meaning.
In this case, it is this Court's opinion that the first of these principles must trump the second. Although the intent of the legislature when it enacted the above statute is probable differs [sic] from the result obtained, the statute must be strictly construed. It is not up to a court to change the language of a criminal statute. It must be left to the General Assembly. If this Court were to accept the State's position on this issue and the Indiana Court of Appeals or the Indiana Supreme Court later determined the issue contrary to the position of the State, there would be numerous persons who have been wrongfully convicted of a crime leading to unfair results and possible post conviction relief petitions.
Therefore, the Court now finds that at this time there is no viable criminal charge for Driving While Suspended as a Class A misdemeanor under the above statute. Until the statutory language is corrected this Court will not issue a warrant for the offense nor allow an accused person to plead guilty to or be found guilty of the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. The State is still free to charge offenders with a Class A infraction and present any prior driving offenses as aggravating circumstances on the issue of any penalty the Court should impose.
On April 25, 2011, the State charged Gearlds with Count II, operating a motor vehicle while suspended as an infraction. Ind.Code § 9–24–19–1; Appellant's App. p. 54. The State now appeals the dismissal of Gearlds' misdemeanor.
The State contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while suspended charge against Gearlds. Specifically, the State argues that the trial court “unnecessarily nullified” Section 9–24–19–2. Appellant's Br. p. 3. The State points out that Section 9–24–19–2 is part of a progressive penalty scheme, whereby the offense is elevated to a Class A misdemeanor if the offender has a prior judgment for driving while suspended within the past ten years.1 Though the State agrees that there is a “mistaken cross-reference” in the statute, it notes that it is a “vestige of a former version of the statute” which was not changed to reflect the new organization of the statute. Id. But regardless, the State explains that the statute as currently written actually removes the ten-year time limitation and allows any qualified prior judgment to support the Class A misdemeanor offense without regard to the age of the prior judgment. Because the legislature did not intend this result and because its intent was to create a progressive penalty for the repeat commission of this offense within the past ten years, the State concludes that the trial court “erred by focusing excessively on the wording to the exclusion of the legislative intent, purpose, and historical application of the statute.” Id. at 4.
We start with Section 9–24–19–2, which provides:
A person who operates a motor vehicle upon a highway when the person knows that the person's driving privilege, license, or permit is suspended or revoked, when less than ten (10) years have elapsed between:
(1) the date a judgment was entered against the person for a prior unrelated violation of section 1 of this chapter,2 this section, IC 9–1–4–52 (repealed July 1, 1991), or IC 9–24–18–5(a) (repealed July 1, 2000); and
(2) the date the violation described in subdivision (1) was committed;
commits a Class A misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added). It is agreed that the use of the phase “in subdivision (1)” is a mistake. Instead, it should refer to the date that the current violation described in the introductory paragraph was committed. See Appellant's App. p. 51 () (trial court order); Appellant's Br. p. 5 (); Appellee's Br. p. 3. Thus, the question is whether the statute is enforceable as written.
Because Section 9–24–19–2 is a penal statute, it must be strictly construed. George v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 945 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind.2011), reh'g denied. Due process requires that a penal statute clearly define the prohibited conduct so that it provides adequate and fair notice as to what precisely is proscribed. Id.
Our primary goal in construing statutes is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. The legislature's intent is best gleaned from the statutory text itself. Id. We examine the statute as a whole and avoid excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. Id. We presume that the legislature intended for the language to be applied logically and consistent with the underlying goals and policies of the statute. Id.
The purpose of Section 9–24–19–2 is to create an enhanced penalty for those who have a prior unrelated judgment for operating a vehicle without a license within the past ten years....
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...the person's driving privilege, license, or permit is suspended or revoked commits a Class A infraction.” 2. In State v. Gearlds, 956 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind.Ct.App.2011), the court addressed this statute and stated that “what the legislature intended was to elevate the offense to a Class A mi......