Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 19 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | 91-3043,Nos. 90-4112,s. 90-4112 |
| Citation | 958 F.2d 1339 |
| Parties | 139 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2827, 73 Ed. Law Rep. 624 Francine SUTTON; Helen Ellis; Gus Swanson, Plaintiffs-Appellees (90-4112), Cross-Appellants (91-3043), v. CLEVELAND BOARD of EDUCATION, Frank Huml, Interim Superintendent; Ronald A. Boyd, Former Superintendent; Alfred A. Tutela, Defendants-Appellants (90-4112), Cross- Appellees (91-3043). |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Sanford J. Berger (briefed), Robert M. Fertel (argued and briefed), Berger & Fertel, Cleveland, Ohio, for plaintiffs-appellees cross-appellants.
James G. Wyman (argued and briefed), Thomas C. Simiele, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants-appellants cross-appellees.
Before: GUY and BOGGS, Circuit Judges; and HARVEY, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiffs, Francine Sutton, Helen Ellis, and Gus Swanson, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed that the Cleveland Board of Education (Board) terminated their employment in violation of state law. Plaintiffs also claimed denial of procedural due process on the basis that they were not provided a full evidentiary hearing either prior to or subsequent to their terminations, and denial of substantive due process on the ground that the disciplinary action taken against them arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived them of employment, wages, and other benefits.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that plaintiffs' grievances were governed by applicable state law and that they were not required to exhaust their union remedies. The district court further held that the Board terminated plaintiffs' employment in violation of state law and granted plaintiffs, who had been reinstated by the Board, damages for back pay and benefits for the periods of time they were not permitted to work. However, the district court rejected plaintiffs' constitutional due process claims and, therefore, refused to grant their request for compensatory damages and attorney fees.
Defendants argue on appeal that (1) the collective bargaining agreement, not state law, governs plaintiffs' terminations; (2) the grievance and arbitration procedures contained in the agreement provide the exclusive means for challenging those terminations; and (3) those procedures comply with constitutional requirements for due process. Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order dismissing their due process claims and denying them compensatory damages and attorney fees.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
The facts are undisputed. As school bus drivers employed by the Board, plaintiffs were "classified civil service employee[s]," Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.11, entitled to retain their positions "during good behavior and efficient service." Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 124.34. 1 Section 124.34 also sets forth the procedure employers must follow for initiating a discharge and entitles employees to a full administrative hearing and judicial review after discharge. 2 The Board does not dispute that it did not follow the procedure set forth in section 124.34 when terminating plaintiffs.
As members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Truck Driver's Union, Local 407 (Union), plaintiffs' employment was also covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the Union and the Board. Article VI of the agreement (Management Rights) provides that the Board has the right to "[s]uspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause, or lay off, transfer, assign, schedule, promote or retain employees." Article XIII (Discipline), provides in pertinent part:
For reasons including, but not limited to, intoxication, narcotics, criminal offenses, license suspensions, attendance, tardiness, absence without leave, neglect of duty, dishonesty, or accidents, an employee may be disciplined up to and including termination.
Article XII of the agreement establishes a four-step grievance procedure wherein "grievance" is defined as "any matter concerning the interpretation, application or violation of this Agreement, between the Board and the Union." Step three of the grievance procedure provides:
After Steps 1 and 2 of this Section have been exhausted, such disputes shall be submitted to a grievance panel. This panel shall consist of three (3) representatives of the Board and three (3) officers of the Union. This panel will meet not less than once each month at a mutually agreeable time and place and such grievances shall be submitted in writing and shall be heard in accordance with the rules established by this panel. A decision rendered by the panel shall be final and binding. In the event the panel is equally divided in their opinion and there exists a deadlock as to the finding in the matter, the Union shall have the sole and exclusive right, within thirty (30) days, to submit the matter to arbitration.
The fourth and final step of the grievance procedure is arbitration designed to resolve any controversy left unresolved due to a split panel at step three in the process, and provides that "[t]he decision and award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the Board, the Union, and the employees affected by the decision and award."
When plaintiffs first applied to the Board for employment, they noted on their applications that they were convicted felons or had felony charges pending against them. 3 Nevertheless, the Board offered them employment, which they accepted. In August 1985, the Board's Chief of Transportation, M. Bob Hamed, became aware of plaintiffs' criminal records. As a consequence, the Board placed each plaintiff on administrative leave and pre-termination hearings were scheduled. Subsequent to these hearings, at which plaintiffs were represented by the Union, plaintiffs were placed on "involuntary administrative leave" for the 1985-86 school year and told they would be reinstated if and when their criminal records were expunged.
The Union then filed a class grievance on behalf of plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees, and the grievance proceeded through steps one and two of the procedure established by the collective bargaining agreement. At step three in the process, the six-member panel never rendered a decision on the merits of plaintiffs' grievance. Rather, the panel deliberation ended when a settlement was reached, resulting in the reinstatement of some of the affected employees.
The settlement, set forth in a December 1985 letter signed by representatives of both the Board and the Union, states that the Union and the Board "agree to reinstate, with no back pay, those drivers who were placed on administrative leave and who did not falsify their employment applications." The letter further states that all reinstated bus drivers must attempt to have their felony convictions expunged when it becomes possible to do so. The letter contains two lists of employees, those to be reinstated and those not to be reinstated. The letter lists plaintiff Helen Ellis among those drivers to be reinstated, but Sutton and Swanson do not appear on either list. Although the letter is silent on the matter, the parties represent to the court that the Board and Union also agreed that any employees dissatisfied with the terms of the settlement would not be bound by it and that the Union retained the right to proceed to arbitration on behalf of any employees not consenting to the settlement.
Plaintiffs did not agree to the settlement but were, nevertheless, reinstated. Plaintiff Ellis was reinstated in November 1985, after having her felony conviction expunged, and plaintiffs Sutton and Swanson were reinstated sometime in January 1986 without expungement of their criminal records. Although the Board and Union initiated the process for having an arbitrator decide the merits of plaintiffs' grievances, plaintiffs' counsel notified both the Board and the Union that plaintiffs did not consent to the arbitration.
Plaintiffs thereafter filed the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the validity of their discharges on both procedural and substantive grounds. Plaintiffs claimed that "involuntary administrative leave" is not a valid means for suspension of Ohio public employees and that, because the Board failed to follow procedures for termination of public employees pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 124.34, plaintiffs were denied meaningful use of established state adjudicatory procedures. 4
The Board moved for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for grievances were the grievance and arbitration procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement, that those procedures satisfy the requirements of the due process clause, and that plaintiffs' failure to exhaust that remedy precludes them from seeking redress in court. Arguing that a bargained for agreement that defines the terms and conditions of employment should control all labor disputes between union employees and a public employer, defendant relied upon Chapter 4117 of the Ohio Revised Code, which states in pertinent part:
(A) All matters pertaining to wages, hours, or terms and other conditions of employment and the continuation, modification, or deletion of an existing provision of a collective bargaining agreement are subject to collective bargaining between the public employer and the exclusive representative....
....
(C) Unless a public employer agrees otherwise in a collective bargaining agreement, nothing in Chapter 4117. of the Revised Code impairs the right and responsibility of each public employer to:
....
(5) Suspend, discipline, demote, or discharge for just cause, or lay off, transfer, assign, schedule, promote, or retain...
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