Branson School District re-82 v. Romer, Civil Action No. 96-B-2979.

Decision Date26 March 1997
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 96-B-2979.
Citation958 F.Supp. 1501
PartiesBRANSON SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-82, Pritchett School District RE-3, Springfield Public Schools District RE-4, and Kandace Sue Spurling and Brooke Ilene Spurling, by and through their parents David Earl and Lona Sue Spurling, Plaintiffs, v. Roy ROMER, Governor of the State of Colorado, and Robert Mailander, Thomas W. Swanson, and Charles A. Vidal, in their official capacity as members of the Colorado State Board of Land Commissioners, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

Charles E. Mortimer, Jr., Evan S. Lipstein, Lakewood, CO, John Berry, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs.

Gale Norton, Colo. Atty. Gen., Patricia Bangert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, CO, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

BABCOCK, District Judge.

Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the enforcement and implementation of Amendment 16 to Article IX of the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 16), adopted by the people of Colorado at the November 5, 1996, general election. On December 26, 1996, I entered a Temporary Restraining Order, restraining defendants from implementing Amendment 16. On January 15, 1997, after hearing, I dissolved the temporary restraining order and issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of only section (9)(5) of Amendment 16. The parties have filed and argued their cross-motions for summary judgment. For the following reasons, I will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

I.

The facts are undisputed and uncomplicated, but the legal issues they raise are numerous and difficult. In 1875 the United States Congress passed the Colorado Enabling Act, 18 Stat. 474, authorizing the inhabitants of the Territory of Colorado to form a state. Section 7 of the Act grants sections 16 and 36 of every township to Colorado "for the support of the common schools." Section 14 states that these school lands are to be disposed of only at public sale and provides for the proceeds of such sales to be placed in a "permanent school-fund," the interest on which to be expended in support of the common schools.

In its original constitution, the State of Colorado placed the school lands in an explicit trust for the benefit of public schools. Amendment 16 alters many of the terms of that trust. Plaintiffs, three Colorado school districts and two public school children, argue that these changes will result in less money to the school lands fund. To that extent, plaintiffs allege that Amendment 16 conflicts with the Colorado Enabling Act, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. VI, ¶ 2.

II.

The very purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether trial is necessary. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 provides that summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III.

The parties raise the following discrete issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit; (2) whether the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the plaintiffs' claim; (3) whether the Colorado Enabling Act creates an enforceable trust in favor of public schools or a compact between the State of Colorado and the United States; and (4) whether Amendment 16, on its face, comports with the requirements of the Colorado Enabling Act. I will address these issues in turn.

A. Standing

The defendants challenge plaintiff's standing to bring this suit on three grounds: (1) political subdivisions do not have standing to sue the state; (2) the plaintiffs' alleged injury is too speculative to create standing; and (3) the Colorado Enabling Act does not create a private right of action. Although the third argument is not framed as a standing question, I will address it as such because it essentially challenges the plaintiffs' right to bring this case.

1. Political Subdivision Standing

The defendants argue that the school district plaintiffs have no standing to sue for an injunction against a state constitutional provision. According to the defendants, the school districts are political subdivisions of the state, existing "only for the convenient administration of state government." Deft. Br. at 6 (citing Romer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 897 P.2d 779, 782 (Colo.1995)). As such, defendants contend, the school districts are part of the state, and allowing them to sue the state is tantamount to the state suing itself.

The first issue is whether federal or state law applies to this question. The defendants argue that only state law applies. I disagree. Whether a party is a political subdivision of a state is a question of state law. City of Moore, Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 699 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.1983) (citing City of Tulsa v. Wheetley, 187 Okl. 155, 101 P.2d 834 (1940)). However, whether a political subdivision has standing in federal court to challenge the federal constitutionality of an amendment to a state constitution, is a question of federal law. See id. at 512 (citing City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Lavine v. Lindsay, 412 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 3012, 37 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1973) and other federal cases). Accordingly, the state law cases cited by defendants are not controlling, except that the Colorado courts have conclusively stated that Colorado school districts are political subdivisions of the state. See Bagby v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 528 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1974).

Whether a political subdivision suing under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution has standing to challenge a state constitutional amendment is an issue of first impression in this circuit. The Tenth Circuit has previously stated that political subdivisions do not have standing to challenge state statutes on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See City of Moore, supra at 511-12; Housing Authority of the Kaw Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1945, 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992). City of Ponca City includes some broad dicta stating that "[i]t is well established that a political subdivision may not lodge constitutional complaints against its creating state." 952 F.2d at 1188. However, all of the cases cited and the facts of that case involved alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to my review of the cases, the Tenth Circuit has never squarely addressed whether that rule extends to actions premised on the Supremacy Clause.

The Supreme Court has also stated that a political subdivision may not sue its creating state on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 S.Ct. 431, 432, 77 L.Ed. 1015 (1933). However, several courts have distinguished between claims premised on individual rights (such as those arising under the Fourteenth Amendment) and claims based on the Supremacy Clause, finding standing appropriate for the latter. See, e.g., Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1067-71 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 827, 100 S.Ct. 52, 62 L.Ed.2d 35 (1979); Santiago Collazo v. Franqui Acosta, 721 F.Supp. 385, 393 (D.P.R.1989). The cogent rationale of this line of cases is summarized in San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F.Supp. 283, 289-90 (S.D.Cal.1978), aff'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 1306, 1309, n. 7 (9th Cir.1981):

The reason for distinguishing between constitutional challenges based on the Supremacy Clause and challenges based on other constitutional provisions lies in the purpose of the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause mandates that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. This provision forbids state regulation which conflicts with federal law. It establishes a structure of government which defines the relative powers of states and the federal government....

Other constitutional provisions, unlike the Supremacy Clause, . . . confer fundamental rights on individual citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment, for example, guarantees that all citizens enjoy equal protection of the laws and due process of law. These are not structural limitations on government power in the Supremacy Clause sense, but they are rights given to individual citizens which limit governmental power generally. Such rights accrue to individual citizens, not to units of government. Consequently, political subdivisions have no legitimate basis for asserting constitutional rights which are intended to limit governmental action vis-a-vis individual citizens.

If the Supremacy Clause is to be effective in achieving its purpose, its dictates must be enforceable by political subdivisions of states as well as by individuals. Political subdivisions can be profoundly affected by state action which conflicts with federal law. If political subdivisions were prevented from challenging preempted state legislation and regulation, such legislation and regulation often would go unchecked even though expressly prohibited by the Constitution.

I agree. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no support for the proposition that the Supremacy Clause may be enforced only by private parties. Neither the Constitution nor case law demands it, and logic refutes it.

The only case to the contrary cited by defendants is City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1039, 101 S.Ct. 619, 66 L.Ed.2d 502 (1980). There, the plaintiffs brought claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Supremacy Clause. Id....

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