Hansen v. Hansen

• Decision Date: 07 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 970321-CA,970321-CA
• Citation: 958 P.2d 931
• Parties: 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 Michael Loy HANSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Laura T. HANSEN, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

Page 931

958 P.2d 931

342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25

Michael Loy HANSEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Laura T. HANSEN, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 970321-CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

May 7, 1998.

Brent D. Young and Ryan J. Taylor, Provo, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

W. Andrew McCullough, Orem, for Defendant and Appellee.

Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and ORME, JJ.

GREENWOOD, Judge:

Michael Loy Hansen appeals the trial court's order dismissing his action against Laura T. Hansen for failure to establish a common law marriage under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 1995, Mr. Hansen filed a Verified Complaint against Ms. Hansen, alleging that he and Ms. Hansen were married under Utah's common law marriage statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995), and requesting a divorce, child custody and support orders, and property distribution.

After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. Applying a clear and convincing standard of proof to the evidence, the court found that Mr. Hansen and Ms. Hansen had been married and divorced prior to their recent cohabitation. Furthermore, during that cohabitation period, Mr. Hansen and Ms. Hansen had, at least for a time, held themselves out to some as being married. However, the parties did not refer to each other as husband and wife in public and their closest friends did not believe the two were married. In addition, although Mr. Hansen asked Ms. Hansen several times to formally remarry him, Ms. Hansen repeatedly rejected Mr. Hansen's proposals. Finally, although Ms. Hansen filed several insurance claims as Mr. Hansen's wife during the period, the parties filed separate tax returns for both years during which the parties cohabitated.

The trial court concluded that "[b]oth parties are and were capable of giving consent, they were and are capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provision of law, they cohabitated, and they mutually assumed marital rights, duties, and obligations. The parties did not, however, acquire a uniform reputation as husband and wife," and there was "no proof to the legal standard required that Laura consented to the existence of a marital relationship after the previous divorce." The court entered a Judgment of Dismissal on February 7, 1997.

Mr. Hansen subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, asserting that the trial court had applied the wrong standard of proof and that a marriage existed. He also argued that, if the trial court's decision were reversed on appeal, application of the time limitation in section 30-1-4.5 to this case would violate the Utah Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Mr. Hansen presents two issues on appeal which we consider: (1) that the trial court erred in applying a clear and convincing standard of proof to the establishment of a marriage under Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1995); and (2) that, under a proper preponderance standard of proof, the factual findings support a determination that Mr. Hansen and Ms. Hansen were married.

"This court reviews the trial court's interpretation of section 30-1-4.5 ... under a correctness standard." Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah Ct.App.1995); see also State ex rel. R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 349 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (stating whether trial court applied wrong standard of proof is question of law reviewed for correctness). Furthermore, application of a legal standard to undisputed facts presents a question of law; thus, if the trial court erred in the standard it applied, we may review the facts to determine whether they nevertheless support the trial court's decision under the correct standard. See Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) (suggesting appellate court may review factual findings under corrected standard of proof).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Hansen argues that the trial court erred in applying a clear and convincing standard of proof to the establishment

of a marriage under section 30-1-4.5, ¹ asserting that the statute clearly mandates application of a preponderance of the evidence standard. Mr. Hansen then argues that, under the preponderance standard, the undisputed facts support a determination of marriage. We address each issue in turn.

Standard of Proof Required under Section 30-1-4.5

Mr. Hansen argues that the trial court erred when it required clear and convincing evidence of the establishment of a common law marriage under section 30-1-4.5. Mr. Hansen contends that in so doing, the trial court disregarded the statute's plain language.

Under traditional rules of statutory construction, statutory language " 'should be interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning ... results in an application that is neither unreasonably confused, inoperable, nor in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.' " Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (quoting Morton Int'l Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)). In addition, where the statute's language clearly intends a certain result, courts may not rely on outside sources to construct an alternate interpretation. See id. ("Unambiguous language in [a] statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." (quotation marks and citations omitted)).

With these rules in mind, we examine the statute. It states: "Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1995) (emphasis added). Mr. Hansen argues that the emphasized language mandates application of a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof to the establishment of a marriage under section 30-1-4.5. We agree.

There can be little doubt that allocation of a party's burden of proof in a proceeding--that rule which dictates the quantum and quality of evidence required to prevail--is a rule of evidence. See Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232, 1235 (Utah 1984) (describing res ipsa loquitur as "evidentiary rule that permits an inference of negligence"), overruled in part by Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Utah 1993); Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 1982) (describing presumption of negligence in bailment law as "evidentiary rule" that "allocates the burden of proof"); see also Perez v. Perez, 212 Conn. 63, 561 A.2d 907, 915 (1989) (describing "rules concerning the burden of proof" as "evidentiary rules"); State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983) (describing rules "which ... regulate the burden of proof" as "evidentiary rules").

There is similarly little doubt that the standard of proof generally applied in civil proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard. See Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1986) ("It is universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of the evidence."); Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979) (noting preponderance is "usual standard of proof ... used in most civil actions"); Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 28 Utah 2d 206, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972) (stating preponderance In light of this case law, we find the language of section 30-1-4.5(2) unambiguous. The standard of proof required to establish a marriage under section 30-1-4.5 is one of the "general rules of evidence" referred to in section 30-1-4.5(2). The standard generally applied in "other [civil] cases" is a preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, the standard of proof applicable to the establishment of facts under section 30-1-4.5 is a preponderance of the evidence standard.

is "universally recognized standard of proof required to establish facts in a civil case"); see also Harken v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) (stating "proper standard of proof in the administrative context is generally the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard" absent " 'allegation of fraud or a statute or a court rule requiring [a] higher standard' " (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).

We acknowledge the trial court's thoughtful analysis of the standards of proof applied in other jurisdictions and of public policy considerations that may weigh in favor of a higher standard than a preponderance. However, where a statute clearly intends a certain result, we are not free to survey other sources to displace that intent. Cf. Visitor Info. Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Serv. Div., Utah State Tax Comm'n, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) (stating court "need ... delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history" only when "statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous").

Sufficiency of the Evidence under Preponderance Standard

Because of our determination that the trial court applied the incorrect standard of proof, we must now address Mr. Hansen's assertion that the undisputed facts support a determination of marriage under a preponderance standard. In doing so, we note that Mr. Hansen has not challenged any of the trial court's findings of fact. Thus, if those findings negate the possibility that a marriage existed, Mr. Hansen's claim fails. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 6200 South Assocs., 872 P.2d 462, 469 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (stating appellant has burden not only "to show error" but also "of establishing that this error was prejudicial.").

Section 30-1-4.5(1) of the Utah Code provides:

(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting parties who:

(a) are capable of giving consent;

(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this chapter;

(c) have cohabitated;

(...