Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist No. 1, s. 91-1638

Decision Date23 March 1992
Docket NumberNos. 91-1638,91-1648,s. 91-1638
Citation959 F.2d 716
Parties73 Ed. Law Rep. 924 LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. Gage; North Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers; Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Alexa Armstrong; Karlos Armstrong; Ed Bullington; Khayyam Davis; Janice Dent; John Harrison; Alvin Hudson; Tatia Hudson; Milton Jackson; Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua; Katherine Knight; Sara Matthews; Becky McKinney; Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert Willingham; Tonya Willingham, Intervenors, v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1; North Little Rock School District; Leon Barnes; Sheryl Dunn; Mac Faulkner; Richard A. Giddings; Marianne Gosser; Don Hindman; Shirley Lowery; Bob Lyon; George A. McCrary; Bob Moore; Steve Morley; Buddy Raines; David Sain; Bob Stender; Dale Ward; John Ward; Judy Wear; Grainger Williams, Defendants, Philip E. Kaplan; Janet Pulliam; John Bilheimer; P.A. Hollingsworth, Appellees. LITTLE ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, Anne Mitchell; Bob Moore; Pat Gee; Pat Rayburn; Mary J. Gage; North Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Pulaski Association of Classroom Teachers; Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association; Alexa Armstrong; Karlos Armstrong; Ed Bullington; Khayyam Davis; Janice Dent; John Harrison; Alvin Hudson; Tatia Hudson; Milton Jackson; Lorene Joshua; Leslie Joshua; Stacy Joshua; Wayne Joshua; Katherine Knight; Sara Matthews; Becky McKinney; Derrick Miles; Janice Miles; John M. Miles; NAACP; Joyce Person; Brian Taylor; Hilton Taylor; Parsha Taylor; Robert Willingham; Tonya Willingham, Intervenors, v. PULASKI COUNTY SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1; North Little Rock School District; Leon Barnes; Sheryl Dunn; Mac Faulkner; Richard A. Giddings; Marianne Gosser; Don Hindman; Shirley Lowery; Bob Lyon; George A. McCrary; Bob Moore; Steve Morley; Buddy Raines; David Sain; Bo
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Christopher J. Heller, Little Rock, Ark., argued, for appellant.

Otis Henry Storey, III, Little Rock, Ark., argued (Lawrence J. Brady, on brief), for appellees.

Before ARNOLD, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The Little Rock School District (LRSD) appeals from an order of the district court awarding the Kaplan group, attorneys for LRSD in school desegregation litigation, attorneys fees in the sum of $555,272.25 with interest at the rate of 6.62% per annum from February 6, 1991. The Kaplan group cross-appeals from this order. LRSD also appeals from an order of the district court awarding to the Kaplan group an additional sum of $25,562.93 with interest at 6% from May 24, 1991 for its attorneys fees in this action. We affirm the district court's decision that the Kaplan group is entitled to additional attorneys fees for their services, but reduce the sum awarded to $241,714.59 with interest from February 6, 1991 at 6.62%. We also affirm the district court's award to the Kaplan group for fees received by them in the district court for prosecuting this action in the sum of $25,562.93 with interest at 6% from May 24, 1991.

BACKGROUND

It is agreed by all that the Kaplan group entered into a contract with LRSD on October 8, 1982 to represent the school district in school desegregation litigation. The contract set forth the hourly rates that various members of the Kaplan group were to be paid for their services. It noted that these rates were less than the rate regularly charged to their clients, and it stated that the rates were to be adjusted annually to the satisfaction of LRSD and the Kaplan group. A request to increase hourly fees was approved by LRSD in mid-1984. No further requests to increase the hourly fees were approved. The Kaplan group was dismissed by LRSD in December 1987. The total fee paid to the Kaplan group from the date of employment to termination was $868,829.91.

There was an understanding between LRSD and the Kaplan group at the time of termination that an application would be made to the United States District Court for attorneys fees for services rendered to the Board by the Kaplan group on the basis of prevailing rates and that the Kaplan group would continue to represent LRSD in making the application. Pursuant to this understanding, the Kaplan group filed an application for attorneys fees with the district court. An evidentiary hearing was held. Based on the evidence produced, the court found that LRSD was a prevailing party, that the parties had agreed that LRSD would prosecute fee petitions at the Kaplan group's full prevailing rates, and that LRSD would pay the Kaplan group the difference between their billed rates and the proceeds of any attorneys fees award. 1 The court further found that the parties had modified their agreement in 1987 to provide that the Kaplan group and LRSD would split evenly any award made by the court. The court found that the appropriate fee was $1,110,544.50 and that the Kaplan group should receive one-half of that sum, or $555,272.25. 2

On appeal, LRSD contends that the district court erred in (1) awarding attorneys fees without explaining its reasons for the fee award; (2) holding that the original contract between the parties required LRSD to pay the Kaplan group the difference between the rates set forth in the contract and their "normal rates" from the proceeds of any attorneys fees award; and (3) holding that the parties modified their agreement to require that any attorneys fees recovered by LRSD be shared equally with the Kaplan group.

Size of Fee Award

We do not believe that the district court erred in determining that the total fee should be $1,110,544.50. It is undisputed that the compensable hours were accurately reported by the Kaplan group. The LRSD does not question the district court's findings as to the Kaplan group's prevailing rates in 1984 and 1988, and the Kaplan group does not contest the district court's decision to reduce compensable hours by ten percent to reflect that the Kaplan group was not wholly successful in its action.

Rather, LRSD argues that the district court did not adequately explain why it did not consider several factors which would require a lower fee award. First, LRSD states that the court should have given greater weight to the fact that the Kaplan group failed to achieve one of the most important goals of the litigation, consolidation of three Pulaski County school districts. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 778 F.2d We reject LRSD's arguments. The district court's determination of the appropriate attorneys fees was neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. The award was based on the compensable hours and prevailing rates as of 1984 and 1988. No additional fee was awarded for the difficulty of the case or any other factor. The court's lodestar award was presumptively a reasonable fee. Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158, 162 (8th Cir.1991). Perhaps the district court could have articulated its reasons for the award more thoroughly, see Jenkins v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889, 109 S.Ct. 221, 102 L.Ed.2d 212 (1988), but its reasons were sufficiently explained. It is true, of course, that the Kaplan group did not achieve consolidation, but it did achieve a broadly based desegregation decree which this court found would achieve substantial equality of education opportunity for all students in Pulaski County. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 921 F.2d 1371, 1377 (8th Cir.1990) (reviewing history of case). Moreover, the district court did consider the Kaplan group's failure to secure total success when it reduced the group's compensable hours by ten percent. Although we acknowledge that fees were paid to the Kaplan group during the pendency of the case, it is also true that the original fee agreement called for annual adjustments which were not always made, and the Kaplan group had to wait from December of 1987 to May of 1991 to be assured of its fee.

                404, 434 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2926, 91 L.Ed.2d 554 (1986).   LRSD also claims that the court should have given greater weight to the fact that the contract between LRSD and the Kaplan group allowed the Kaplan group to amass many billable hours without any significant risk of monetary loss, and allowed the Kaplan group to have the use of the money for several years
                
Agreement to Pay Kaplan Group the Excess of a Fee Award if LRSD Achieved...

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3 cases
  • Little Rock School Dist. v. State of Ark.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 14 Octubre 1997
    ...such an arrangement, we are bound to accept the higher award, according to our decision in Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F.2d 716 (8th Cir.1992). In that case, also arising out of this litigation, we upheld an award of attorneys' fees to LRSD based o......
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    ...Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1458-59 (8th Cir. 1988)(refusing to lower award for "rural" attorney); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 1992)(upholding award based on prevailing rates notwithstanding services contracted at a discounted rate......
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    ...using the lodestar approach provided by federal law yields the same result. See generally, Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1,959 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1992); Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 1999). An appropriate hourly fee for......

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