In re Tyriq T., 19153.

Decision Date19 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 19153.,19153.
Citation96 A.3d 494,313 Conn. 99
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesIn re TYRIQ T.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, with whom was Sharon Elias, assistant public defender, for the appellant (respondent).

Nancy L. Chupak, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Francis Carino, supervisory assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and John Davenport, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Marsha L. Levick and Hannah Benton filed a brief for the National Center for Youth Law et al. as amici curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.**

ESPINOSA, J.

In this certified appeal, we are called upon to decide whether a trial court's interlocutory order granting a motion seeking a discretionary transfer of a respondent's case from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 46b–127 (b)(1)1 is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. In the present case, the respondent, Tyriq T., appealed to the Appellate Court after his juvenile case was transferred to the regular criminal docket pursuant to § 46b–127 (b)(1). The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment, and the respondent appealed to this court. We granted the respondent's petition for certification, limited to the following question: “Did the Appellate Court properly dismiss the [respondent's] appeal for lack of a final judgment?” In re Tyriq T., 309 Conn. 904, 68 A.3d 659 (2013). We answer the question in the affirmative, concluding that the clear intent of the legislatureis to prohibit interlocutory appeals from discretionary transfer orders. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant procedural background. The respondent, who was sixteen years old at the time of his arrest, was charged as a juvenile with carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 29–35(a), possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 29–38, and theft of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a–212. The state filed a motion to transfer his case to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court at Waterbury and, pursuant to § 46b–127, the trial court held a hearing over two days. After making the requisite factual findings, the court granted the state's motion and ordered the respondent's case to be transferred to the regular criminal docket.

The respondent filed a timely appeal to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, the Appellate Court, sua sponte, ordered the parties to appear and argue whether the respondent's appeal should be dismissed due to the lack of a final judgment.2 After a hearing, the court dismissed the respondent's appeal.3 This certified appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent argues that it is clear that the legislature did not intend to prohibit interlocutory appeals of discretionary transfer orders because § 46b–127 (b) is silent as to whether an interlocutory appeal can be taken from a discretionary transfer order. He maintains also that the genealogy of the discretionary transfer provision and language from a related provision in § 46b–127 that was added in 2010 support his position. 4 Public Acts, Spec. Sess., June, 2010, No. 10–1, § 30 (adding subsection [f] to General Statutes [Supp.2010] § 46b–127). In response, the state argues that the intent of the legislature to prohibit interlocutory appeals of discretionary transfer orders is evidenced by the deletion of the final judgment language from General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 46b–127. Public Acts, Spec. Sess., July, 1994, No. 94–2, § 6.

We agree with the state that the legislature expressed a clear intent to prohibit the immediate appeal of discretionary transfer orders. As we explain herein, although the current statutory text of § 46b–127 does not resolve the question of whether a discretionary transfer order constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal, we conclude, on the basis of the genealogy of the transfer provisions, read together with this court's interpretation of the legislative intent evident from the prior amendments to those provisions, that under the current statutory language a discretionary transfer order cannot be immediately appealed. This interpretation of the discretionary transfer provision results in a harmonious and consistent body of law with respect to all of the transfer provisions currently contained in § 46b–127.

It is well settled that this court has subject matter jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338, 968 A.2d 385 (2009). “The legislature may, however, deem otherwise interlocutory actions of the trial courts to be final judgments, as it has done by statute in limited circumstances. See, e.g., General Statutes § 31–118 (authorizing appeals from temporary injunctions in labor dispute); General Statutes § 52–278 l (authorizing appeals from prejudgment remedies); see also W. Horton & K. Bartschi, [Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut Rules of Appellate Procedure (2009 Ed.) ], §§ 61–2 through 61–11.” Abreu v. Leone, supra, at 338, 968 A.2d 385. Because [t]he right of appeal is purely statutory”; State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983); we must consider whether the legislature has deemed discretionary transfer orders final judgments.

Whether the legislature intended discretionary transfer orders issued pursuant to § 46b–127 (b)(1) to be final judgments for purposes of appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review. See Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 379, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013).

Consistent with these principles of statutory interpretation, we turn first to the language of the statute. The current version of § 46b–127 provides for three types of transfers of a case that charges a juvenile with an offense: (1) mandatory transfers from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court (mandatory transfer provision); General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 46b–127 (a); 5 (2) discretionary transfers from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court (discretionary transfer provision); General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 46b–127 (b); and (3) transfers of cases of youths age sixteen or seventeen from the youthful offender docket, regular criminal docket of the Superior Court or any docket for the presentment of defendants in motor vehicle matters, to the docket for juvenile matters (youthful offender transfer provision). General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 46b–127 (f).6

The transfer provision at issue in the present case, the discretionary transfer provision, provides: “Upon motion of a prosecutorial official, the superior court for juvenile matters shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the case of any child charged with the commission of a class C, D or E felony or an unclassified felony shall be transferred from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. The court shall not order that the case be transferred under this subdivision unless the court finds that (A) such offense was committed after such child attained the age of fourteen years, (B) there is probable cause to believe the child has committed the act for which the child is charged, and (C) the best interests of the child and the public will not be served by maintaining the case in the superior court for juvenile matters. In making such findings, the court shall consider (i) any prior criminal or juvenile offenses committed by the child, (ii) the seriousness of such offenses, (iii) any evidence that the child has intellectual disability or mental illness, and (iv) the availability of services in the docket for juvenile matters that can serve the child's needs. Any motion under this subdivision shall be made, and any hearing under this subdivision shall be held, not later than thirty days after the child is arraigned in the superior court for juvenile matters.” General Statutes (Supp.2014) § 46b–127 (b)(1).

In the current version of the statute, both the discretionary transfer and mandatory transfer provisions are silent as to whether those transfers are final judgments for purposes of appeal. Thus, one reasonably could conclude that the legislature did not intend to allow interlocutory appeals of discretionary transfers. See Marchesi v. Board of Selectmen, 309 Conn. 608, 618, 72 A.3d 394 (2013) (“it is a well settled principle of statutory construction that the legislature knows how to convey its intent expressly ... or to use broader...

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