Georgia Peanut Co. v. Famo Products Co.
Decision Date | 29 April 1938 |
Docket Number | No. 8694.,8694. |
Citation | 96 F.2d 440 |
Parties | GEORGIA PEANUT CO. et al. v. FAMO PRODUCTS CO. et al. DONALSONVILLE GRAIN ELEVATOR CO. v. SAME. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
W. L. Bryan, of Atlanta, Ga., and Meserve, Mumper, Hughes & Robertson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
J. E. Simpson, of Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before DENMAN, MATHEWS, and HEALY, Circuit Judges.
Appellant, plaintiff below, appeals from a judgment against it in a jury waived proceeding. It sued upon an alleged contract for the sale of certain peanuts to the appellees-defendants' predecessor in interest. Appellant claimed that the contract was made through a broker by virtue of a memorandum of sale of the peanuts, signed by the broker, it was claimed, as representative of both parties.
The appellees, defendants below, were successor in interest to the claimed buyer. They contended that there was no meeting of minds on the contract and that the alleged broker was in fact merely the agent of the appellant seller, and hence its signature was not that of an agent of the buyer.
It is not necessary to resolve these disputes, since we regard it as controlling that the price of the peanuts was $18,450, and that there was no written authorization from the buyer to the broker.
For the purposes of this decision, we are accepting appellant's contention that the claimed broker was in fact the agent of both parties in signing the memorandum of sale, and that if it had been properly authorized the contract would have been valid.
California Civil Code, § 1624, subd. 4, as amended, St.1905, p. 611 provides:
And section 2309 reads:
Appellant contends that there is an exception in the California law of a brokerage transaction from the provision of Civil Code, § 2309, and that a broker occupies a status in which his authority to act as such may be proved by parol.
No California case is cited showing such an exception to what is clearly the plain provision of the Code section that the authority of any agent, including brokers, to execute an instrument required to be in writing shall be likewise created in a written instrument.
Appellant cites a case by the North Dakota Supreme Court in which there is the dictum: ...
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...whether a third party may hold the principal on a contract entered into by an agent without written authority. (Georgia Peanut Co. v. Famo Products (9 Cir. 1938), 96 F.2d 440; McNear v. Petroleum Export Corp. (1929), 208 Cal. 162, 280 P. 684; Cooke v. Newmark Grain Co. (1921), 54 Cal.App. 2......
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