Eddleman v. Jefferson County, Ky., 95-5394
| Decision Date | 29 August 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-5394,95-5394 |
| Citation | 96 F.3d 1448 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. George EDDLEMAN, II; Eugene Helm; Sam Watkins, Jr.; Leonard A. Ciak; Shelley Strong; Lisa Thompson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY; Jefferson County Department of Corrections; Richard A. Frey, Jr., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: MERRITT, Chief Circuit Judge; ENGEL and RYAN, Circuit Judges.
This appeal presents two procedural issues for interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The issues for review by this Court are whether the District Court erred in: (1) granting Plaintiffs' motion for class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and (2) granting Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm both the decision to certify the class and the decision to allow Plaintiffs' to file an amended complaint.
The named Plaintiffs each claim to have been strip searched by the Jefferson County Corrections Department after being arrested for minor, nonviolent offenses, primarily traffic stops, and seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs allege that the Department of Corrections maintained an unconstitutional blanket policy or custom to strip search all arrestees, regardless of the circumstances or the existence of individualized suspicion necessitating a search. Determination of the merits of the case has been stayed at the District Court pending the outcome in this Court on the question of class certification, and this Court does not decide any issue concerning the merits of the action.
The named Plaintiffs here allege that they were required to remove their socks, shoes and belts, lift their shirts, drop their pants and open the waistbands of their underpants for inspection of their genital area by Corrections Department employees. At least one named Plaintiff was also subject to a hand search of the area below his underpants and a visual body cavity search. The searches of some of the named Plaintiffs were done in an open receiving area of the jail--called a "sallyport" search--in front of male and female corrections officers. All the named Plaintiffs were pre-trial detainees who were either released on their own recognizance or held for a few hours in a holding cell.
In the first six months of 1991, about two dozen individuals sued the County alleging violation of their right to be free of strip searches after arrest for minor offenses without individualized suspicion that they are carrying a weapon or contraband. In September 1991, several months after the complaints were filed by the named Plaintiffs herein, the Defendants moved to stay discovery in the case pending resolution of a dispositive argument by Defendants that the complaints filed against them were precluded by a consent decree into which the Department of Corrections had entered concerning strip searches. The District Court determined that the consent decree did not preclude Plaintiffs' claims and the stay of discovery was lifted in June 1992, nine months later. During this time several more plaintiffs filed similar claims against Defendants.
Two months later, in July 1992, the District Court urged the parties to settle. For the next six months, until the end of 1992, the parties were engaged in settlement discussions. 17 of 22 similarly-situated plaintiffs settled during this time.
In June 1993, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaints to add class allegations. The motion was granted in a very brief order in September 1993:
Upon motion, and after consideration of same, it is
ORDERED that George A. Eddleman, II, Eugene Helm and Sam Watkins, Jr. be and hereby are granted leave to file their First Amended Complaint.
Joint Appendix 1 at 333.
In August 1993, the District Court entered a permanent injunction against Defendants prohibiting strip searches for minor offenses without reasonable suspicion that the person was carrying a weapon or contraband. (J.A. at 332) The entry of the permanent injunction mooted the Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief but left their liability and money damages claims intact.
The named Plaintiffs moved to certify the class in January 1994 and the District Court granted class certification on August 11, 1994 (J.A. at 362). The class was certified as follows:
All individuals who were arrested for non-violent minor offenses between April 25, 1990 and the present that were required by the Defendant to remove their clothing for visual inspection of all or part of their exposed bodies at the Jefferson County Jail, unless there existed reasonable cause to believe that they were carrying or concealing weapons or other contraband.
D.Ct. Opinion at 8, J.A. at 369. Interlocutory appeal was granted. The merits of the case have been stayed in the District Court pending resolution of the class certification issue by this Court.
Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) Joint Motion to Amend Their
Defendants first argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaints to assert class certification. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend a pleading should be "freely given when justice so requires." Reasons to deny leave to amend a complaint include (1) undue prejudice, (2) undue delay in amending, (3) amendment not offered in good faith or (4) that the party has had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and has failed to do so. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' two-year delay in moving to amend the complaints (1) constitutes inexcusable delay and (2) caused Defendants to be unduly prejudiced thereby.
There is no bright-line test to determine what is "undue delay." Given the circumstances here--the pendency of a potentially dispositive motion regarding the effect of the consent decree on Plaintiffs' claims followed immediately by settlement negotiations--the delay is not "inexcusable."
Defendants contend that they are prejudiced because class certification allows claims precluded by the statute of limitations to be revived, thereby exposing Defendants to liability from allegedly dead claims and increasing the size of the potential class. Defendants do not convince us that any prejudice to them is significant as a result of amending the complaint to add class certification. The addition of some class members that might otherwise be time barred due to the amendment when the class is already concededly large, if in fact this is the case, a point on which we make no opinion, does not constitute the type of "undue" prejudice that would outweigh the rule that complaints are to be freely amended. Class certification does not preclude a defense based on the statute of limitations as to one or more class members. The statute of limitations defense will be available only against plaintiffs whose claims arose more than one year before the filing of the first intervening complaint, not against plaintiffs whose claims arose more than one year before the amendment but not more than one year before the initial complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). This, of course, does not take into consideration tolling or other circumstances that may bear upon the statute of limitations defense.
The District Corut did not set out its reasons for allowing Plaintiffs to amend their complaints to add class certification. The order simply states that the motion to amend is granted. Despite the lack of analysis in the District Court's order, the facts in the record make clear that the delay in moving for class certification arose from (1) the nearly one-year stay granted in 1992 while the District Court decided whether the consent decree precluded the Plaintiffs' claims and (2) the settlement efforts ordered by Judge Johnstone that occurred from mid- to late 1992. There was then a delay of six months until the motion to amend to add class certification was filed in June 1993. Given the circumstances, the delay does not seem "undue" and any prejudice resulting to Defendants from the delay in certifying the class is minor.
The Supreme Court has held that district courts must conduct a "rigorous analysis" into whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 are met before certifying a class. General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). The district court has broad discretion in certifying class actions, but must exercise the discretion within the framework of Rule 23. Cross v. National Trust Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir.1977). When evaluating whether to certify the class, the district court must take the allegations of plaintiffs as true and any doubts as to certification should be resolved in favor of plaintiffs. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) contains four requirements that the named plaintiffs must meet for certification: numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation to certify a class. Rule 23(a) states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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...Fed. R.Civ.P. 23.11 Defendants also say this Court erred in certifying this case as a class action. See Eddleman v. Jefferson County, 1996 WL 495013, at *3, 96 F.3d 1448 (6th Cir.1996) ("The district court has broad discretion in certifying class actions, but must exercise the discretion wi......
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