Compton v. the Bunker Hill Bank

• Decision Date: 30 September 1880
• Citation: 1880 WL 10107,36 Am.Rep. 147,96 Ill. 301
• Parties: ELIZABETH COMPTONv.THE BUNKER HILL BANK et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

96 Ill. 301

1880 WL 10107 (Ill.)

36 Am.Rep. 147

ELIZABETH COMPTON

v.THE BUNKER HILL BANK et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Sept. 30, 1880.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. W. R. WELCH, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. YANCEY & RICHARDS, and Mr. L. P. PEEBLES, for the appellant:

It has long been settled that a man may avoid his act: 1st, from fear of loss of life; 2d, of loss of member; 3d, of mayhem, or great bodily harm; 4th, of imprisonment. Bacon's Abridg. Decrees, 253; Fass v. Hildreth, 10 Allen, 76; Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill, 154; Bogle v. Hammons, 2 Heisk. 136; Belote v. Handeson, 5 Cold. 474; Baker v. Martin, 12 Wall. 158; Branden v. Piece, 7 Id. 214; Helm v. Helm, 11 Kane, 14.

The modern tendency is to overthrow every thing which is built on fraud or violence. Foshay v. Ferguson, 5 Hill, 158; Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Minn. 458; United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 432; Walbe v. Parker, 5 Cold. 476; Mann v. Lewis, 3 W. Va. 223; Mann v. McVey, 3 Id. 238; 1 Pars. Cont. (5 ed.) 395.

When a contract is procured to be executed under a threat of arrest under a warrant, it has been held to be void, not only because it was given under duress, but because it is against public policy to permit such abuse of process. Bane v. Detrich, 52 Ill. 20; Fay et al. v. Oatley, 6 Wis. 42; Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; 1 Pars. Cont. (6th ed.) 392; Foshay v. Ferguson, supra.

Father and son may each avoid his obligation obtained by duress of the other, and so husband by duress of the wife, and conversely the wife may avoid her act by the duress of the husband. Bac. Abr. “Duress” B; Plummer v. The Peo ple, 16 Ill. 360; Brocks v. Berryhill, 20 Ind. 87; Eadie v. Shurmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Green v. Scranage, 19 Iowa, 461.

A contract obtained by threat and fear of battery, or arrest or imprisonment, or destruction of property, may be avoided on the ground of duress--for there is nothing but the form without the substance--it wants the voluntary assent of the party to be bound by it. Bane v. Detrich, supra; Spaids v. Barrett et al. 57 Ill. 292; Oates v. Hudson, (6 Exch.) 346; Nelson v. Suddaeth, 1 Hese & Muf, 350; Saspartas v. Jennings, 1 Bay S. C. 470.

Where money and other valuable things is paid to prevent a criminal prosecution, the contract is immoral and clearly against the law.

If money is paid on an agreement not to prosecute for a criminal offence, it would be compounding a felony, and would of itself constitute a crime indictable and punishable as such. Brothdell v. Braider, 51 Ill. 234; Commonwealth v. Peas, 16 Mars. 91; Collins v. Blantar, 2 Wils. 347.

It is doubtless true that under our statute a person may receive compensation for the private injury occasioned by the commission of the crime, yet if there is any promise or agreement not to prosecute held out as an inducement to make such reparation, this would be compounding a crime, and that part of the consideration would be illegal and would vitiate, and render the whole contract void. The general rule being that if any part of an entire agreement or promise is illegal, it taints the whole transaction and a deed based upon such an agreement would be void. 1 Parsons on Cont. 456; Henderson v. Palmer, 71 Ill. 579; Burks v. Albe, 26 Vt. 184; Derring v. Chapman, 22 Me. 488; Dedham Bank v. Checkering, 4 Pick. 314; Carlton v. Bailey, 7 Foster (N. H.) 230; Hoover v. Price, 27 Miss. 113.

Messrs. JOHN M. & JOHN MAYO PALMER, for the appellees:

The sole object of the bill filed by the appellant in the court below, is to compel the cancellation of a single deed of conveyance made by herself to one of the appellees. Enos et al. v. Hunter, 4 Gilm. 211.

The facts disclosed by the record are that the husband of the appellant, a trusted employee of the bank, embezzled a large sum of its money.

That the husband of the appellant, for reasons of his own, and without the participation of the officers of the bank in the effort, induced her to execute the deed in question.

All the testimony shows that the officers of the bank did no more with respect to the deed than to accept it; so that the allegation contained in the bill of ““threatening to arrest her husband,” is unsupported.

The authorities cited for appellant, numerous as they are, must be considered wholly inapplicable, for no duress is shown with respect to the appellant or her husband.

The testimony shows that the wife was profoundly concerned in the situation of her husband, and united with him in making partial restitution to the bank. Her anxiety for his safety from prosecution was a powerful motive for her conduct; but there is nothing in the circumstances or the conduct of the officers of the bank, who are but trustees for unfortunate creditors, which renders it proper that the deed in question should be set aside.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in equity by appellant against appellees, to set aside a deed of a house and lot, on the ground that it was executed by reason of fraud, duress and imposition.

The court below decreed that the bill be dismissed.

The facts on which the relief is sought, are: George Compton, the husband of the appellant, was cashier of the Bunker Hill Bank, a corporation doing a general banking business at Bunker Hill, Macoupin county, Illinois. It was discovered that he and one J. A. Beach had embezzled the funds of the bank, and upon being interrogated in reference thereto, he admitted that he had used funds of the bank to the amount of about $6,000. This admission was made on the 23d of October, 1877. On the same day the board of directors of the bank unanimously adopted and entered upon their records, the following resolution:

“WHEREAS, Messrs. J. A. Beach and George Compton, having, by their statement to the board of directors, shown a deficit in the money belonging to the bank, for which they are responsible, amount of said deficit not at this time known, that in consideration of said Beach and Compton making a full statement of the amount due, and also making the bank secure in way of deeds to real estate and transfers of personal property, so far as they in their power can do, we hereby agree and promise that no criminal prosecution will be made against them by the board.”

Compton subsequently admitted that the amount which he had appropriated, belonging to the bank, was $7,781 25.

On the same day, and after the adoption of the resolution, the deed in controversy was executed.

The circumstances connected with the execution of the deed, are thus detailed by the appellant in her evidence: “All I knew about the officers of the bank charging him” (her husband) “with embezzlement, is what I heard from the outside and from my husband; he told me the officers of the bank were going to hold him and Mr. Beach accountable for the losses. On or about the 23d of October, 1877, I signed what they said was a deed; I neither read it nor had it read in my presence; my sister Hellen, my brother Frank, Mr. Harry Budd, Mr. Compton, and my daughter Fanny, were all who were present when the deed was executed; I received no consideration for the deed; the inducement offered me was, my brother Frank came to me and said the people were all angry with my husband. By that I thought he meant all the bank people, officers and depositors, and that in order to appease them, and save my husband, and save him from the penalty of the law, I ought to part with everything, even to my wardrobe; and he said, ‘In fact, you must do it.’ And when I signed the deed, I said to my husband, ought I not to have some written promise from the bank that it was to save him from all further difficulty? And he said it was recorded on the minutes of the bank, and that was the same as a written promise to that effect, and I stated that on those conditions I signed the deed. I was under great nervous excitement at the time, and can't distinctly recollect all that was said. I do remember, however, that my brother said that they would imprison my husband if I did not sign the deed. Mr. Compton said that the bank had agreed, and it was on the minutes, to release him from criminal prosecution, if I would sign the deed.”

Other evidence clearly shows that neither the directors of the bank, nor any one else representing the bank, were present when the deed was signed, or had any conversation with appellant in regard to signing it. The deed was produced by appellant's husband, signed and acknowledged by himself and her, and by him delivered to the bank. And it is also shown that no one representing the bank had any knowledge of the representations that were made to appellant, to induce her to execute the deed. The suggestion of appellant's counsel that appellan...