Rowand v. Finney

• Citation: 96 Pa. 192
• Parties: Rowand <I>versus</I> Finney et ux.
• Decision Date: 22 November 1880
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

96 Pa. 192

Rowand versus Finney et ux.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 9, 1880.

November 22, 1880.

November 9th 1880.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1880, No. 134.

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J. H. Baldwin and James Fitzsimmons, for plaintiff in error.— Under the charge in answer to the third point of the plaintiffs below, the jury were authorized to find that Rowand did in good faith make a contract with John A. Finney for the sale of this property, deliver his deed to Mrs. Finney, receive her money, mortgage and notes in pursuance of that contract, and that Mrs. Finney held the possession of the property till it was sold from her at sheriff's sale, and then — nearly three years thereafter — could come into court and by proving that she had not understood the contract made for her by her husband, reverse all that had been done and recover the money paid with interest. We respectfully submit that such cannot be the law in this case. On the contrary, we believe the law to be too well settled for dispute that a married woman who undertakes to transact business with strangers through her husband as her agent, and ratifies his acts by her deed, is just as effectually bound by his representations as if she were single and acted through any other agency. Can it be possible that after keeping possession of this property until it was sold from her at sheriff's sale, after having averred in defence of her mortgage that the contract was a sale with an agreement for repurchase; after placing herself in such position that she could not restore the property to the vendor, and without offer of reparation for damages sustained, she can be permitted to recover on proof that she had not understood her husband's contract for her; that she did not intend to assent to a purchase but only to a loan? Surely strangers have some rights which a married woman is bound to respect, and sealed instruments carry some obligations with them. It should be observed that there is no charge of fraud or collusion between the husband and Rowand. The point rests simply upon the assent or consent of Ada M. Finney.

Robert Robb, for defendants in error.—A judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction upon a cause of action between the parties and upon the same grounds, is conclusive evidence of a former recovery, and will operate as a plea in bar or an estoppel: Lentz v. Wallace, 5 Harris 412. The sale in this cause was a transaction in the nature of a loan. Mrs. Finney loaned Rowand $1200, and gave him the mortgage and notes to enable Rowand to raise money, and Rowand agreed to pay the instalments on the mortgage as they became due; this he neglected to do. Mrs. Finney paid $750 other than the first $1200, and at time of trial of sci. fa. on mortgage they knew Rowand owned the note for $750, and as a judgment in the sci. fa. proceeding would have been conclusive between Mrs. Finney and Rowand they pleaded set-off, &c., and proved the judgment of $750. And the $1200 sued for is the money loan, and the cause of action is not the same subject-matter nor between the same parties, &c.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, November 22d 1880.

Under our system of jurisprudence, in which principles of equity are recognised and enforced in common-law proceedings, it is not always impossible to prove that a transaction, evidenced by a deed, conveying real estate, accompanied with a bond and mortgage from vendee to vendor, securing the unpaid portion of the purchase-money, was in fact a loan of money and credit, and not, as it purports to be, an absolute sale and conveyance of land; but, while this may be done, such an undertaking is always difficult and not always successful. As was said by Mr. Justice WILLIAMS, in Martin v. Berens, 17 P. F. Smith 459, "where parties, without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only evidence of their agreement, and we are not disposed to relax the rule. It has been found to be a wholesome one, and now that parties are allowed to testify in their own behalf, the necessity of adhering strictly to it is all the more imperative." It is only on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake, in the procurement of a written instrument, or fraudulent use of it afterwards, that a chancellor will lend his aid to a party who seeks to avoid the legitimate operation of such instrument; and, while parol evidence is admissible to prove the alleged fraud, accident or mistake, the evidence, as was held in the case above cited, should always be clear, precise and indubitable. If courts do not strictly enforce the rule, and, at the same time, exercise the power, with which they are invested in such cases, the security, afforded by deeds and other written instruments, as evidence of title and of business transactions between men, will be most seriously impaired.

When viewed in the light of prominent facts, which were undisputed, the case before us presents some singular features. By deed, dated and acknowledged August 3d 1875, the plaintiff in error and his wife, for the consideration of $2700, conveyed in fee a lot of ground, in the borough of Verona, to Mrs. Finney, one of the defendants in error, who at the same time united with her husband in a mortgage of the same lot, to the vendor, purporting to secure their bond to him conditioned for the payment of $750 in four months and the like sum in six months. At or about the same time the vendor received $1200, which, with the amount secured by the bond and mortgage, made up the full consideration mentioned in the deed....