Stapleton v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 19 September 1918 |
| Citation | 96 S.E. 801 |
| Parties | STAPLETON. v. COMMONWEALTH. |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Error to Circuit Court, Scott County.
John W. Stapleton was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and brings error. Affirmed.
W. S. Cox, of Gate City, G. Claude Bond, of Nickelsville, and Coleman & Carter, of Gate City, for plaintiff in error.
John E. Saunders, Atty. Gen., and J. D. Hank, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
KELLY, J. John W. Stapleton, indicted for the murder of John B. Shoemaker, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and brings the case here upon a writ of error.
The evidence, which was conflicting, need not be reviewed in detail. The deceased, who was unarmed, was shot to death by the accused under circumstances which, according to the testimony for the commonwealth, fully warranted the verdict. The accused gave a wholly different version and one which, if true, would have entitled him to acquittal on the ground of self-defense. His counsel practically concede that the verdict of the jury conclusively settles this conflict against him in this court, but it is insisted that there was error in the instructions for which the judgment should be reversed.
Instruction No. 9, given for the commonwealth and assigned as error, was as follows:
"That if the jury believe from the evidence that previous to the time of the killing there was a grudge on the part of the prisoner towards the deceased, and that the prisoner had previously declared his purpose to kill the deceased or inflict upon the deceased serious personal hurt if the deceased interfered with him, and that he killed the deceased because of it in pursuance of such declared purpose on the grudge aforesaid, then such killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, and is murder in the first degree."
There was no error in this instruction. It is plain and settled law that a homicide in execution of a previously existing grudge, and pursuant to a previously declared purpose, is murder in the first degree. Gray's Case (Instruction No. 2) 92 Va. 773, 22 S. E. 858. This proposition is not, as we understand, controverted; but it is urged that the instruction in question fails to place upon the commonwealth the burden Of proving the existence of the grudge and the declared purpose to kill, and further ignores the defendant's theory and narrative of the killing.
There were 31 instructions given upon the trial—19 for the commonwealth, and 12 for the defendant. These instructions fully and fairly presented to the jury the respective theories and contentions of the commonwealth and the accused. Under the familiar rule applying to both civil and criminal cases, instructions are to be read as a whole. When so read in this case, the alleged defects in the commonwealth's instruction No. 9 disappear. Instructions given for the defendant, in no way conflicting with those given for the commonwealth, not only presented every aspect of the defense relied upon, but repeated and emphasized the burden upon the commonwealth to prove, to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt, every element necessary to a conviction under the indictment.
The next objection urged against the instructions arises out of an alleged inconsistency between No. 11, given for the commonwealth, and No. 9, given for the defendant. These instructions, in the order just named, were as follows:
No. 11. "The court tells the jury that evidence of threats made by the deceased against, the prisoner are to be received by them with great caution, and, although such threats may be proved to have been made, yet it must be shown to the satisfaction of the jury that these threats were communicated to the prisoner prior to the killing, before they can be considered as affording any justification of the homicide."
No. 9. "The court further tells the jury that, although mere threats do not of themselves excuse a homicide, yet, if they believe from the evidence that threats were made by the deceased against the defendant, such threats are evidence to be considered by the jury in determining the reasonableness and bona fides of the defendant's plea of self-defense and of his belief that the deceased meant to kill or do him some serious bodily harm."
The first of these instructions unquestionably stated the law correctly. Lewis v....
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Jackson v. Virginia
... 443 U.S. 307 . 99 S.Ct. 2781 . 61 L.Ed.2d 560 . James A. JACKSON, Petitioner, . v. . Commonwealth of VIRGINIA et al. . No. 78-5283. . Argued March 21, 1979. . Decided June 28, 1979. . Rehearing Denied Oct. 1, 1979. . ...1 Under Virginia law, murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought." Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 96 S.E. 801. Premeditation, or specific intent to kill, distinguishes murder in the first from murder in the second ......
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...and premeditated (Scott v. Commonwealth, supra; Karnes v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 99 S.E. 562, 4 A.L.R. 1509; Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 96 S.E. 801). The burden was on the defendant to explain (Clinton v. Commonwealth, supra). Fortunately, wanton murders like that shown by ......
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