Garfield v. Paris

• Decision Date: 01 October 1877
• Citation: 96 U.S. 557,24 L.Ed. 821
• Parties: GARFIELD v. PARIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

96 U.S. 557

24 L.Ed. 821

GARFIELD v. PARIS.

October Term, 1877

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.

This was an action by Paris, Allen, & Co., of New York, against Garfield & Wheeler, of Detroit, Mich., to recover for certain spirituous liquors sold to the defendants by the plaintiffs, in the city of New York.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs; whereupon the defendants sued out this writ of error.

Mr. Henry M. Duffeld for the plaintiffs in error.

The admission of the evidence concerning the labels, which were not mentioned in the bill of particulars, was erroneous.

'The office of a bill of particulars is to inform the opposite party of the causes of action to be relied upon on the trial, which are not specifically set out in the declaration.' Bosworth, J., in Bowman v. Earle, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 694; Davis v. Freeman, 10 Mich. 188. The plaintiff will be confined to the items it contains. 2 Archb. Pr. 222; 1 Tidd, Pr. 599; Williams v. Sinclair, 3 McLean, 289. When furnished, it is deemed part of the declaration. Starkweather v. Kittle, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 20. The plaintiff must be confined to the particulars he has specified, as closely and effectually as if they constituted essential allegations in a special declaration. Commonwealth v. Giles, 1 Gray (Mass.), 469; Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 321. Plaintiff will not be allowed to establish his claim in a manner different from that in which he has elected by his bill of particulars to consider the defendant his debtor. De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 191.

If the sale of the liquor was a Michigan contract, it was void under the prohibitory liquor law of that State, and the plaintiffs cannot recover. Myers v. Carr, 12 Mich. 63; Roethke v. Philip Best Brewing Co., 33 id. 341; In re Paddock, 6 Nat. Bank. Reg. 132.

The sale was not made in the State of New York, unless there consummated. The delivery of the labels to one of the plaintiffs in error was not a receipt and acceptance of part of the goods sold. These labels were not invoiced; no price was put upon them; no given amount or number of them was agreed to be furnished; nothing was added to the price of the whiskey on account of them. They are not proven to be of any value. The receipt and acceptance by the buyer must be such as completely affirms the contract. Heath, J., in Kent v. Huskinson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223.

It must appear that the vendor has parted with the possession of the goods, and placed them under the control of the purchaser, so as to put a complete end to all the rights of the unpaid vendor, as such. Gray v. Davis, 10 N. Y. 285; Messer v. Woodman, 22 N. H. 172; Addison, Contr. 113, note 3. It is not enough that the buyer should have taken a part of the goods in his possession, Browne, Stat. Frauds, sect. 326; nor have taken out a sample, German v. Boddy, 2 Car. & Kir. 145; nor even examined the whole lot delivered, for the purpose of ascertaining the quantity or quality, Baylis v. Lindy, 4 L. T. N. S. 176; even though the lot be injured thereby, Curtis v. Pugh, 10 Ad. & E. 111; Elliott v. Thomas, 3 Mee. & W. 170.

A case somewhat resembling this is decided against the validity of the contract, in Delventhal v. Jones, 53 Mo. 460. And the later decisions have firmly laid down the important and true principle that there can be no acceptance and receipt affirming and binding the contract, so long as the buyer has the privilege of returning the goods as objectionable in quantity or quality. Hanson v. Armitage, 5 Barn. & Ald. 557; Howe v. Palmer, 3 id. 321; Acebal v. Levy, 10 Bing. 376; Nicholle v Plume, 1 Car. & P. 272; Norman v. Phillips, 14 Mee. & W. 277; Smith v. Surnam, 9 Barn. & Cress. 561; Coats v. Chaplin, 3 Add. & E. N. S. 483; Jordan v. Norton, 4 Mee. & W. 155. And see, to the same effect, Shindler v. Houston, 1 Comst. (N. Y.) 261; Outwater v. Dodge, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 400; Lloyd v. Wright, 25 Ga. 215; Spencer v. Hale, 30 Vt. 314; Maxwell v. Brown, 39 Me. 98; Shepherd v. Pressy, 32 N. H. 49; Coombs v. Bristol & Exeter Railway Co., 3 H. & N. 510; Rogers v. Phillips, 40 N. Y. 519.

Can it be seriously urged, that, by merely allowing the labels to be sent to the hotel of one of the plaintiffs in error, in New York, they thereby precluded themselves from objecting that the liquor afterwards furnished was not what they purchased? Could the plaintiffs have compelled defendants to take any liquors they might choose to ship, because Wheeler, while in New York, had accepted a few labels? Or, on the other hand, can it be claimed that the defendants in error, by delivering the labels, had lost their right of stoppage in transitu, in case the other party became insolvent?

The court declined to hear counsel for the defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

Neither the manufacture nor the sale of spirituous or intoxicating liquors is allowed by the law of the State where the present controversy arose. Instead of that, the State law provides that all payments made for such liquors so sold may be recovered back, and that all contracts and agreements in relation to such sales shall be utterly null and void against all persons and in all cases; with an exception in favor of the bona fide holders of negotiable securities and the purchasers of property without notice. 1 Comp. Laws, Mich., p. 690.

Two bills of goods, consisting of spirituous liquors, were purchased of the plaintiffs by the defendants, which, including exchange, amounted to $4,143.69. Payment being refused, the plaintiffs brought suit in the court below to recover the amount, and the verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs. Exceptions were taken by the defendants, and they sued out the present writ of error.

Sufficient appears to show that the plaintiffs are citizens of New York, and that the defendants are citizens of Michigan; that the liquors were purchased of the plaintiffs, as alleged; and that the same were received and sold by the defendants: but they set up the prohibitory liquor law of the latter State, providing that all such contracts are utterly null and void.

Evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs, showing that the liquors were ordered by one of the defendants at a time when he was temporarily in the city of New York; and that the plaintiffs, by his request, sent certain labels to be attached to the same, to the defendant, at the hotel in that city where he was stopping. By the agreement at the time the sale was made, the plaintiffs were to furnish these labels to the purchasers; and the evidence showed that the value of the labels entered into the price charged for the liquors, and that the labels, by the terms of the contract, were to be furnished to the buyers, by the sellers, without any other charge than the price to be paid for the liquors. Labels of the kind were something more than ordinary labels affixed to bottles, as they indicated not only the kind of liquor which the bottle contained, but also embraced an affidavit that the distillation was genuine, and of the particular brand manufactured and distilled by the plaintiffs; support to which is derived from the fact that the label was copyrighted, so that no other person than the plaintiffs had any right to make, use, or vend it.

Certain questions were submitted to the jury, among which were the following: Were there any receipt and acceptance in New York of part of the goods sold; and, if so, what was so received? To which the jury answered, There was; to wit, certain labels. Was any thing added to the price of the liquors on account of the labels, and, if so, what amount or price? Answer: There was nothing added; but the labels added to the value of the liquors, and formed part or parcel of the price.

Testimony was offered by the plaintiffs in respect to the delivery of the labels to the defendant while he was at the hotel in New York, to which the defendants objected; but the court overruled the objection, and the testimony was admitted, subject to the defendant's objection.

Errors assigned are in substance and effect as follows: 1. That the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the delivery of the labels, as proved, was not a receipt and acceptance of part of the goods sold within the meaning of the State Statute of Frauds. 2. That the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the evidence was not sufficient to take the case out of the Statute of Frauds. 3. That the court erred in refusing to charge the jury that the sale was not consummated until the defendants received and accepted the goods in the State where they resided. 4. That the court erred in instructing the jury that the defence set up is one not to be favored, and that the proof to support it must be clear and satisfactory, before the jury can consistently enforce it. 5. That the statute is a penal statute, in derogation of the rights of property; and that for that reason, if for no other, it must receive a strict construction. 6. That the court erred in instructing the jury that if the labels were included in the contract, and the liquors were worth more to the defendants on account of the labels, then the receipt and acceptance of the same by the acting defendant took the case out of the New York Statute of Frauds, and their verdict should be for the plaintiffs.

Due exception was also made to the ruling of the court in admitting the evidence reported in respect to the delivery and acceptance of the labels furnished to the purchasers at the time the order for the liquors was filled, the objection being that the labels are not mentioned in the plaintiff's bill of particulars filed in the case.

Matters of evidence are never required to be stated in such a paper. Courts usually require such a notice where the declaration is general, in order that the defendant may know what the cause of action is to which ...