Hartman v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc.

• Citation: 960 F.Supp. 1577
• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-149-CIV-FTM-24D.,95-149-CIV-FTM-24D.
• Parties: Cheryl L. HARTMAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mark J. Douglas, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of the survivor, Jennifer Douglas, a minor, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., formerly named and known as ARA Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Correctional Medical Systems, a Missouri corporation registered to do business in Florida, Jeff Schultz and Don Hunter as Sheriff of Collier County, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

960 F.Supp. 1577

Cheryl L. HARTMAN, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mark J. Douglas, on behalf of the Estate and on behalf of the survivor, Jennifer Douglas, a minor, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., formerly named and known as ARA Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Correctional Medical Systems, a Missouri corporation registered to do business in Florida, Jeff Schultz and Don Hunter as Sheriff of Collier County, Defendants.

No. 95-149-CIV-FTM-24D.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.

December 30, 1996.

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SWARTZ, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on the Defendants, CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.'s (CMS), JEFF SCHULTZ's (Schultz) and DON HUNTER's (Sheriff Hunter) Motions for Summary Judgment. In these motions, the defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity. The Court has carefully reviewed the submissions of the parties. The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings.

FACTS ALLEGED IN THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges the following facts against the defendant Schultz. On November 5, 1993, Mark J. Douglas was incarcerated in the Collier County Jail awaiting trial. Mr. Douglas met with Schultz whose title and position were as a clinical psychologist. However, Schultz was not licensed in the State of Florida as a clinical psychologist. Both the Intake Record and the Suicide Screening Report indicated that on November 5, 1993, Mr. Douglas was placed on "strict suicide precaution" by Schultz so as to permit him to assess Mr. Douglas' suicide potential and need for mental health services. The Mental Health Screening Report, prepared and signed by Schultz on November 5, 1993, notes suicide ideation with intent, and a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with depression. The Receiving Screening Form, also dated November 5, 1993 notes a suicide attempt in 1988, mentions that three close friends of Mr. Douglas had committed suicide, and that Mark Douglas "is contemplating suicide." The form calls for a "later medical referral." The Intake Mental Health Screening shows no "disposition" action taken. On November 8, 1993, and all times thereafter, Mark Douglas was removed from the suicide watch by Schultz and confined in a general population cell that was not equipped for a known suicidal inmate. Instead, the cell contained several known instrumentalities for suicides, such as clothing, sheets, towels, and various means and instrumentalities from which to tie and suspend those items. At the time of his removal from the suicide watch, Mr. Douglas had not been seen by a psychiatrist or any other licensed mental health provider. On December 8, 1993, defendant Schultz saw Mark Douglas and charted that he was upset over his girlfriend's testimony in court and that he had been thinking of suicide. The diagnosis by Schultz was that Mark Douglas was significantly depressed, had sleep difficulty, and an impaired appetite. Further, Schultz charted that he would assess Mark Douglas the following week. He did not. Nor did Schultz refer Mark Douglas to a psychiatrist or other licensed mental health professional. A progress note by Schultz on December 14, 1993, states that Mark Douglas was mildly dysphoric but much improved with no suicide ideation. Schultz noted that Mark Douglas declined psychiatric evaluation and Schultz was to monitor Mr. Douglas' progress. Schultz thereafter never monitored Mark Douglas. Mark Douglas attempted suicide in the Collier County Jail on December 24, 1993, was taken to a hospital and later a nursing home where he remained in a vegetative state until his death on July 17, 1994. The plaintiff alleges that Schultz knew of plaintiff's mental health history, including his prior suicide attempts and knew that there was a substantial risk that Mr. Douglas would attempt suicide. Despite this knowledge, defendant Schultz failed to intervene and provide any assistance to Mark Douglas, failed to refer Mark Douglas to a psychiatrist (or other appropriate mental health professional), failed to provide Mark Douglas with any medication, failed to regularly monitor Mark Douglas' mental health needs, and, for all practical purposes, simply abandoned Mark Douglas as a patient. According to the plaintiff, all of these allegations amounted to deliberate and callous indifference on the part of Schultz and were the direct and proximate cause of Mr. Douglas' suicide.

In the Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts against the defendant CMS. The above actions and omissions of Schultz were taken in accordance with the established policies, practices and procedures of CMS. The officers, servants, agents, employees and contractors of CMS knew of Mark Douglas' prior suicide attempts and mental health history while in the jail. With that knowledge, the agents, servants and employees of CMS, abandoned Mark Douglas as a patient. CMS is responsible for the policies, practices, procedures and customs which govern the operation of the mental health services at the Collier County Jail. CMS was deliberately indifferent to the serious mental health needs of Mark Douglas in that the policy, practice, procedure and custom in effect at the Collier County Jail, at all times material to this action, permitted a person with no more than a Master's Degree, and with no professional licenses:

(A) to have primary responsibility for the care of seriously mental ill inmates, and to determine (1) when an inmate should be referred to a psychiatrist or other qualified mental health professional, (2) when an inmate with an extensive history of mental health problems should be placed on suicide precautions, (3) when an inmate with an extensive history of mental health problems should be taken off of suicide precautions, (4) when an inmate with an extensive history of mental health problems, and a record of violent crimes, should or should not be deemed a danger to himself or others, and (5) when an inmate with an extensive history of mental health problems should or should not be deemed to be acting in an appropriate manner so as to preclude the need for referral to a psychiatrist;

(B) to use his own discretion as to when to consult with the jail psychiatrist, or any other physician, about the mental health status of an inmate with an extensive history of mental health problems; and

(C) to decide for himself whether or not to report to the jail psychiatrist, or any other physician, that a patient with an extensive history of mental health problems was expressing thoughts of suicide.

In addition, the policy, practice, procedure and custom in effect at the Collier County Jail, at all times material this action, did not require the contract psychiatrist, the jail physician nor any other physician to supervise Schultz. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that these policies, practices, procedures and customs which permit non-medical staff to determine the need for and the course of treatment of an inmate known to have extensive and serious mental health problems are policies, practices, procedures and customs which are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners.

In the Second Amended Complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts against the defendant Sheriff Hunter. Sheriff Hunter operated and controlled the Collier County Jail and was under a nondelegable duty to treat and render medical and mental health assistance to all inmates, including decedent Mark Douglas. CMS was under contract with Sheriff Hunter to provide medical and mental health services to inmates in his jail. Sheriff Hunter was negligent in failing to properly supervise and ensure compliance with the contract by CMS and in failing to ensure that properly licensed mental health personnel were fulfilling the terms and conditions of the contract. Sheriff Hunter knew or should have known that CMS and Schultz were not adequately and competently performing this contractual duties to provide mental health services, as evidenced by the recent suicide attempt by at least one other inmate. Sheriff Hunter remains liable for the constitutional deprivations caused by the policies or customs of CMS because he has delegated final decisions to CMS. Therefore the acts, policies and customs of CMS become the official policy of Sheriff Hunter. In addition, Sheriff Hunter was negligent through his failure to properly train his correctional officers and staff to recognize and report the suicidal ideations of inmates. Sheriff Hunter is liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of his officers, agents, servants, employees, and contractors, one or more of who negligently performed their ordinary duties.

STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) a motion for summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine material fact is on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) Once this burden is met the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. When the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an essential element of the case to which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

In making this determination, the Court must view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving part...