Longstreth v. Maynard
| Decision Date | 06 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | 91-6374 and 91-7044,Nos. 91-6370,s. 91-6370 |
| Citation | 961 F.2d 895 |
| Parties | Christopher E. LONGSTRETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary MAYNARD; Stephen Kaiser; Susan Gilbert, Unit Manager; David Rowden, Unit Manager; Bob Affolter, Correctional Counselor, Defendants-Appellees. C.D. MOSIER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary MAYNARD, D.O.C.; Dan M. Reynolds, Warden, Defendants-Appellees. Allen JUSTUS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary N. MAYNARD, Warden; Steve Hargett, Deputy Warden; Frank Marks, Chaplain; Donald Lankford, Food Supervisor, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
F. Browning Pipestem, Norman, Okl., for plaintiffs-appellants Longstreth and Justus in Nos. 91-6370 and 91-7044.
In No. 91-6370, Gay Abston Tudor, Asst. Atty. Gen., and in No. 91-7044, Guy L. Hurst, Asst. Atty. Gen., Deputy Chief, Civ. Div. (Susan B. Loving, Atty. Gen. of Okl. with them on the brief), Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees Maynard, et al.
C.D. Mosier, pro se.
F. Browning Pipestem, Norman, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant C.D. Mosier in No. 91-6374.
Susan B. Loving, Atty. Gen. of Okl., and Gay Abston Tudor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendants-appellees Maynard et al. in No. 91-6374.
Before McKAY, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, and BELOT, District Judge *.
The plaintiffs-appellants Justus, Longstreth, and Mosier are all prisoners in the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (the Department). Each plaintiff claims that his religious beliefs preclude the cutting of his hair. Since 1986 the Department has had a general grooming policy, stated in various regulations applying to male inmates, which forbids all beards, mustaches, and hair more than three inches in length. The original policy provided a procedure for granting exemptions to those whose religious beliefs required them to keep their hair uncut. Each of these three plaintiffs was denied an exemption under that procedure.
Plaintiff Justus brought his action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, requesting injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Justus challenged the Department's grooming code and its failure to provide him with a vegetarian diet. He claimed both policies interfered with his religious observances as a member of the Holy American Church of the Essene. The district court found the dietary claim to be insubstantial and frivolous and, on the hair claim, deferred to the Department's determination that the grooming code was essential to prison security and order, and the court then dismissed the complaint. Justus appealed, and this court affirmed the dismissal of the dietary claim but remanded for more fact finding on the grooming issue. Justus v. Maynard, No. 86-2849 (10th Cir. 4-25-88) (per curiam). After further proceedings, the Department moved for summary judgment on the grooming claim. The district court granted the motion on March 7, 1991. The instant appeal in No. 91-7044 followed. Moreover, an application was made for injunctive relief by this court pending this appeal. On October 30, 1991, this court entered an order enjoining the defendants from implementing the grooming code against Justus pending this appeal. Further facts concerning this appeal will be detailed below.
In October 1991 plaintiff Longstreth, having been denied a religious exemption to the grooming code, brought suit against the Department under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986 in the Western District of Oklahoma. He sought damages, declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to prevent the Department's grooming code from being enforced against him. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on November 1, 1991. In a memorandum opinion issued later, the court found that because the grooming code was a reasonable response to legitimate penological objectives, Longstreth was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits and thus was unable to establish that he was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The instant appeal in No. 91-6370 followed. 1
Mosier originally applied for and was granted an exemption from the prison grooming code in 1986. In 1989 he was required to make a new application. That application was denied for failure to provide adequate documentation from sources outside of prison of the sincerity of his belief in the Native American Church. He initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1996, and 1997 in January 1990 in the Western District of Oklahoma seeking injunctive relief, inter alia. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. On appeal, this court reversed and remanded, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained. Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir.1991). Subsequently, in October 1991, Mosier sought a preliminary injunction below to prevent the enforcement of the grooming code against him. The district court denied the request, finding that the new "no exemption" policy, initiated September 11, 1991, mooted Mosier's complaint of the denial of his exemption under the earlier policy. The instant appeal in No. 91-6374 resulted.
These three appeals of Longstreth, Mosier, and Justus have been consolidated by this court for briefing and argument and will all be decided by this opinion.
The defendants in Nos. 91-6370 and 91-6374, the appeals of Longstreth and Mosier, have suggested that those appeals are moot. They point out that on January 14, 1992, there was a change in the grooming code policy, reinstating provisions for seeking religious exemptions. The defendants say that in the district court Longstreth and Mosier alleged they were wrongfully denied religious exemptions under the grooming code as it was before September 11, 1991, when it was changed to remove provisions for seeking such exemptions; that Longstreth's and Mosier's claims of unlawful denial of exemptions to them remain alive below, pending adjudication on the merits; and that the only issue on appeal now in their cases is the denial of preliminary injunctive relief against the post-September 11, 1991 grooming policy permitting no exemptions, which issue is now moot because that policy was changed with the January 14, 1992 reinstatement of the availability of religious exemptions. Motion to Dismiss at 3.
Plaintiffs Longstreth and Mosier respond, opposing dismissal of their appeals for mootness and arguing that the issues are capable of repetition yet evading review because of the Department's policy changes. They say the cases should be reversed so that they may obtain interlocutory relief maintaining the status quo pending an adjudication of their claims on the merits by preventing the cutting of their hair under whichever grooming policy is in effect. Plaintiffs'-Appellants' Response at 3. Other facts pertinent to the mootness issue follow.
As noted, in September 1991 the grooming code was amended to eliminate religious exemptions from the code. On January 7, 1992, in LeFors v. Maynard, No. CIV-91-1521-R, Western District of Oklahoma, the court found after trial that the evidence did not support a finding that the anticipated security concerns of defendants are rationally related to the grooming code imposing a hair length regulation with no religious exemption. Memorandum Opinion at 5-6. 2 The court could not find that the hair length restrictions, insofar as they interfere with sincerely held religious beliefs, are rationally related to state interests in promoting order and rehabilitation in its penal institutions. Id. at 6-7. There was no evidence at trial of any widespread security problem related to long hair in any part of the prison system. Id. at 10.
The LeFors opinion found the trial witnesses from the Department of Corrections to be credible and knowledgeable and that the court should give great deference to their opinions on how the prison system should be run. However, the court concluded that "the grooming policy complained of, at this time, is not rationally related to legitimate penological interests, but is instead an exaggerated response to concerns which are purely hypothetical." The court found the "current grooming policy is an unconstitutional intrusion upon religious freedom insofar as it is applied to those inmates whose sincerely held religious beliefs prohibit the cutting of their hair." Id. at 14. Citing trial testimony, the court stated: "According to the Plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs, cutting the hair is a sin which can have 'serious consequences.' " (footnote omitted). The defendants were enjoined from enforcing the hair-length provisions of the grooming code against plaintiffs LeFors, Hansford and Pelley. 3 The district judge retained jurisdiction for two years or until further order of the court to permit notification by defendants of any undue burden on them or that security has become a more realistic threat. Id. at 15.
The defendants' motion to dismiss advises us that on January 14, 1992, one week following the LeFors opinion, a further revision was made to the Inmate Grooming Code by the Department of Corrections. 4 It restates the requirement generally for male inmates that hair will be cut and all facial hair removed. Hair will not touch the shirt collar, will not touch or cover the ear, and will not exceed three inches in length. Beards and mustaches are prohibited. Hair styles for female inmates will comply with prevailing community standards.
This new regulation provides an exemption request process to "accommodate those inmates whose religious beliefs conflict with the requirements of the grooming code." An inmate must apply to obtain an exemption, and a review committee then consider the applications. The inmate must submit an essay stating reasons why the exemption should be granted, specifying the religion of which he is a practicing member, and detailing why he cannot comply with the grooming...
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