962 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1992), 89-1775, Reed v. McLochlin

Docket Nº:89-1775.
Citation:962 F.2d 10
Party Name:Orrin Scott REED, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Richard A. MCLOCHLIN, Sheriff of Fulton County, Defendant/Appellee.
Case Date:May 18, 1992
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Page 10

962 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1992)

Orrin Scott REED, Plaintiff/Appellant,


Richard A. MCLOCHLIN, Sheriff of Fulton County, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 89-1775.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

May 18, 1992

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA7 Rule 53 regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Submitted April 22, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, No. 83 C 423; Allen Sharp, Chief Judge.



Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and KANNE, Circuit Judges.


On September 14, 1983, Reed, while a pre-trial detainee in the Fulton County Jail, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging numerous constitutional violations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court allowed Reed to amend his complaint to include a request for monetary damages in September 1984 and in May 1986 appointed counsel to represent him in his civil rights case. The district court dismissed Reed's complaint in December 1987, but vacated that dismissal on June 8, 1988 and converted the defendant's pending motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. After discovery, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), which Reed now appeals. We affirm.

Initially, we note that, even though Reed filed his original complaint pro se, he is not entitled the liberal construction of his pleadings accorded to pro se litigants under Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), because he was represented by counsel throughout the summary judgment proceeding. Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir.1985). The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Reed had produced no evidence that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. 1 Reed does not contest this finding on appeal. Rather, he contends that the district court's grant of summary judgment was premature because it did not consider certain evidence that could only be obtained after the discovery deadline. 2 Reed points out that he attempted to obtain discovery by filing a motion to compel, but the district court did not address the motion.


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