Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.
| Decision Date | 28 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-3562,91-3562 |
| Parties | 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 74, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,446 James R. LOWE, Appellant, v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Thomas H. Bornholdt, Overland Park, Kan., argued, for appellant.
Carolyn B. Witherspoon, Little Rock, Ark., argued (Donna S. Galchus, on brief), for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, Chief Judge, ROSS, Senior Circuit Judge, and LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
James R. Lowe brought this action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., against his former employer, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the District Court 1 granted defendant's motion for directed verdict and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Lowe appeals, and we affirm.
Lowe worked for J.B. Hunt for about two years. He was terminal manager of the company's trucking terminal in Kansas City. Lowe was almost fifty-two years old when he was hired, and almost fifty-four when he was fired. The asserted reason for his discharge was the falsification of a petty-cash report. The same company officials who hired Lowe also made the decision to fire him.
There was no direct evidence that age was a determining factor in Lowe's dismissal. In contesting the District Court's entry of a directed verdict against him, his principal contention is that he presented evidence tending to show that the reason given by the employer was not the true reason. In this situation, Lowe argues, it is reasonable to infer that the employer's asserted justification is a mere pretext. Accordingly, the argument runs, the inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's having made a prima facie case is a reasonable one, and the trier of fact should have been allowed to consider whether to accept it.
As a general proposition, it is true that a plaintiff who makes a prima facie case and who presents evidence which, if believed, would discredit the employer's asserted justification has a right to go to the trier of fact. Here, a prima facie case was presented. Lowe was within the protected age group, his job performance was satisfactory (up until the time of the disputed petty-cash report), and he was replaced by a younger person after his dismissal. See Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205, 103 S.Ct. 1194, 75 L.Ed.2d 438 (1983). In response to the asserted justification for his dismissal, the plaintiff argued that the shortage in the petty-cash fund was small, that he was not even accused of having taken the money for himself, that his performance ratings, up until the time of discharge, had been good, that less severe methods of discipline were available, and that another, similarly situated employee was simply disciplined, rather than being fired.
In general, a plaintiff may rebut a defendant's asserted justification either directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the proffered explanation is unworthy of belief. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Haglof v. Northwest Rehabilitation, Inc., 910 F.2d 492, 494 (8th Cir.1990); MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.1988).
The general rules as to the shifting burdens of production and persuasion in discrimination cases, however, are not to be applied woodenly, as if they were themselves statutory law. They are simply aids designed to make it easier to decide questions of fact about intent and motive. And, from the point of view of an appellate court, whether all of the i's were dotted and all of the t's crossed in the burden-shifting analysis undertaken in the trial court is not of primary importance. After the case is over and has been appealed, the question is simply whether the evidence (we speak of a case like the present, where the plaintiff has lost on directed verdict) was sufficient to justify a reasonable jury in finding discrimination.
Here, the District Court carefully outlined its reasons for answering that question in the negative. It did so in an oral statement, made in open court, ruling on the motion for directed verdict. We find the District Court's statement complete and well reasoned. The evidence that plaintiff claims is inconsistent with defendant's proffered justification is thin, but perhaps sufficient, all other things being equal, to defeat a motion for directed verdict. In the present case, however, all other things were not equal. The most important fact here is that plaintiff was a member of the protected age group both at the time of his hiring and at the...
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