Griesel v. Hamlin

• Citation: 963 F.2d 338
• Decision Date: 17 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-8650,91-8650
• Parties: Ann GRIESEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. B.D. HAMLIN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 338

963 F.2d 338

Ann GRIESEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. B.D. HAMLIN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 91-8650.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

June 17, 1992.

Albert S. Johnson, County Atty., Joan F. Roach, Chief Staff Atty., Decatur, Ga., for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Beltran, Beltran and Coffey, Ralph Perales, Irwin W. Stolz, Jr., Gambrell, Clarke, Anderson and Stolz, Seaton D. Purdom, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and ALAIMO ^*, Senior District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant, D.B. Hamlin, appeals a district court denial of his motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hamlin is not entitled to official immunity under Georgia law.

II. FACTS

This wrongful death action was filed initially in state court on July 15, 1988. Appellee, Ann Griesel, alleged that appellant Hamlin had caused the death of her husband, Merlin Dean Griesel. Prior to the state court's ruling on Hamlin's motion for summary judgment, Griesel voluntarily dismissed her state court suit and filed the present diversity action in federal court. The facts underlying this suit are set out below. ¹

On July 18, 1986, Mr. Griesel registered at a truck-stop motel in Conley, Georgia. That evening, Mr. Griesel telephoned his wife at approximately 6:45 p.m., complaining of a pressure in his chest and a "funny feeling" in his left arm. At approximately midnight, personnel at the motel responded to a call in Mr. Griesel's room. Upon entering Mr. Griesel's room, the motel employees found him in distress because of chest pains and numbness in his arm. Thereupon, the motel manager called the Emergency Medical Service of DeKalb County, Georgia.

At approximately 12:38 a.m., two DeKalb County advanced emergency medical technicians ("AEMT's"), W.D. Hodges and appellant Hamlin, arrived on the scene. Hamlin is duly certified by the State of Georgia in the field of emergency medical services and has been actively employed in the field since 1977. Hamlin and his fellow EMT took Mr. Griesel's pulse and blood pressure and performed a three-point contact electrocardiogram ("EKG") on him. In addition, they asked Griesel several questions and filed a report, noting Mr. Griesel's history of diabetes. After analyzing the results of the EKG, Hamlin and his fellow technician determined that Mr. Griesel had not suffered a heart attack but rather was experiencing the symptoms of angina or muscle strain. See Soprano Aff. at p 13. Although Hamlin determined that Mr. Griesel did not need to be immediately transported to the hospital, he advised Griesel to see a doctor. The AEMT's then left Mr. Griesel in his room. On the following afternoon, security personnel of the motel found Mr. Griesel dead in his room, the victim of an acute coronary event.

III. DECISION BELOW

The district court denied Hamlin's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hamlin had exceeded his authority. The court stated that Hamlin's attempt to diagnose Mr. Griesel's condition from the results of the EKG went beyond the bounds of his authority as an AEMT. The court stated:

Viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, this court concludes that although Georgia law empowers AEMT's to exercise judgment in certain areas of emergency treatment, defendant's post-treatment attempt to diagnose conclusively Mr. Griesel's medical condition exceeded his statutorily authorized discretion. The particular act for which recovery is sought--namely, defendant's attempt to diagnose Mr. Griesel's medical condition from the results of a diagnostic test--was not invested with such discretion as would compel the cloak of sovereign immunity. Indeed, the defendant had no authority, statutory or otherwise, to exercise discretion on the basis of his interpretation of an EKG test result.

District Court Order at 7 (January 16, 1991).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

We must first address whether the district court's denial of Hamlin's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Hamlin is not entitled to sovereign immunity is an appealable order. Ordinarily, this court has jurisdiction only over appeals from "final decisions" of the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, a decision of a district court is appealable if it falls within "that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a denial of summary judgment is immediately appealable if the denial is based on the determination that a government official is not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged constitutional deprivations. See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (denial of a claim for absolute immunity is immediately appealable). Because this is a diversity action, qualified immunity is not an issue in this case. Rather, the issue is whether the principles of Mitchell v. Forsyth extend to permit immediate appeal of a denial of summary judgment on the basis of lack of state sovereign immunity.

In Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617 (2nd Cir.1991), the Second Circuit stated that, in a diversity case, while the substantive law of the state governs the applicability of immunity to state law claims, "federal law determines the appealability of the district court's order" denying summary judgment. 949 F.2d at 621 (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1720, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988)). The Second Circuit applied the Cohen factors ² in determining whether an immediate appeal is available, determined that the state law immunity at issue there was an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and thus, following Mitchell v. Forsyth, held that the denial of state law immunity was immediately appealable. We agree with the Second Circuit that the Cohen analysis, as applied in Mitchell v. Forsyth, provides the appropriate framework.

The immunity under Georgia law, which is at issue in this case, satisfies all of the Cohen factors for the same reasons that the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth found that the Cohen factors were satisfied when summary judgment was denied to a government official asserting qualified immunity for alleged constitutional deprivations. In discussing the Cohen factor relating to whether the order is effectively unreviewable after trial, the Supreme Court emphasized that qualified immunity is an "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability" and is "effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (emphasis in original).

The crucial issue in our determination of whether Hamlin's claim of sovereign immunity is immediately appealable is whether the state sovereign immunity under Georgia law is an immunity from suit rather than simply a defense to substantive liability. ³ Under Georgia law, "a suit cannot be maintained against the State without its consent." Crowder v. Department of State Parks, 228 Ga. 436, 185 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1971) (emphasis added). See also Sikes v. Candler County, 247 Ga. 115, 274 S.E.2d 464, 466 (1981) (stating that immunity from suit is a basic attribute of sovereignty and that the State cannot be made amenable to suit without its consent). Therefore, it is clear that sovereign immunity under Georgia law is an immunity from suit.

Because sovereign immunity under Georgia law is an immunity from suit, under the Cohen doctrine, we have jurisdiction over the district court's order denying summary judgment based on sovereign immunity under Georgia law. See also Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi Dept. of Public Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 848-49 (5th Cir.1991) (permitting immediate appeal of denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity); Loya v. Texas Dept. of Corrections, 878 F.2d 860 (5th Cir.1989) (same).

B. Immunity

Turning to the merits of Hamlin's claims, we review de novo a district court's denial of summary judgment involving qualified immunity. James v. City of Douglas, Ga., 941 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.1991); Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1988). Because we conclude above that the state law sovereign immunity at issue in this case is akin to qualified immunity, we apply the de novo standard of review to the district court's denial of summary judgment. Summary judgment must be granted if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and if the moving party demonstrates that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir.1990). Applying these principles to this case, we conclude that Hamlin is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of state law sovereign immunity.

The seminal case in Georgia discussing state sovereign immunity is Hennessey v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980). As the court stated in...