Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club of America, Inc.

Decision Date06 July 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-7060,91-7060
Citation964 F.2d 1090
Parties18 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 176 Harry ROMMELL and Jean Rommell, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AUTOMOBILE RACING CLUB OF AMERICA, INC., a corporation; Alabama International Motor Speedway, a corporation; International Speedway Corporation, Wildcat Custom Vans, Inc., Jimmy Human, Bill Scott, Wayne Smith, Bruce Beauchamp, and Induction Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Eugene P. Stutts, Spain, Gillon, Grooms, Blan & Nettles, James A. Kee, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Morris W. Richardson, Henry E. Simpson, Lange, Simpson, Robinson & Somerville, Birmingham, Ala., for defendants-appellees.

J. Bentley Owens, III, Starnes & Atchison, Birmingham, Ala., for Induction Systems, Inc.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, CLARK *, Senior Circuit Judge, and BROWN **, Senior District Judge.

WESLEY E. BROWN, Senior District Judge:

Plaintiff Harry Rommell was injured while working in a pit crew during an "ARCA 500" auto race at the Alabama International Motor Speedway, (Speedway), in Talladega, Alabama, on May 2, 1987. The race was sanctioned, governed and administered by the Automobile Racing Club of America (ARCA). Rommell was a volunteer member of a crew that serviced Car No. 53, owned by defendant Jimmy Human, (Wildcat Custom Vans) which was being driven by defendant Bill Scott.

Plaintiff was serving as a "catch-can" man, responsible for catching overflow gas when the race car was being fueled in the pit. The nozzle on a gasoline filler can failed to close causing fuel to be sprayed onto Rommell and the car. The gasoline hit the exhaust, or the car backfired, and an explosion and fire followed.

Plaintiff brought this action against ARCA, Speedway, Scott and Human, and two other members of the pit crew, defendants Wayne Smith and Bruce Beauchamp, alleging that their negligent and wanton conduct caused his injuries. Induction Systems, Inc., (Induction) the manufacturer of the gas nozzle that allegedly failed was also joined as a defendant, and alleged to be liable for negligence, wanton conduct, and breach of warranties.

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the various defendants on all of plaintiff's claims. Allegations of negligence were dismissed on the basis of several releases signed by the plaintiff prior to the accident and upon a finding that plaintiff's assertion that he did not understand the effect of the releases was not sufficient to raise any question as to the validity of the releases. The claim based upon the alleged wanton conduct of defendant ARCA for failing to require race participants to wear fire protective clothing was found insufficient. 1 The district court granted the motion of Induction System for summary judgment upon plaintiff's claims for negligence, wantonness, and a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturers Liability Doctrine (AEMLD) on the ground that these claims were barred by Alabama's two-year statute of limitations. 2 Summary judgment was also granted in favor of Induction upon plaintiff's claim for breach of warranties, upon the ground that these claims were also barred by the statute of limitations, since the alleged faulty nozzle was "equipment" and not "consumer goods".

In this appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the ARCA defendants since there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the claims of wantonness as to these defendants. Plaintiff also claims that the court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the releases barred all claims except for wantonness, and that it was error to find that the gasoline filler nozzle distributed by defendant Induction was "equipment" and not a "consumer good" under the Alabama Commercial Code.

Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.Proc., provides that summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories We independently review the summary judgment order, upon the record, to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists. If there are material factual disputes, or if reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then summary judgment would be improper. See Hinesville Bank v. Pony Exp. Courier Corp. 868 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.1989)

                and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."   Rule 56(c), relating to the use of affidavits, does not require that the moving party's motion always be supported by affidavits to show the absence of disputed material facts.  "Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis."  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 276 (1986)
                

After a review of the record, for the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm the trial court's judgment on all claims based upon negligence and wanton conduct, but reverse the court on the warranty issue.

FACTS

Defendant Bill Scott, the driver of car No. 53, had been involved in racing for about 20 years and had actually built and owned the car and raced it for himself until 1982 when he sold a half interest to defendant Wayne Smith. In 1984 he sold all of his interest to Smith, but he continued to drive the car for Smith at Talladega, Dayton, Pocono, Atlanta and in Michigan. In all he had participated as a driver in about 250 races, 8 to 10 of those at Talladega. Prior to the accident, Scott had made one pit stop and the car had been refueled without a problem. The fire occurred during a second, unscheduled pit stop to check a mechanical problem. At the time of the fire, Scott was wearing a Nomex fireproof suit, fireproof underwear, socks and helmet liner. Since he was not wearing gloves at the time, he sustained some superficial burns on his hands.

Defendant Wayne Smith had an ownership interest in Car No. 53 from 1980-81 until April, 1987 when he sold it to defendant Jimmy Human. Smith had been involved in racing since the 1960's and had been a driver and worked in pit crews for many years, participating in about 50 ARCA races during that time. He was the one who had designated Scott as the driver of Car No. 53 and, on the day of the race, he was acting as the "crew chief" for Car No. 53. Smith and Scott recruited volunteers to work the pit during the Saturday race. Among these volunteers were plaintiff, defendant Bruce Beauchamp, and four men from Lake Speed's crew. It was a common practice to recruit volunteers from other crews who would not be racing until Sunday, since many enjoyed the work and wanted opportunities to practice their various specialties. 3 At the time of the explosion and fire, Smith was under the hood, working on the motor, and he was able to help Scott escape from the car without serious injury.

Defendant Jimmy Human the owner of Car No. 53, was the only "novice" at the pit that day. As noted, he had owned the car for less than a month and had never participated in racing at all prior to May 2, 1987. He designated Wayne Smith "to look after everything," and explained that he bought the car just because of "racing fever"--he "just wanted to try that, to try something new." During the race, he kept notes on the laps and did not actively work with the crew.

Defendant Bruce Beauchamp, age 24, had built and raced his own car on short An experienced fuel man can empty one 11-gallon can of fuel into a race car in 7 to 8 seconds. 4 As noted, Scott's car was refueled without incident during the first pit stop of the day. At the second pit stop, Beauchamp "dumped" the first fuel can without trouble, but the filler nozzle, known as a "Redhead," did not seal well when he tried to empty the second can. When he pulled the nozzle out of the fuel tank of the car, the automatic shut-off mechanism failed, he and Rommell were sprayed with fuel, and the explosion and fire followed. 5 Beauchamp was not seriously burned in the accident. 6

                tracks in 1982 and 1983 when he was in college.   He worked for Mark Stahl of North Carolina, who owned, drove and built Winston Cup stock cars and worked in a pit crew for the first time in May, 1985 at a NASCAR race--"The World 600"--for Mark Stahl and his car.   He had participated as a pit man in 15 to 20 races, where he mostly acted as the "gas man," responsible for filling the tanks of race cars in the pit.   He was at the Talladega track with Mark Stahl's crew, getting ready for Mark's race on Sunday.   At the request of Stahl's crew chief, he agreed to help out with Scott's Car No. 53 during the Saturday race and did so because he enjoyed the work.   He was a volunteer and was not paid for working in the pit.   He did not know and had never met the plaintiff Harry Rommell before that time.   He worked with Rommell, who acted as the "catch can" man.   The fuel tank has a small hose that runs out the left rear end of the car and, when the tank is full, the fuel overflows and runs out of this hose.   There was no automatic shut off when the tank was full and the only way the fuel man knows that the tank is full is to see fuel coming out of the overflow hose.   Rommell's job was to catch this overflow of fuel when the tank was full
                

At the time of the accident, plaintiff had been involved in racing for about 39 years and had been self employed for 25 years. He became interested in auto racing at the age of 12 or 13 and attended races all over Wisconsin in the early 1950's. He...

To continue reading

Request your trial
16 cases
  • Bowden ex rel. Bowden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • November 29, 2000
    ...additionally show that Defendant acted intentionally, consciously, or with reckless indifference. See Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club of Am., 964 F.2d 1090, 1096 (11th Cir.1992) (applying Alabama law). Foreseeability alone cannot give rise to an inference of the scienter necessary to sust......
  • Fuller v. Exxon Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
    • December 9, 1999
    ...under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R.Civ.P. 10(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 1090, 1098 n. 14 (11th Cir.1992). Accordingly, because the court concludes that removal was proper and that this case will proceed in......
  • Borden v. CSX Transp., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • November 29, 1993
    ...that from the doing of such act or omission of such duty injury will likely or probably result." Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club of America, Inc., 964 F.2d 1090, 1096 (11th Cir.1992) quoting Copeland v. Pike Liberal Arts School, 553 So.2d 100 (1989). When a person having knowledge of exis......
  • Richards v. Michelin Tire Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • May 31, 1994
    ...prior injuries does not automatically create a jury question on wantonness. Toole, 999 F.2d at 1435; Rommell v. Automobile Racing Club of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 1090, 1096-98 (11th Cir.1992); see also Benford v. Richards Med. Co., 792 F.2d 1537, 1538-39 (11th Cir.1986) (defendant not wanton de......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT