Hankins v. Finnel
| Decision Date | 25 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-1299,91-1299 |
| Citation | 964 F.2d 853 |
| Parties | Ronald HANKINS, Appellee, v. William C. FINNEL, State of Missouri, Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Robert L. Presson, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellants.
Therese M. Schuele, Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before ARNOLD, * JOHN R. GIBSON, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.
The State of Missouri and William Finnel appeal from a district court 1 judgment enjoining the State of Missouri from attaching funds it had just paid Ronald Hankins to satisfy a judgment against its former employee, William Finnel. A jury had awarded Hankins $1 in nominal damages and $3,000 in punitive damages after finding that Finnel had sexually molested Hankins during the time that Finnel taught school at the Missouri State Penitentiary and Hankins was an inmate there. Shortly after this court affirmed the judgment, the State brought an ex parte action in the circuit court of Cole County, Missouri, seeking reimbursement for the cost of Hankins' incarceration pursuant to the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 217.825-217.841 (Supp.1991). The State sought reimbursement equal to ninety percent of Hankins' judgment. The Cole County Circuit Court appointed a receiver to take control of the money paid to Hankins and later stayed proceedings pending the outcome of this action. The district court held that it had ancillary jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a), that the State waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to the extent that it voluntarily accepted the obligation of the judgment against Finnel, and that the Supremacy Clause barred application of the Missouri reimbursement statute. Hankins v. Finnel, 759 F.Supp. 569 (W.D.Mo.1991). On appeal, the State argues that it has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 69(a), that federal law does not preempt the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, and that the district court should have abstained. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
In 1988, Hankins sued Finnel in the district court for the Western District of Missouri, alleging that while he was an inmate in the penitentiary, Finnel sexually harassed or molested him on four occasions. Hankins attended the penitentiary school where Finnel was an instructor. The case was tried to a jury, which found for Hankins on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) claims and awarded $1 nominal damages and $3,000 punitive damages. This court affirmed the judgment. Hankins v. Finnel, 909 F.2d 510 (8th Cir.1990). The Attorney General of the State of Missouri represented Finnel at trial and on appeal. The State also agreed to indemnify Finnel for any judgment against him pursuant to the statute entitled "State Legal Expense Fund," Mo.Rev.Stat. § 105.711 (Supp.1991).
On July 31, 1990, the State initiated ex parte proceedings in the Cole County Circuit Court attempting to obtain ninety percent of the amount it was to pay to Hankins as a result of the judgment against Finnel. Under the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, the State may seek reimbursement of up to ninety percent of a prisoner's assets, which are defined to include a money judgment received from the State as a result of a civil action against one of its employees. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 217.827(1)(a).
The circuit court appointed a receiver to hold the funds in Hankins' inmate account and ordered Hankins to show cause why an order should not be entered appropriating his assets to reimburse the State for the cost of his confinement. Three days after the circuit court's August 17, 1990, order, Hankins' account was debited by $3,234.22 for "cell reimbursement." On that same day, the State deposited the identical amount (representing the $3,000 judgment plus interest) into Hankins' overdrawn account. 2
In November, Hankins returned to the district court, filing motions for a writ of mandamus to stay the state court proceedings and to proceed in aid of execution on the judgment. Before the district court could rule on the mandamus motion, the state court stayed its proceedings, making Hankins' first motion moot. Hankins, 759 F.Supp. at 570.
Addressing Hankins' other motion, the district court cited its authority under Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a) to enforce its judgment and conduct proceedings in aid of execution. Id. at 571. Because the federal statute under which Hankins sued, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), provides no mechanism for enforcement of a judgment, the district court determined it must rely on Missouri law on that issue. The court concluded that Missouri law empowered it to conduct "proceedings in prohibition" under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 530.010 (1986). Id. It also cited federal case law permitting federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonparties that have an obligation to indemnify the judgment debtor. Id. The district court concluded that because the State of Missouri had consented to satisfy the judgment, the court retained ancillary jurisdiction to enforce that judgment. Id.
The district court next concluded that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar enforcement of the judgment against the State, as the State had waived its immunity to the extent that it had voluntarily agreed to indemnify its employee, Finnel, and had acted in his stead. Id. at 572. The district court stated: "Where the State has stepped in to satisfy the judgment against Mr. Finnel, the State cannot then assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity to circumvent the Court's authority to enforce that judgment." Id.
The district court next addressed the conflict between 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act. The court concluded that although no provision in section 1983 "expressly conflicts with the state's right to attach a prisoner's assets," id. at 573, the Missouri Reimbursement Act nonetheless thwarts the objectives of section 1983. Id. at 574. The court explained: "If the State were permitted to seize the Section 1983 damage awards prisoners receive for prison employees' conduct, the prisoners would have no motive to bring such suits and the State and its employees would have no inducement to comply with federal law." Id. The court concluded that the Supremacy Clause invalidated the Missouri statute as applied in this case because it conflicted with section 1983. Id.
The district court thus enjoined the State from attaching the funds the State had just paid Hankins. This appeal followed.
Finnel and the State of Missouri 3 argue that the district court erred in concluding that the State had waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court did not find a "general waiver," but concluded that the State had waived its immunity with regard to the judgment in this case by "agree[ing] to indemnify" Finnel and then "stepp[ing] in to satisfy the judgment." Hankins, 759 F.Supp. at 572.
The State asserts that its statute authorizing representation and indemnification of employees who are sued does not constitute an express or implied waiver of the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity. It further contends that its issuance of the check to Hankins 4 does not establish an implied waiver because no official, including the State's Attorney General, can waive the Eleventh Amendment by his actions. Only the Missouri Assembly, it asserts, can waive the State's immunity, and only by enacting general legislation.
As the State acknowledges, the Eleventh Amendment bar is not absolute. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990). In certain instances, Congress may abrogate the states' sovereign immunity, or a state may consent to suit in federal court. Id. Because the "Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the States," Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985), the Supreme Court has prescribed a stringent test for determining the existence of a waiver. A waiver must be " 'stated by the most express language,' " or, if implied, it must appear " 'by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' " Feeney, 495 U.S. at 305, 110 S.Ct. at 1873 ().
A state may also waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity through conduct. Garrity v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 738 (1st Cir.1984). Courts have inferred a waiver when the State has made a general appearance in federal court and defended a lawsuit on the merits. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. 553, 555 n. 2, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48, 2 S.Ct. 878, 882-84, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883). In Paul N. Howard Co. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Authority, 744 F.2d 880 (1st Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S.Ct. 965, 83 L.Ed.2d 970 (1985), a governmental corporation "not only appeared but filed a counterclaim and a third-party complaint." Id. at 886. The First Circuit thus had "little trouble concluding that [the corporation] voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the federal court, thereby waiving any Eleventh Amendment immunity...." Id.
An Eleventh Amendment waiver need not be a general waiver, but may be a partial or limited one. See WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996, 1002-03 & n. 8 (1st Cir.1988) (...
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