Wooten v. Roach

• Decision Date: 06 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-40315,19-40315
• Citation: 964 F.3d 395
• Parties: Suzanne H. WOOTEN, Plaintiff-Appellee v. John ROACH, Sr.; Christopher Milner ; Greg Abbott, in his individual Capacity; Harry Eugene White, Defendants-Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

964 F.3d 395

Suzanne H. WOOTEN, Plaintiff-Appellee

v.John ROACH, Sr.; Christopher Milner ; Greg Abbott, in his individual Capacity; Harry Eugene White, Defendants-Appellants

No. 19-40315

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

FILED July 6, 2020

Sean R. Cox, Esq., Law Offices of Sean R. Cox, Dallas, TX, Scott H. Palmer, James Painter Roberts, Attorney, Scott H. Palmer, P.C., Addison, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bill L. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Office of the Solicitor General, Austin, TX, Christopher D. Hilton, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Financial Litigation & Charitable Trusts Division, Austin, TX, Patrick K. Sweeten, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Texas, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellants Greg Abbott, Harry Eugene White

Robert Jacob Davis, Matthews, Shiels, Pearce, Knott, Eden & Davis, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellants John Roach, Sr., Christopher Milner

Before BARKSDALE, HIGGINSON, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

STUART KYLE DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Former Texas state judge Suzanne Wooten sued various state and local law enforcement officials, alleging they violated the Constitution by investigating and prosecuting her in retaliation for unseating an incumbent judge and making rulings they disagreed with. Despite the breadth of the allegations in this case and the various defenses asserted in response, the scope of issues we address in this appeal is relatively narrow: we consider only whether Defendants are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their alleged acts. We conclude that immunity shields some defendants, but not all. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I .

A.

Because this case was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we accept as true the following allegations in Wooten's operative complaint. See Singleton v. Cannizzaro , 956 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 2020).

In March 2008, Wooten defeated Judge Charles Sandoval in the Republican primary election for a seat on the 380th District Court in Collin County, Texas. She went on to win the general election and took the bench in January 2009. The day after the primary, Sandoval went to the Collin County District Attorney's Office ("CCDAO") to demand that the office investigate Wooten and "find a crime." CCDAO obliged and began investigating Wooten's alleged misbehavior—without the assistance of any law enforcement entity. Christopher Milner, the head of CCDAO's Special Crimes Unit, led the investigation. John Roach, Sr., as District Attorney, oversaw CCDAO during the relevant period.

CCDAO's investigation proceeded on the general theory that Wooten received bribes from two campaign contributors, David and Stacy Cary. The bribes were made through Wooten's media consultant, James Spencer. CCDAO investigated and eventually prosecuted her even though it knew her actions were not criminal. CCDAO wanted Wooten to leave the bench because it disagreed with her rulings in some criminal cases.

CCDAO was not the only office involved in the investigation. Relatively soon after the investigation began, Milner requested assistance from the office of the then-Texas Attorney General, Greg Abbott. Specifically, Milner asked for help from Assistant Attorney General Harry White because White had experience prosecuting election law violations. White became involved in the investigation in December 2008, operating under the authority of the CCDAO and Roach. He participated initially as a Special Assistant District Attorney, was "deputized" as such in September 2009, and was eventually appointed attorney pro tem for the investigation in July 2010.

As part of the investigation, several grand juries were convened. The first grand jury subpoena was issued in September 2008, months before Wooten took the bench in January 2009. Multiple subpoenas for documents issued that fall. The following year, Milner began issuing grand jury subpoenas for various people connected with Wooten's campaign. Milner "grand jury shopp[ed]"—meaning, he avoided presenting Wooten's criminal case to a grand jury so that he could continue using the grand juries to investigate her. The third grand jury, convened in the fall of 2009, wrote the presiding district judge and explained "that they felt the case against Judge Wooten was unnecessary, a waste of tax payers [sic] dollars, and that no crime had been committed."

While the investigation was proceeding, Wooten continued to work as a judge. Milner would "often" sit in the back of her courtroom for no apparent reason—behavior she viewed as an attempt to intimidate her. In October 2009, her attorney met with Milner to discuss the investigation. Milner told Wooten's attorney "that [Wooten] had one week to resign, or she was going to be facing indictment and would lose her house, law license, her family, her reputation, and that he would put her in prison for a long time." Wooten declined to resign. Milner also met with James Spencer, Wooten's media consultant, and demanded he sign a blank confession. Spencer refused.

In April 2010, while the Wooten investigation was ongoing, the FBI began investigating three CCDAO attorneys: Roach, Milner, and Assistant District Attorney Greg Davis. The investigation concerned allegations CCDAO was using grand juries for politically motivated investigations, including Wooten's. The FBI interviewed various people, including a grand juror, "D.J." D.J. told the FBI that he had concerns about CCDAO's involvement in Wooten's case, and that it seemed "like a political witch-hunt." D.J. thought Milner was "dragging out the investigation" and "it was all politically motivated."

In June 2010, the current grand jury's term was set to expire. On June 24, the grand jury voted for a ninety-day extension of its six-month term, but the presiding district judge denied the extension. Nevertheless, on June 28—after the term had expired—White requested Wooten's presence at an added grand jury session on June 30. Wooten agreed to meet with White in advance of the added session. The meeting proved unfruitful, in part because White had no questions for Wooten. Wooten interpreted the meeting as an attempt to intimidate her. Following the meeting, Wooten moved to quash the re-assembled grand jury, and the presiding judge granted the motion, concluding the government attorneys lacked authority to re-assemble the jury after its expiration date to conduct further proceedings. The judge also threatened any violators of his order with contempt.

Meanwhile, the FBI investigation into Roach, Davis, and Milner continued. It wrapped up in August 2010, after White told the FBI that CCDAO's investigation of Wooten was legitimate and a grand jury indictment was forthcoming. On October 14, 2010, Wooten was indicted for the first time.

The following July, White relayed an offer to dismiss the indictment if Wooten would resign, agree not to run for public office again, and plead guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the election code. Wooten again refused to step down. So, White went before the grand jury (the sixth such jury empaneled during the Wooten investigation) and obtained a "re-indictment" of Wooten. The indictment contained nine counts related to bribery, money laundering, tampering with records, and organized criminal activity. Wooten was convicted by a jury. Her campaign contributors David and Stacy Cary were also convicted, and her media consultant James Spencer took a plea deal.

The Carys appealed their convictions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals eventually heard both cases and, in 2016, unanimously held both convictions invalid for insufficient evidence. See David Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 761, 767–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ; Stacy Cary v. State , 507 S.W.3d 750, 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Based on those decisions, Wooten filed a state habeas petition, which a state district court granted, vacating her conviction in its entirety.

B.

Wooten then filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Collin County, Roach, Milner, White, and Abbott (collectively, "Defendants"). Wooten brought various constitutional claims, claims of supervisory liability and failure to intervene, and a claim against Collin County under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Defendants all moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting—among other defenses—various forms of immunity.

Although Defendants all urged multiple grounds for dismissal, the district court ruled narrowly. The court concluded Milner and Roach performed investigative functions and were therefore not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court concluded White (1) was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity for his involvement in the investigation from December 2008 through July 22, 2010, but (2) was immune following his appointment as attorney pro tem because, after that point, his actions were in preparation for judicial proceedings. Because Abbott's immunity as a supervisor was contingent on White's, the court concluded the same reasoning applied to Abbott. The district court also denied White and Abbott's claims of state-law official immunity,¹ noting that "conclusively establishing official immunity at this stage in the litigation [would] be difficult based on the allegations of this case." The district court did not discuss Roach and Milner's claims of official immunity, instead denying them "as moot."

Regarding Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity, the district court declined to issue a ruling. Noting Wooten had requested leave to amend her complaint, the court concluded that "allowing the Plaintiff to replead [would] assist the Court in deciding [the] qualified immunity" issue. In a footnote, the court also offered Wooten guidance on how she could strengthen her complaint. For example, the court pointed out that Wooten had not alleged facts...