Sizemore v. Myers
Decision Date | 08 September 1998 |
Parties | Bill SIZEMORE, Petitioner, v. Hardy MYERS, Attorney General, State of Oregon, Roger Gray, Greg Hartman, Steve Harper, and Kathleen Beaufait, Respondents, and Daniel W. Meek, Intervenor. SC S45582. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Gregory W. Byrne, of Byrne & Associates, P.C., Portland, filed the petition and argued the cause for petitioner.
Gregory A. Hartman, of Bennett, Hartman, and Reynolds, Portland, argued the cause for respondents Gray, Hartman, and Beaufait. With him on the answering memorandum was Aruna A. Masih, Portland.
Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, Salem, waived appearance for respondent Myers.
No appearance for respondent Harper.
Daniel W. Meek, Portland, filed the memorandum and argued the cause for intervenor pro se.
Before CARSON, C.J., and GILLETTE, VAN HOOMISSEN, DURHAM, KULONGOSKI and LEESON, JJ.
This is an original proceeding in which petitioner challenges the explanatory statement for 1998 Ballot Measure 59. If adopted, Measure 59 would amend the Oregon Constitution to prohibit public funds from being spent to collect or assist in the collection of "political funds." The measure defines "political funds" as funds contributed to a candidate or political action committee, or funds spent to support or oppose a candidate for public office or a ballot measure.
An explanatory statement committee, comprised of five citizens including petitioner, prepared an explanatory statement for Measure 59 and filed that statement with the Secretary of State. ORS 251.205; ORS 251.215(1). Petitioner dissented from that statement. The Secretary of State held a hearing to receive comments on the prepared explanatory statement, and petitioner offered suggestions at that hearing. ORS 251.215(2). Consequently, petitioner is entitled to seek a different explanatory statement in this court. ORS 251.235; see also Homuth v. Keisling (S39531), 314 Or. 214, 218, 837 P.2d 532 (1992) ( ).
Our task is to determine whether the explanatory statement contains a sufficient and clear statement explaining the measure. See June v. Roberts, 310 Or. 244, 247, 797 P.2d 357 (1990) ( ); ORS 251.235 ( ). As we shall explain, we conclude that two of petitioner's challenges to the explanatory statement are well taken, and, accordingly, we modify the explanatory statement and certify the modified statement to the Secretary of State. See ORS 251.235 (describing review process).
The explanatory statement for Measure 59 provides as follows:
(Boldface in original.)
Petitioner raises four challenges to the explanatory statement. First, he objects to the use of the word "illegal" in the third paragraph, contending that it is a "charged" term that will inflame the voters. Second, he objects to the use of boldface type in the third paragraph, contending that it inappropriately highlights the purported effects if Measure 59 is adopted, drawing attention away from the description of the measure contained in the first two paragraphs. Third, petitioner objects to the final paragraph of the explanatory statement, because he disagrees that the measure, if adopted, will affect the voters' pamphlet. Finally, he challenges the notion that an explanatory statement, such as the one prepared here, may include any description of the purported effects of the measure.
Respondents Gray, Hartman, and Beaufait (respondents) 1 and intervenor contend that the explanatory statement properly and accurately describes the effects if Measure 59 is adopted by the voters. Intervenor also offers some minor grammatical modifications to the statement, concerning the discussion of the voters' pamphlet.
We first consider whether ORS 251.215(1) permits the explanatory statement committee to include a description of the effects of a measure in the explanatory statement. Because the answer is a matter of statutory construction, we follow the template set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). We first examine the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. Context includes other related statutes and earlier versions of the statute under consideration. See Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430, 435, 918 P.2d 808 (1996) (so stating). If the meaning of the statute cannot be determined from an examination of its text and context, then we examine the legislative history of the statute. PGE, 317 Or. at 611-12, 859 P.2d 1143. Our goal at both levels of analysis is to determine legislative intent. Id. at 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143.
ORS 251.215(1) requires an explanatory statement committee to prepare "an impartial, simple and understandable statement explaining the measure," not to exceed 500 words. (Emphasis added.) As a textual matter, the parties' dispute centers upon the meaning of the word "explaining." The statute does not define that term, so we turn to its plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. See PGE, 317 Or. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143 ( ).
The dictionary definition of the word "explain" provides, in part:
"ex-plain * * * 1 a: to make manifest: present in detail: EXPOUND, DISCLOSE * * * b: to make plain or understandable: clear of complexities or obscurity: INTERPRET, CLARIFY * * * c: to give the meaning or significance of: provide an understanding of * * * d: to give the reason for or cause of * * * 3 a: to show the logical development of: EXPLICATE."
Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 801 (unabridged ed 1993) (boldface in original). Respondents emphasize that one meaning of the word "explain" is "to show the logical development of." In their view, that broader definition demonstrates that, in directing the explanatory statement committee to "explain [ ]" a measure, ORS 251.215(1) permits the committee to show the logical developments, i.e., the effects, of the measure in the explanatory statement. Stated differently, respondents contend that the words "explaining the measure," as used in ORS 251.215(1), encompass explaining the effect or effects of the measure.
That is one logical interpretation of the text of ORS 251.215(1). However, the wording of that statute also suggests that the purpose of an explanatory statement is to describe the measure itself, in a manner that is sufficient and clear. That is, an explanatory statement must "make plain or understandable," or "provide an understanding of," the measure, but not its effect. In that vein, it is significant that ORS 251.215(1) does not provide that an explanatory statement also must, or may, identify the effect of a measure. Compare ORS 250.035(2)(d) ( ).
Turning to the context of ORS 251.215(1), we observe that an earlier version of that statute required the explanatory statement committee to prepare "an impartial, simple and understandable statement explaining the measure and its effect." ORS 251.215(1) (1991) (emphasis added). See also Homuth, 314 Or. at 220, 837 P.2d 532 ( ). However, the 1993 Legislature removed the phrase "and its effect" from ORS 251.215(1). Or. Laws 1993, ch. 493, § 20; Or. Laws 1993, ch. 811, § 14.
We can draw one of two conclusions from the legislature's decision to remove the phrase "and its effect" from ORS 251.215(1). On one hand, that statutory change suggests that the legislature intended to prevent explanatory statements from explaining the effect or effects of a measure, thereby limiting an explanatory statement to explaining the measure itself. That is petitioner's position here. However, the 1993 change also could have been intended to remove the requirement that an explanatory statement explain the effect of a measure, while still permitting the statement to...
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