Doe by Doe v. Cowherd

Citation965 F.2d 109
Decision Date01 June 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-5932,91-5932
PartiesSamuel DOE, by his mother and next friend, Mary DOE, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Harry J. COWHERD, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Kelly A. Miller (argued and briefed), Glenna J. Curry, Ronald E. Marstin, Legal Aid Soc., Louisville, Ky., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Ryan M. Halloran, Gen. Counsel, E.D. Klatte, Staff Atty., Cabinet for Human Resources Office of the Counsel, Frankfort, Ky., William K. Moore, Staff Atty. (argued and briefed), Midway, Ky., for defendant-appellant.

Before: KEITH, Circuit Judge; LIVELY, Senior Circuit Judge; and COHN, District Judge. *

KEITH, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Harry J. Cowherd ("defendant") appeals the judgment of the district court, 770 F.Supp. 354, ordering the State of Kentucky to amend its release and admissions procedures for mentally retarded persons at the State's institutions. For the reasons outlined below, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part.

I.

This is a class action brought pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Samuel Doe ("plaintiff") is a mentally retarded adult who currently resides in a Kentucky Mental Retardation Residential Treatment Center ("RTC"). Plaintiff represents a class of citizens who are similarly situated to him as involuntarily committed adults in a Kentucky RTC. Defendant is Secretary of the Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources. He appeals the July 1, 1991, judgment of the district court for partial summary judgment and preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs. The district court ordered the State of Kentucky (the "State") to amend its procedures for admissions and release of both voluntary and involuntary adults at RTCs.

The issues raised by the instant case stem from issues previously addressed by this Court in Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S.Ct. 495, 102 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988). In Austin, we reviewed Kentucky's admission procedures for mentally retarded adults. Prior to our decision in Austin, Kentucky involuntarily committed mentally retarded adults to its RTCs without the benefit of a hearing. However, the State considered virtually all of its mentally retarded admissions to be voluntary. For example, the State treated those admissions that were initiated by the parent or guardian of the mentally retarded adult as voluntary. We held in Austin that mentally retarded adults are involuntarily committed when admission is made upon the application of a parent or guardian. We also held that mentally retarded adults are entitled to procedural due process prior to being committed involuntarily.

The State is again before us challenging the district court's expansion of the principles which we enunciated in Austin. There are three issues raised in this appeal. The first is whether the State must implement a written provision that adults who are voluntarily admitted into a RTC must be released upon their request. Second, we are asked to determine whether the State must satisfy the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof in order to involuntarily commit a mentally retarded adult. The final issue is whether the State is prohibited from allowing relatives of a mentally retarded adult to join as parties in an action to involuntarily commit the mentally retarded person. The district court answered each of the above questions affirmatively. We reverse the district court's judgment as to the first issue, and affirm on each of the remaining issues for the following reasons.

II.

In 1990, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted House Bill 511 which revised Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Chapter 202B. Our decision in Austin was based on the provisions of Chapter 202B, which governed admissions and discharges of mentally retarded persons.

Plaintiff's first challenge relates to § 4(3) of H.B. 511, which establishes that:

Upon recommendation or approval of the interdisciplinary team of an ICF/MR, the physician shall discharge any voluntarily admitted resident whose care and treatment in the ICF/MR is determined to be no longer necessary or advisable.

According to plaintiff, the statute is constitutionally infirm because it fails to provide for the release of a voluntarily admitted patient upon their request. The State asserts that although the statute does not explicitly provide for voluntarily admitted patients to be released upon request, the State does recognize such a right. The district court stated, however, that "[t]he right to release upon request is an extremely important right; and ... it cannot be protected by statutory silence." Accordingly, the district court held that § 4(3) of H.B. 511 is unconstitutional to the extent that it fails to provide for the release of voluntarily admitted adults upon their request.

The State contends that we lack jurisdiction to decide this issue because the instant case fails to present an actual case or controversy. It contends that this Court may strike down legislation only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed or immediately threatened with harm by the challenged action. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961). We agree.

As a threshold matter, the class represented by plaintiff consists of involuntarily admitted patients. The challenged action affects mentally retarded adults who are voluntarily committed to a RTC. Therefore, the class represented in this action cannot be affected by the challenged action. Moreover, plaintiff has not shown that any voluntarily admitted patient has requested and been denied release from a Kentucky institution. Thus, there is no evidence of any harm whatsoever. Accordingly we agree that there is no actual case or controversy arising from the instant action, and we reverse the district court's decision on this issue.

The next issue relates to H.B. 511's use of the clear and convincing standard of proof for involuntary commitments of mentally retarded adults. The State uses the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof for involuntary commitments of mentally ill adults. Plaintiff successfully argued before the district court that the lesser standard of proof for the mentally retarded violates equal protection.

At the time we decided Austin, Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann § 202B.050 provided that:

All rights guaranteed by [Ky.Rev.Stat.] Chapters 202A (other than those rights enumerated in [Ky.Rev.Stat.] 202A.026 and 202A.051) and [Ky.Rev.Stat.] Chapter 210 to mentally ill persons shall apply to mentally retarded persons.

Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. Chapter 202A provided for substantial procedural due process prior to the involuntary commitment of mentally ill patients. The rights for mentally ill patients included the right to a preliminary hearing before a person could be involuntarily committed to a state institution, the right to a final hearing and the right to a jury trial. The statute also...

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5 cases
  • Heller v. Doe Doe
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 24 d4 Junho d4 1993
    ...The only individual interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause is in an accurate decision, not a favorable one. Pp. ____. 965 F.2d 109 (CA6 1992), KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., f......
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    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 15 d4 Julho d4 1993
    ... ...         This matter cannot be fully considered without reference to constitutional questions particularly in view of the recent decision in Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109 (6th Cir.1992). In a case involving an incompetent, matters relating to the so-called ... Page 715 ... "right to die" also involve questions relating to the constitutionally protected right to live and to accept treatment ...         As a ward of the State, Sue ... ...
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  • Knable v. Bexley City School District
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    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
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2 books & journal articles
  • The role of courts in terminating nutrition and hydration for incompetent patients.
    • United States
    • Issues in Law & Medicine Vol. 10 No. 4, March 1995
    • 22 d3 Março d3 1995
    ...681 (Ky. 1964). The Court of Appeals was Kentucky's highest court when this decision was issued. (16) Id. at 682. (17) Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). Although the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this holding of the Sixth ......
  • Medical treatment rights of older persons and persons with disabilities: 1991-92 developments.
    • United States
    • Issues in Law & Medicine Vol. 8 No. 4, March 1993
    • 22 d1 Março d1 1993
    ...v. Washington, 494 U.S. 210, 226 (1990). (63) Foucha, 118 L. Ed. 2d at 449. (64) Id. (65) Riggins, 118 L. Ed. at 489. (66) Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, at 113 (6th Cir.) cert. granted, sub nom. Heller v. Doe, 61 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Oct. 19, (67) The Sixth Circuit classified the commitment ......

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