965 F.2d 1262 (3rd Cir. 1992), 91-3666, Schumacher v. Nix
|Citation:||965 F.2d 1262|
|Party Name:||Dana SCHUMACHER, Leroy Hodge, Appellants, v. Robert N.C. NIX, Jr., Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Rolf Larsen, Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, John P. Flaherty, Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, James T. McDermott, Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Stephen A. Zappala, Justice of the Supreme|
|Case Date:||June 03, 1992|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit|
Argued April 6, 1992.
Jules Lobel (argued), Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.
A. Taylor Williams (argued), Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.
Before: GREENBERG and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges, and DEBEVOISE, District Judge [*].
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
This case presents an equal protection challenge to Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rule 203(a)(2)(ii), which governs the eligibility of graduates of unaccredited law schools to sit for the Pennsylvania bar examination. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the Rule is rationally related to Pennsylvania's interest in securing mutual treatment for its attorneys seeking admission to the bars of other states. We will affirm.
Plaintiffs Dana Schumacher and Leroy Hodge are graduates of the People's College of Law in California, which is not accredited by the American Bar Association. They have taken and passed the California first-year law students' examination, professional responsibility examination, and general bar examination. Plaintiffs are members in good standing of the California bar, and have practiced law in that state for more than five years.
Plaintiffs moved to Pennsylvania in 1987. Since then they have been admitted to the bars of the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. Plaintiffs have been unable to gain admission to the Pennsylvania bar, however, because they are ineligible to sit for the Pennsylvania bar examination. 1
As a general matter, only graduates of law schools accredited by the ABA are eligible to sit for the Pennsylvania bar examination. Pa.B.A.R. 203(a)(2)(i). There is an exception, however, for graduates of unaccredited law schools who are members in good standing of the bar of a "reciprocal state" and have practiced law there for five years. Id. 203(a)(2)(ii). 2 "Reciprocal state" is defined as "[a] state having a reciprocal agreement or arrangement with [Pennsylvania] concerning admission to the bar." Id. 102(a). In practice, the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners has accorded reciprocal status to those states which permit experienced Pennsylvania attorneys who are graduates of accredited law schools to waive into their bar without taking an examination. 3
California is not considered a reciprocal state by the Board of Law Examiners, because it will not allow Pennsylvania attorneys, whether graduates of accredited law schools or not, to become members of its bar without taking an examination. Accordingly, although plaintiffs are members in good standing of the California bar and have practiced law there for five years, they are ineligible to sit for the Pennsylvania bar examination. To become eligible, plaintiffs would have to either obtain a degree from an accredited law school or become members in good standing of the bar of a reciprocal state and practice law there for five years. See id. 203(a)(2)(ii).
On August 29, 1990, plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federal district court seeking a declaration that Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing its enforcement. Defendants are the Chief Justice and Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who promulgated Rule 203(a)(2)(ii), see 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 1701 & 1722(a)(1), and the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, who is responsible for implementing the Rule, see Pa.B.A.R. 104(c).
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. 4 They assert that the Rule substantially interferes with their fundamental right to interstate travel by discouraging them from moving to Pennsylvania, and is invalid under the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis. 5 In the alternative, they contend that the Rule cannot pass the minimum rational basis test, because there is no logical connection between whether a state is considered reciprocal by the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners and whether it accords mutual treatment to Pennsylvania attorneys who are graduates of unaccredited law schools.
After both parties sought summary judgment, a magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted for defendants. Rejecting plaintiffs' argument that strict scrutiny applied, he held that Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) passed muster under rational basis review. The district court issued a memorandum and order adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation. Schumacher v. Nix, No. 90-1431, 1991 WL 346074 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 27, 1991). This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. 6 At issue is whether Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) violates plaintiffs' right to equal protection of the laws. Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants is plenary. Sacred Heart Medical Ctr. v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 543 (3d Cir.1992). We apply the same principles governing the district court's determination whether to grant summary judgment, and must be convinced that defendants have successfully demonstrated "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [they are] ... entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The threshold question is what standard of equal protection analysis governs our review of Rule 203(a)(2)(ii). As a general matter, economic and social legislation 7 is subject to rational basis review, under which a law need only be "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2517, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam). However, where such legislation establishes "a classification [that] trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage," id., it must meet the strict scrutiny standard, under which a law must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985).
As we have noted, plaintiffs argue that we must subject Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) to strict scrutiny, because it substantially burdens their right to travel by deterring them from migrating to Pennsylvania. The district court disagreed, and applied rational basis review instead. It found the right to travel cases cited by plaintiffs inapposite, because Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) does not "condition the receipt of a benefit on a form of in-state residency." And even though the Rule has the "practical effect" of making plaintiffs ineligible to practice law in Pennsylvania, the district court concluded that it does not so impinge plaintiffs' "freedom of movement" as to trigger strict scrutiny. We agree.
"[F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966). Although the Supreme Court has declined to "ascribe the source of this right ... to a particular constitutional provision," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), it has been said that the right to interstate travel finds its "most forceful expression in the context of equal protection analysis," Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 67, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2316, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 258-68 (3d Cir.1990) (concluding
that the right to intrastate travel emanates from the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
The Supreme Court's modern right to travel jurisprudence originated in Shapiro v. Thompson. There the Supreme Court struck down under strict scrutiny a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits. Following Shapiro, the Court applied strict scrutiny in striking down durational residency requirements to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); and to receive free nonemergency medical care, Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1082, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). But cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975) (upholding durational residency requirement for in-state divorce). 8
In Zobel v. Williams, however, the Court employed rational basis review in striking down a legislative scheme for distribution of surplus oil revenues to citizens based on duration of residency. Three years later, in Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 105 S.Ct. 2862, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985), the Court applied rational basis review in striking down a limited property tax exemption for Vietnam veterans with residency prior to May 8, 1976. In Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986), a plurality of the Court applied strict scrutiny to a civil service preference for...
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