Anderson v. Stauffer Chemical Co.

Decision Date08 June 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-1173,91-1173
Citation965 F.2d 397
Parties59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 21, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,534 Marlow ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

John L. Olson (argued), Gregory E. Barrett, Schlueter, Ecklund, Olson, Barrett & Mayfield, Rockford, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

Janet M. Hedrick (argued), Richard H. Schnadig, Bruce R. Alper, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before COFFEY and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge. *

COFFEY, Circuit Judge.

Stauffer Chemical Company (Stauffer) fired Marlow Anderson, its District Manager in Northern Illinois, in May of 1985. Anderson then sued Stauffer, alleging that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Stauffer and denied Anderson's motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Stauffer manufactures agricultural chemicals and sells them to local dealers through its sales representatives. Anderson began work as a Stauffer sales representative in 1968, and in 1972 was promoted to the position of District Manager, overseeing a number of sales representatives in his district. Anderson's immediate superior in the Stauffer hierarchy was Jerry Lacey, the Regional Sales Manager. During the winter of 1983-84, Lacey received unsolicited complaints about Anderson from sales representatives and dealers. In general, the sales representatives found him difficult to work for, claiming that he intervened in their work and prevented them from accomplishing sales goals. The dealers also had a variety of problems with Anderson, the most pervasive being his handling of complaints from the dealers' customers. Stauffer was having problems with some of its chemicals not performing as represented, and when the farmers would register complaints with the dealers about the products' nonperformance, the dealers looked to Stauffer's sales representatives and Anderson to resolve the complaints. Following company policy, Anderson settled most of these complaints by giving replacement products to the farmer, rather than cash, because this was cheaper for the company. The dealers disliked this method, however, preferring to have claims settled with cash, so that the farmer would have to come back and buy replacement products from them. Anderson's use of products angered both the dealers and the sales representatives, who wanted to keep the dealers happy and satisfied with Stauffer. In addition, some dealers and sales representatives also expressed a personal dislike or lack of respect for Anderson.

Lacey met with Anderson in June of 1984 to discuss these complaints. He explained to Anderson that good customer relations and working relationships with his subordinates were important for business and offered to find courses or seminars through which Anderson could improve his communication skills. Anderson failed to avail himself of the opportunity to take any courses or seminars, and attempted to explain away or rationalize the complaints, rather than confronting the problem.

Two months later, in August of 1984, Lacey received a letter from Ken Gibson, a sales representative in Anderson's district. In the letter Gibson stated that he was resigning from Stauffer and proceeded to give his reasons.

To be quite honest there is only one main reason for my leaving--Mr. Marlow Anderson. I simply refuse to be supervised by someone who I have no respect for as a person.... Mr. Anderson is extremely bad in my opinion, at dealing with dealers and growers[.]

R.Doc. 38, Ex. 3 (emphasis in original). Gibson also stated that dealers in his area had directly asked him to avoid using Anderson to handle customers' complaints, preferring to have him go directly to Lacey.

In September Lacey met with Anderson again to discuss Gibson's criticisms, which had reaffirmed the substance of the earlier complaints. Lacey told Anderson that the complaints revealed a definite problem, one going beyond a few scattered grievances, and that it needed to be addressed and improved or there would have to be "some action" regarding his employment. As before, he offered to enroll Anderson in a course or seminar to improve his interpersonal skills, but Anderson declined, again attempting to rationalize the complaints against him.

On December 12, 1984, Lacey met with Anderson to discuss his most recent annual performance evaluation, covering the period from October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984. In the "Overall Performance" section of this evaluation Lacey gave Anderson a 4 on a 7-point scale. According to instructions accompanying the evaluation form, this meant: "Overall performance meets the requirements of the job--employee doing the job well." In a separate section of the evaluation, titled "Performance Factors and Development Needs," Lacey gave Anderson positive ratings in nine areas, neutral ratings in five, and negative ratings in four. 1 The negative ratings indicated that he needed to improve in four areas: job knowledge, planning skills, leadership, and work relationships. As to leadership, Lacey wrote of Anderson: "Delegates some responsibilities, needs to work hard on coaching techniques." R.Doc. 38, Ex. 5. Regarding work relationships, Lacey wrote that he "Question[ed] the level of respect [Anderson] has among his subordinates." Id. Anderson and Lacey went through the evaluation line by line, discussing both the good areas and the need for improvement. Lacey stressed that Anderson still needed to work on his relationships with dealers and sales representatives. Around this time, Anderson also received a ten-percent raise, effective at the start of the new year.

In February of 1985, Lacey received a letter from Stauffer's national sales manager, James Wissmiller. Wissmiller informed Lacey that he had recently met with dealers from Anderson's territory who were "very dissatisfied" with Anderson and "wondered how long Stauffer would put up with him." Id., Ex. 7. Less than a month later, Lacey received letters from sales representatives in Anderson's area, detailing personality conflicts between Anderson and dealers, failures by Anderson to analyze problems or resolve complaints, broken promises made by Anderson, and a general belief that Anderson was costing Stauffer business.

Based on the continued complaints and Anderson's lack of improvement, Lacey decided to discharge him. On May 1, 1985, Lacey, Wissmiller, and Peter Tullsen, the Regional Employee Relations Manager, met with Anderson, informing him that his employment was being terminated because of performance problems. They gave Anderson the opportunity to resign, which he did, receiving a lump severance payment equivalent to a continuation of his salary through October 10, 1985.

In November of 1987, Anderson filed a complaint against Stauffer, alleging that

                he had been discharged because of his age, in violation of the ADEA.   The district court granted Stauffer summary judgment, giving alternative reasons for its decision.  "[P]laintiff either did not meet his employer's legitimate expectations regarding his job performance (no prima facie case established) or defendant has articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment action which plaintiff has failed to adequately rebut by showing pretext."   Memorandum Opinion and Order, R.Doc. 43, at 7.   Anderson moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but the court denied the motion, reiterating its holding that Anderson had not raised a genuine issue as to whether Stauffer's purported reasons for firing him were a mere pretext for discrimination.  "In sum, Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut defendant's stated reasons for Plaintiff's dismissal.   In fact, the record is virtually devoid of any evidence that would rebut Defendant's stated reasons."   Order, R.Doc. 53, at 2
                
DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is the propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment. We review summary judgment orders de novo, viewing the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1991). Summary judgment is appropriate only when the materials before the court demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In other words, the record must reveal that "no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Karazanos, 948 F.2d at 335.

To prevail on an ADEA claim, the plaintiff must ultimately prove that she was discharged because of her age. La Montagne v. American Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir.1984). The plaintiff need not prove that the employer was motivated by age alone, however; it is enough that age was a "determining factor" or a "but for" element in the employer's decision. Id. Either of two paths may be followed in proving age discrimination. First, the plaintiff may present direct evidence that age was a determining factor in the discharge. Often, however, such evidence is unavailable, and plaintiffs rely on the second method of proof, the burden-shifting method borrowed from Title VII cases and originally established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). This method places the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. If the plaintiff clears this hurdle, the burden of production (not proof--that remains with the plaintiff throughout) shifts to the defendant, which must "articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's discharge." Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 427 ...

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